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Executive summary
Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organised Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot 
Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu) – was 
carried out with the financial support of the European 
Commission, DG Home Affairs, within the Prevention of 
and Fight against Crime (ISEC) Programme. It focused 
on five EU MS: Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, 
and United Kingdom.
This research is an exploratory study on the infiltration 
of organised crime groups (OCGs) in legal businesses. 
Infiltration occurs in every case in which a natural 
person belonging to a criminal organisation or acting on 
its behalf, or an already infiltrated legal person, invests 
financial and/or human resources to participate in the 
decision-making process of a legitimate business. 
The main output of the research is a list of risk factors 
of OCG infiltration in legal businesses, i.e. factors that 
facilitate or promote infiltration. Risk factors are derived 
from an unprecedented cross-national comparative 
analysis of the vulnerabilities of territories and business 
sectors, criminal groups’ modi operandi, and the 
characteristics of infiltrated businesses. 
Infiltration risk factors provide inputs for the 
development of a risk assessment model of OCG 
infiltration. Its development will assist Law Enforcement 
Agencies (LEAs) in identifying the factors facilitating 
and/or promoting infiltration and enhancing the 
prevention and enforcement of criminal infiltration. This 
will help protect EU MS legitimate economies from the 
misuse of legal businesses for illicit purposes.
PART I. Mapping organised crime 
infiltration in legitimate businesses
This study analyses OCG infiltration in legitimate 
businesses through 2,380 references to OCG infiltration 
from a variety of open sources (i.e. academic studies, 
LEA operations and reports, newspaper articles). It 
examines the distribution of OCG infiltration and its 
correlation with socio-economic indicators to identify 
the main characteristics of the territories and business 
sectors targeted by OCGs.
Infiltrated territories
The results show that territories with references to OCG 
infiltration include (Figure 1):
• Regions with a stable, historical presence of criminal 
groups (e.g. Southern Italy);
• Border regions (e.g. Western Slovenia) and regions 
with important ports and airports (e.g. North and 
South Holland);
• Regions with large urban areas (e.g. Lazio and 
Lombardy in Italy, the Stockholm and Malmö regions 
in Sweden, the London area in the UK).
References to OCG infiltration seem to be associated 
with high levels of shadow economy and corruption, and 
high levels of infrastructural development. By contrast, 
low competition levels and low openness to foreign 
countries do not seem to be associated with references 
to OCG infiltration in legal businesses.
Figure 1. Number of references to OCG infiltration in 
open sources by region (NUTS 2). Percentage of the 
country total1
 None
<2%
3-8%
9-14%
>14%
References to OCG infiltration. 
% of country total (N=1,480)
1. Details on the geographic location of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are 
available for 1,069 references in Italy, 125 references in the Netherlands, 
69 references in Slovenia, 49 references in Sweden, and 168 references 
in the United Kingdom.
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
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Infiltrated business sectors
The results show that business sectors with references 
to OCG infiltration include (Figure 2):
• Cash-intensive sectors (e.g. bars and restaurants);
• Sectors that are territorially specific (e.g. hotels);
• Labour-intensive sectors characterised by low 
technology (e.g. construction);
• Sectors functional to illicit activities (e.g. transportation; 
wholesale and retail trade; financial and insurance 
activities);
• Sectors characterised by weak or developing regulation 
(e.g. gambling activities; renewable energy), or 
inefficient control systems (e.g. construction).
Figure 2. Number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by country and business sector2
References to OCG infiltration seem to be associated 
with low levels of openness to foreign investments; 
low levels of competition and technology; and small 
average business entity size. The relationship between 
references to OCG infiltration and a sector’s profitability 
is weak and negative.
2. Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 0-digit) are 
available for 1,286 references in Italy, 558 references in the Netherlands, 
74 references in Slovenia, 114 references in Sweden, and 248 references 
in the United Kingdom.
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
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PART II. Assessing the risk of 
infiltration in legitimate businesses
This study analyses 70 case studies of OCG infiltration 
and 299 infiltrated businesses. It identifies the main 
drivers of OCG infiltration of legal businesses, the step-
by-step process of infiltration, and the characteristics of 
infiltrated businesses.
Drivers of OCG infiltration
OCGs infiltrate legitimate businesses to maximise 
economic and non-economic benefits. In particular, 
they aim to:
• Launder the profits from criminal activities;
• Obtain considerable earnings and benefit from their 
profitability;
• Perpetrate frauds (e.g. insurance fraud, VAT and tax 
fraud, benefit fraud);
• Conceal illicit activities such as drug trafficking and 
prostitution;
• Achieve other goals such as maximising social 
consensus and achieving control over a particular 
sector or territory.
OCGs active in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom mainly infiltrate businesses in order 
to perpetrate frauds. Most Slovenian OCGs infiltrate 
legal businesses to conceal illegal activities, mainly 
prostitution. In Italy, some OCGs have invested in legal 
business entities to maximise their social consensus 
and to control a particular market of the local economy.
The step-by-step process of infiltration
Infiltrated legal businesses divide between two types: 
already-existing businesses and new ones. Dutch 
organised criminals are more prone to infiltrate the 
former; Slovenian organised criminals favour the start 
of new businesses. In Italy, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, there is a balance between the two types of 
infiltrated businesses.
The infiltration process is often straightforward. It 
involves one member of the criminal group regularly 
starting a new business or acquiring an already-existing 
one from a legal entrepreneur. This process can be 
facilitated by the scant requirements needed to set up 
a company or the lack of regulation on the process of 
acquiring a business.
In other cases, the infiltration process requires further 
steps, e.g. establishment of a partnership with the 
former shareholder and/or director of the targeted 
business (Figure 3). The infiltration process occasionally 
involves OCG members’ relatives, professionals, public 
officials, and politicians who help organised criminals to 
acquire and manage the legal business.
Figure 3. Crime script of OCG infiltration of legal businesses
Legal 
entrepreneur 
starts business
Identify 
business
Start  
business
Use of premises 
for criminal 
activity
Deposit money in 
offshore bank 
accounts
Use of business 
for criminal 
activity
Use of business 
for legitimate 
activity
Register 
business
Legal entr. 
approaches 
OCG member
OCG acquires 
business
OCG 
approaches 
legal entr.
OCG gets 
involved in 
business
Register straw  
man as 
shareholder 
Company 
registration agent 
starts business
Source: Transcrime elaboration
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Control strategies of infiltrated businesses
Control strategies refer to the ownership structure of 
infiltrated businesses, i.e. how infiltrated businesses 
are owned and controlled.
Most infiltrated businesses are private limited 
liability companies (Figure 4). They allow for greater 
fragmentation of the share capital, thus making it 
more difficult for law enforcement agencies to identify 
the beneficial owners of the infiltrated businesses 
and reducing the potential impact of seizure and 
confiscation.
Figure 4. Legal forms of infiltrated businesses by 
country3
Shareholders are divided among the following types:
• OCG members (in more than half of infiltrated 
businesses);
• Figureheads, i.e. relatives and legal entrepreneurs 
(especially in Italy), legal (shell) companies 
(particularly in the Netherlands), and professionals 
(in a limited number of cases in Italy and Sweden).
Other control strategies include cross-shareholding and 
large networks of companies; groups of interconnected 
companies; frequent transformations of registered 
address, name and shareholders; and the creation of 
multi-jurisdictional structures.
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Management strategies of infiltrated businesses
Management strategies refer to the financial 
management of infiltrated businesses, i.e. how 
infiltrated businesses are financed and if they are able 
to produce profits. 
The analysis of infiltrated businesses’ financing sources, 
use of assets and profitability shows:
• Low levels of financial net debt compared to legal, 
non-infiltrated companies. This indicates that legal 
businesses infiltrated by OCGs do not need to resort 
to banks and other financial institutions for loans to 
finance their activities; 
• High levels of debts to suppliers and other debts. This 
may indicate the use of fictitious suppliers to conceal 
the injection of illicit proceeds as trade payables;
• High levels of non-financial current credits (i.e. 
inventory). High levels of current assets and cash 
could facilitate organised criminals in liquidating 
the business in the case of a law enforcement 
investigation and avoiding the risk of asset 
confiscation;
• Low profits compared to non-infiltrated businesses, 
regardless of the driver of infiltration. Infiltrated 
businesses often face economic difficulties, either 
because of their management by the members of 
the criminal group or because organised criminals 
target businesses with financial difficulties.
Key inputs for a common risk assessment model
The infiltration process is often difficult to detect. Risk 
assessment models help monitor the vulnerabilities 
of the legal economy that may be exploited by 
criminal organisations, thus anticipating the negative 
consequences and developing appropriate actions to 
recognise and prevent them.
Infiltration risk factors are those features of the 
territory, business sector and legal business that favour 
infiltration or highlight an already infiltrated business. 
Four dimensions are identified, each corresponding 
to specific risk factors: territory, business sector, 
ownership structure, and economic and financial 
management (Table 1).
3. The category ‘other legal forms’ includes: branches, non-profit 
organisations, and foreign companies.
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
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Table 1. Dimensions and risk factors of OCG 
infiltration
Dimension Risk factor
Territory
Past evidence of OCG infiltration
Presence of OCGs
Large urban areas
High level of infrastructural 
equipment
High level of shadow economy
High level of corruption
Business sector
Past evidence of OCG infiltration
Low level of competition
Low level of openness to foreign 
investments
Low level of technology
Small average company size
Low barriers to entry
Weak or developing regulation
Ownership 
structure of legal 
business
Limited company
Characteristics of shareholders 
(young/old, female shareholders)
Corporate shareholders
Complex corporate ownership 
schemes and cross-shareholding
Frequent change of company 
details
Small company size
Financial 
management of 
legal business
Low level of financial debt
High level of current assets
Low revenues and profitability
The risk of infiltration can be identified as a function 
of the features of the territory, business sector, and 
ownership structure and financial management of legal 
businesses. The list of risk factors identified in Project 
ARIEL – that could be further integrated and updated 
– is the first step towards the development of a risk 
assessment model to detect the infiltration of OCGs in 
European legitimate economies.
Source: Transcrime elaboration 
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1. Introduction
1.1 Project ARIEL
This report presents the final results of project ARIEL – 
Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of Organised Crime 
in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 
EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu). Project ARIEL was 
carried out with the financial support of the European 
Commission, DG Home Affairs, within the Prevention of 
and Fight against Crime (ISEC) Programme.
Project ARIEL was carried out by a consortium of five 
partners from European universities and research 
centres:
• Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore-Transcrime, Italy 
(project coordinator)
• Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law 
Enforcement, the Netherlands
• University of Maribor-Faculty of Criminal Justice and 
Security, Slovenia
• Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 
Sweden 
• University of Durham, United Kingdom
Europol was involved in the project as end user, together 
with national law enforcement agencies for each of 
the five EU member states: Ministero dell’Interno 
(Italy), Fiscal Information and Investigation Service 
(the Netherlands), Ministrstvo za Notranje Zadeve 
(Slovenia), Polisen-National Bureau of Investigation 
(Sweden),4 and Cumbria Police (United Kingdom).
Project ARIEL has aimed to identify the vulnerabilities 
of legitimate businesses to infiltration by organised 
crime groups. In particular, the project has pursued two 
objectives:
• To identify the methods used by different OCGs to 
infiltrate, control, and manage legitimate businesses 
in five selected EU member states (Italy, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom). 
These five EU MS were chosen in order to maximise 
the coverage of the EU territory.
• To identify the risk factors of OCG infiltration for the 
development of a common risk assessment model 
to detect the infiltration of legitimate businesses by 
criminal groups. The risk assessment model could 
be further updated and tested in other EU MS and 
international countries.
1.2 An understudied phenomenon
The complex relationship between organised crime groups 
and the legal economy has been debated by several 
authors (Arlacchi, 1983, 2007; Catanzaro, 1986, 1988; 
Cressey, 1969; Ianni & Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Smith, 1975; 
van Duyne, von Lampe, van Dijck, & Newell, 2005). Some 
authors argue that criminal organisations need to engage 
in legal activities because investment opportunities 
in the illegal markets are insufficient to reinvest the 
money accumulated with illicit activities (Barresi, 1999; 
Ruggiero, 1996). The proceeds of illegal activities are 
thus laundered through investments in the legal economy 
(Catanzaro, 1988; Centorrino & Signorino, 1997).
Other authors suggest that infiltration of the legal 
economy is a constant feature of criminal organisations, 
which diversify their investments between legal and 
illegal markets (Fantò, 1999; Santino, 2006). Once 
the money has been invested in the legal economy, 
organised crime groups act like other entrepreneurs 
by responding to the normal market rules (Edelhertz & 
Overcast, 1994).
The boundaries between the legal and illegal economies 
are blurred. Economic activities are distributed along a 
continuum with criminal activities at one extreme and 
completely legal ones at the other (Ruggiero, 2008; 
Smith, 1975, 1980). Between these two extremes 
lie several other possible ways in which organised 
criminals engage in activities that are formally legal yet 
organised and managed illegally. The legal sectors in 
which criminal entrepreneurs operate, together with 
illegal activities, define the criminal economy as a 
whole (Becchi & Rey, 1994).
The organised crime and money laundering literature 
provides insights into the relationship between criminal 
organisations and the legal economy (e.g. Savona & 
Riccardi, 2015; van Duyne et al., 2005). However, 
there is little understanding of infiltration by organised 
crime groups in legal businesses, i.e. the drivers of 
infiltration, the locations and business sectors of the 
businesses targeted, the process of infiltration, and 
the strategies used to control and manage infiltrated 
businesses. Furthermore, scholars have mainly focused 
on specific sectors or countries, whereas cross-country 
comparative analyses are still lacking.
This study provides an unprecedented cross-national 
comparative analysis of organised crime infiltration 
of legitimate businesses in five EU MS. It focuses on 
the vulnerabilities of territories and business sectors, 
on criminal groups’ modi operandi, and on the 
characteristics of infiltrated businesses. It identifies the 
factors that facilitate or promote OCG infiltration of legal 
businesses and provides inputs for the development of 
a risk assessment model to detect infiltration.
4. The National Bureau of Investigation has recently changed its name into 
Nationell Operativ Avdelning (NOA).
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1.3 Definition of organised crime 
infiltration
The study of infiltration by organised crime groups 
of legal businesses faces several methodological 
challenges. The criminal infiltration of legal businesses 
is not criminalised in European countries. Therefore, 
neither legal definitions of the phenomenon nor police 
or judicial data are available at European and country 
level.
For the purpose of Project ARIEL, ‘infiltration of an 
organised crime group into a legitimate business’ 
means:
any case in which a natural person belonging 
to a criminal organisation or acting on its 
behalf, or an already infiltrated legal person, 
invests financial and/or human resources to 
participate in the decision-making process of 
a legitimate business.
Building on Europol’s definition of serious and organised 
crime (Europol, 2013a), ‘organised crime group’ refers 
to any criminal actor – from large organisations to loose 
networks of collaborating criminals – that falls under the 
definition provided by the EU Framework Decision on the 
Fight against Organised Crime (2008/841/JHA)5 and/or 
is involved in serious crimes as identified by art. 83(1) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.6
Such broad definitions of organised crime have 
been criticised for their vagueness (Calderoni, 2008; 
Finckenauer, 2005; Hagan, 2006; Maltz, 1996). However, 
they make it possible to include a broad range of criminal 
organisations in the analysis, and to take account of the 
differences among European countries. Similarly, the 
broad definition of OCG infiltration of legal businesses 
makes it possible to include in the analysis a variety of 
legal businesses controlled and managed by organised 
criminals in the five countries covered by the project.
Operationalisation of organised crime infiltration
The definition of organised crime infiltration was 
operationalised to collect information and case 
studies. The following four elements need to be present 
to identify a reference or a case study of criminal 
infiltration:
• A criminal organisation;
• A natural person belonging to a criminal organisation 
or acting on its behalf, or an already infiltrated legal 
person;
• The investment of financial and/or human resources;
• The participation in the decision-making process of a 
legitimate business.
A criminal organisation. An ‘organised crime group’ 
refers to any criminal actor – from large organisations 
to loose networks of collaborating criminals – that falls 
under the definition provided by the EU Framework 
Decision on the Fight against Organised Crime 
(2008/841/JHA) and/or is involved in serious crimes as 
identified by art. 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union.
A natural person belonging to a criminal organisation 
or acting on its behalf, or an already infiltrated legal 
person. The infiltration is carried out by a member of 
the criminal group or a person who is used as a cover 
by OCG members and acts as a straw man (e.g. relative, 
lawyer, notary). A legal person (e.g. cooperative, 
corporation, company) ultimately controlled by a 
criminal organisation through a member of the group or 
a straw man may also conduct the infiltration process.
The investment of financial and/or human resources. 
The investment of money is not an essential requirement 
for the criminal infiltration of a legitimate business. 
Human resources may also be adopted to acquire 
control over the management (e.g. an OCG member 
becomes director of a legal company).
The participation in the decision-making process of 
a legitimate business. The OCG, through a member, a 
straw man, or an infiltrated legal business, influences 
the decision-making processes of a legitimate operating 
business, i.e. it is able to influence decisions about 
business strategies and future investments, as well as 
hiring, promotions and salary increases, subcontracting 
and supply contracts, security and controls.
5. Art. 1 of the 2008 EU Framework Decision on the Fight against Organised 
Crime defines a criminal organisation as: ‘a structured association, 
established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in 
concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by 
deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four 
years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit’ (Council of the European Union, 2008).
6. Art. 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
identify serious crimes as: ‘terrorism, trafficking in human beings and 
sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit 
arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of 
payment, computer crime and organised crime’ (European Union, 2012).
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1.4 Structure of the report
This report is organised into two parts. Part I maps OCG 
infiltration in the five countries covered by the project. 
In particular, Chapter 2 describes the territories and 
business sectors with references to criminal infiltration 
in legal businesses and their main features. For each 
country, in Chapters 3 to 7 a targeted profile identifies 
the regions and business sectors affected by the 
phenomenon and the criminal actors involved. Part 
II focuses on the drivers of infiltration (Chapter 8), 
the step-by-step infiltration process (Chapter 9), and 
the control and management strategies of infiltrated 
businesses (Chapters 10 and 11, respectively). Finally, 
Chapter 12 summarises the vulnerabilities of legitimate 
businesses to OCG infiltration as they emerged from 
the analyses presented in previous chapters. It then 
identifies risk factors to be included in a common risk 
assessment model to detect criminal infiltration of legal 
businesses in EU member states.
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PART I. Mapping 
organised crime 
infiltration in legitimate 
businesses
Previous studies on OCG investments in the legal 
economy have used data on confiscated assets 
as proxies for criminal investments (Kruisbergen, 
Kleemans, & Kouwenberg, 2015; Riccardi, 2014; 
Schneider, 2004; Transcrime, 2013b; van Duyne & 
Soudijn, 2009). Yet, the use of such data may lead to 
underestimation of certain types of assets because 
of the focus of law enforcement investigations on 
specific assets or the regulations on asset recovery 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015). Furthermore, data on 
confiscated assets may provide an outdated analysis 
of criminal investments because of the time that 
elapses between the investment and the final 
confiscation (Transcrime, 2013b).
A recent study on organised crime investments in 
Europe has highlighted further issues in the case of 
cross-country analyses of criminal investments in 
the legal economy (Savona & Riccardi, 2015). First, 
regulations and practices on asset recovery vary across 
European countries. Second, only a few countries 
produce statistics on confiscated assets. Finally, 
data on confiscated assets tend to over represent 
movable assets (e.g. cash and bank accounts) and 
underestimate real estate properties and legal 
businesses (Savona & Riccardi, 2015).
The study of criminal infiltration of legal businesses 
cannot rely on data on confiscated assets. The first part 
of this report builds on previous studies on organised 
crime investments in Europe (Savona & Riccardi, 
2015) and analyses references of OCG infiltration in 
legitimate businesses from a variety of open sources, 
i.e. academic studies, judicial files, LEA reports and 
police operation files, institutional reports, newspaper 
articles (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Percentage of references to OCG 
infiltration in open sources by type of source
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Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
A systematic review of the literature collected 
information on OCG infiltration of legal businesses in 
Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden and United 
Kingdom between 2005 and 2013. When the date 
of infiltration was unclear, the date of the source was 
taken as a proxy (Savona & Riccardi, 2015).
Database on OCG infiltration
The Database on Criminal Infiltration (DCI) contains 
references to OCG infiltration in legal businesses in 
the five countries covered by the project. It stores the 
information collected during the review of the literature 
on OCG infiltration in legal businesses. It records details 
on the geographic location of the infiltration (NUTS 3 
detail), the business sector of the infiltrated business 
(NACE 2-digit detail), and the criminal organisation 
involved.
Building on previous studies (Savona & Riccardi, 2015), 
each source may generate more than one reference, 
e.g. when a document reports a case of infiltration 
in various business sectors by the same criminal 
organisation (Box 1). In several cases, the documents 
lack information on the number of legal businesses 
infiltrated by OCGs. Therefore, the references do not 
necessarily correspond to a single business entity.
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Box 1. Example of the coding process
‘During Operation Athena law enforcement 
agencies dismantled a Camorra clan involved 
in drug trafficking and seized a transportation 
company and a business involved in the 
wholesale of meat products, both registered in 
Naples’ (DIA, 2012, p. 82).
The DIA report produces two references to 
OCG infiltration: i) a legal business in the 
transportation sector in Naples, infiltrated by 
the Camorra; ii) a legal business involved in 
wholesale trade in Naples, also infiltrated by 
the Camorra.
The DCI contains 2,380 references to OCG infiltration 
in legal businesses in Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Sweden and United Kingdom. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of references to OCG infiltration across the 
five EU MS. More than half of the references concern 
evidence of criminal infiltration in Italy. Sweden and 
Slovenia are the two countries with the lowest number 
of references (140 and 74, respectively).
Figure 2. Percentage of references to OCG infiltration 
in open sources by country
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
The number of references also varies across organised 
crime groups (Figure 3). Italian mafias are involved in 
about half of the mentions of OCG infiltration. Local 
OCGs refer to British, Dutch, Slovenian and Swedish 
criminals in their own country. They also include Italian 
criminal groups other than mafia organisations. Other 
OCGs refer to foreign criminal groups active in the five 
EU MS.
Figure 3. Percentage of references to OCG 
infiltration in open sources by type of OCG
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
Given the wide definition of OCG infiltration, the variety 
of sources, and the diverse nature of the information 
collected, the results of the analysis of the DCI should 
be interpreted carefully. First, references to OCG infiltra-
tion of legal businesses do not correspond to single in-
filtrated businesses. Therefore, they cannot be counted 
and analysed from a strict statistical standpoint. 
Four categories were created to analyse the referenc-
es of OCG infiltration in legal businesses across regions 
and business sectors, i.e. ‘< Mean-0.5 SD’ (x ≤ mean - 
0.5 ∙ standard deviation), ‘Mean-0.5 SD~Mean’ (mean - 
0.5 ∙ standard deviation < x ≤ mean), ‘Mean~Mean+0.5 
SD’ (mean < x ≤ mean + 0.5 ∙ standard deviation), and 
‘> Mean+0.5 SD’ (x > mean + 0.5 ∙ standard deviation). 
The four categories are intended to provide a general 
understanding of the distribution of references across 
territories and business sectors, rather than identify 
those at low and high risk of criminal infiltration.
Second, the information recorded in the DCI may partly 
reflect differenc s in priorities and levels of awareness 
and interest by local and national institutions, LEAs, 
scholars, and the media. Therefore, in some cases a 
relatively high number of references may be indicative 
of greater attention to organised and economic crime by 
national agencies and the media.
The lack of centralised data on OCG investments in 
legal economies presents methodological limitations. 
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Nonetheless, the broad variety of open sources has 
provided a useful, albeit preliminary, understanding 
of OCG infiltration in legitimate businesses in the five 
EU MS. The references are used as proxies for OCG 
infiltration and provide a very preliminary mapping of 
the activities of different organised crime groups across 
different sectors and different territories. In particular, 
they provide insights into various aspects of criminal 
infiltration of legal businesses, both at aggregate 
(Chapter 2) and country level (Chapters 3 to 7):
• The territories with evidence of infiltration;
• The infiltrated business sectors;
• The actors involved in the infiltration.
2. Organised crime 
infiltration in 5 EU 
countries7
2.1. Infiltrated territories
The DCI collects 2,380 references to OCG infiltration 
of legal businesses in the five countries covered by 
the project. Since such references cannot be counted 
and analysed from a strict statistical standpoint, four 
categories were created to identify regional and sectoral 
differences in OCG infiltration in Italy, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Figure 2 above shows the distribution of references 
across the five EU MS. Some differences emerge in 
terms of references to OCG infiltration recorded by the 
literature. Italy gathers most of the references collected 
(55% of the whole DCI). Sweden and Slovenia are the 
two countries where lower numbers of references were 
found (6% and 3% of the whole DCI, respectively). These 
results may reflect differences in the incidence of the 
phenomenon in the five countries. At the same time, 
they may be biased by variations in the amount of data 
and information available and in the attention devoted 
to the phenomenon by scholars, LEAs, and the media.
Figure 4 shows the references to OCG infiltration in legal 
businesses across regions. Each region is compared 
with its country’s total. Some territories emerge as 
characterised by several references to criminal infiltration:
• Southern Italian regions with a traditional mafia 
presence (i.e. Sicily, Calabria, and Campania), Lazio 
and Lombardy, two of the most populated and richest 
regions and those where police operations against 
OCGs have concentrated in recent years;
• North and South Holland, where the two largest cities 
of the country (i.e. Amsterdam and Rotterdam), as 
well as the main transport facilities (i.e. harbours and 
airports), are located;
• Western Slovenia, due to the high number of 
references to the Slovenian capital, Ljubljana;
• The Stockholm and Malmö regions in Sweden, which 
represent the first and third largest metropolitan 
areas respectively and the regions where the vast 
majority of economic activities are conducted;
• South-Western Scotland (particularly Glasgow) and 
the London area in the UK, i.e. thriving business areas.
Figure 4. Number of references to OCG infiltration in 
open sources by region (NUTS 2). Percentage of the 
country total8
 None
<2%
3-8%
9-14%
>14%
References to OCG infiltration. 
% of country total (N=1,480)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
7. With the collaboration of Lorella Garofalo and Giulia Berlusconi 
(Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore-Transcrime, Italy) 
8. The number of references to OCG infiltration with information on the 
regions (NUTS 2) does not correspond with the total number of references. 
Details on the geographic location of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are available 
for 1,069 references in Italy, 125 references in the Netherlands, 69 
references in Slovenia, 49 references in Sweden, and 168 references in 
the United Kingdom.
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Table 1. Top 3 regions (NUTS 2 and NUTS 3) for references to OCG infiltration in open sources by 
country
Country NUTS 2 NUTS 3
Italy Lombardia; Sicilia; Calabria Milano; Roma; Reggio di Calabria
The Netherlands Noord-Holland; Zuid-Holland; Limburg Groot-Amsterdam; Groot-Rijnmond; Utrecht
Slovenia Zahodna Slovenija; Vzhodna Slovenija
Osrednjeslovenska; Gorenjska; Goriška; Obal-
no-kraška; Savinjska
Sweden Stockholm; Sydsverige; Västsverige
Stockholms län; Skåne län; Västra Götalands 
län
United Kingdom
South Western Scotland; Inner London; 
North Eastern Scotland
Glasgow City; Aberdeen City and Aberdeen-
shire; Durham CC; Inner London - West
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
Characteristics of infiltrated territories
Previous studies on OCGs investments in the legitimate 
economy have shown that businesses located in 
territories with specific characteristics present more 
references to infiltration (Transcrime, 2013b; Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015). Table 2 summarises the main 
hypotheses on the characteristics of infiltrated territories.
Table 2. Hypotheses on the characteristics of infiltrated territories
OC drivers and/or 
needs
Assumptions
Characteristics of 
territories
Relationship with 
infiltration
Social consensus; 
Territory control; 
Cultural/personal 
reasons
OCGs invest in businesses operating 
in the same territory where they are 
present and active
OC presence Positive
Profit maximis-
ation; Territory 
control
OCGs invest in areas with ‘protected’ 
economies characterised by low 
competition levels and low openness 
to foreign investments
Openness to foreign 
countries
Negative
Profit 
maximisation; 
Social consensus
OCGs invest in areas characterised 
by traditional economic activities, low 
technological levels, and low R&D 
rates
Technology Negative
Territory control; 
Social consensus
OCGs infiltrate businesses located 
in areas characterised by low 
levels of wealth and low levels of 
infrastructure development
Income Negative
Infrastructural 
equipment
Negative
Profit 
maximisation; 
Concealment of 
criminal activities
OCGs infiltrate businesses that 
operate in contexts characterised 
by high levels of tax evasion, black 
economy, and economic-financial 
crimes
Shadow economy Positive
Corruption Positive
Source: Transcrime elaboration
The results confirm those of previous studies (Savona & 
Riccardi, 2015) highlighting the main characteristics of 
the regions with more references to OCG investments in 
the legal economy:
• Territories with a stable, historical presence of 
criminal groups (e.g. Southern Italy);
• Border regions (e.g. Western Slovenia) and regions 
with important ports and airports (e.g., North and 
South Holland);
• Regions with large urban areas (e.g. Milan, London, 
Amsterdam, Stockholm, Ljubljana).
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The literature suggests that areas with a historical, well-
rooted presence of organised crime groups are likely 
to present evidence of the involvement of such groups 
in both illegal and legal markets (Caneppele, Riccardi, 
& Standridge, 2013; Riccardi, 2014; The Dutch 
Parliament, 1996; Vander Beken, 2004; Varese, 2011).
OCGs may favour areas characterised by low competition 
– and thus low openness to international investments 
and high territorial specificity – in order to benefit from 
a monopolistic position (Daniele & Marani, 2008). 
Other characteristics of territories that may favour OCG 
infiltration in legal businesses include: high incidence of 
traditional economic activities, low technological levels 
and low research and development rates (Transcrime, 
2013b); high levels of tax evasion and shadow economy; 
widespread corruption and money laundering activities 
(Albanese, 2008; Caneppele et al., 2013; Marine, 
2010; Riccardi, 2014; Transcrime, 2013b).
OCGs may also exploit the fragility of the industrial, 
commercial, financial, and banking systems, act as last 
resort creditors to businesses with financial difficulties 
and eventually take them over (Bertoni & Rossi, 
1997; Masciandro & Ruozi, 1999; Riccardi, 2014). 
Areas characterised by low income and infrastructural 
development (i.e. economic affluence) may also be 
vulnerable to infiltration, whereas wealthy areas may be 
more difficult to infiltrate (Transcrime, 2013b). Finally, 
areas with low levels of regulation may facilitate the 
infiltration by OCGs and the concealment of criminal 
activities (Albanese, 2008; Blum, Levi, Naylor, & 
Williams, 1999; FATF, 2004; Suendorf, 2001; Savona & 
Riccardi, 2015; Vander Beken, 2005).
For each region (NUTS 2) of the five EU MS, the references 
to OCG infiltration of legal businesses recorded in the DCI 
were compared with the characteristics of the infiltrated 
territories. The analysis was performed by comparing a 
region’s value with both the national average and the 
European average. Table 3 summarises the results. 
Dark brown cells indicate that OCG infiltration and a 
given characteristic are significantly correlated. Medium 
brown cells indicate the existence of a weak correlation. 
Light brown cells indicate the existence of an unclear 
correlation, i.e. the correlation is not significant and the 
direction of the relationship varies according to the type 
of basis for comparison (national or European average).
Table 3. Relationship between the references to OCG infiltration in open sources and the characteristics of 
infiltrated territories
Technology Income Infrastructural equipment Shadow economy Corruption
OCG infiltration +/- +/- + + +
Legend:
        Correlation            Weak correlation                 Unclear correlation
9. The references recorded in the DCI were used as proxies for OCG 
infiltration. The Methodological Annex describes the proxies used to 
measure the characteristics of the regions of the five EU MS. Correlation 
tests were carried out to assess the relationship between OCG infiltration 
The number of references to OCG infiltration seems 
greater in those regions characterised by high levels 
of shadow economy and corruption. High levels 
of infrastructural development (i.e. the presence 
of motorways) also seem to be associated with 
references to OCG infiltration in legal businesses. By 
contrast, no clear relationship was found between 
references of criminal infiltration in legal businesses 
and technological levels and income. Low competition 
levels and low openness to foreign countries do not 
seem to be associated with regions that have a greater 
number of references to OCG infiltration. Among the top 
10 regions in terms of number of references to criminal 
infiltration in the five EU MS, five were among the top 15 
exporting regions in 2010 (PBL, 2013).
Figure 5 shows the relationship between references 
to OCG infiltration in legal businesses and the shadow 
economy in the regions of the five countries covered 
by the project. The regions with the highest number 
of references to OCG infiltration are those areas 
where the shadow economy is more widespread. 
Comparison with the European average shows that the 
areas characterised by the highest levels of shadow 
economy are Italian regions. Other relevant regions 
are Sydsverige (Sweden), and Western and Eastern 
Slovenia. Among the five EU MS, the country with the 
lowest level of shadow economy is the Netherlands. 
South Netherlands, Limburg and Flevoland are the 
regions with the lowest values.
and a given characteristic of the infiltrated territories. The analysis was 
performed by comparing a region’s value with both the national average 
and the European (EU 28) average.
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10. A region’s value is compared with the European average (EU 28). In the 
case of references to OCG infiltration, information is available for the five EU 
MS only. Therefore, a region’s value is compared with the average of the five 
countries. Details on the geographic location of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are 
available for 1,069 references in Italy, 125 references in the Netherlands, 
69 references in Slovenia, 49 references in Sweden, and 168 references 
in the United Kingdom.
Figure 5. Number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources and shadow economy by region (NUTS 2). 
Comparison with the European average10 11 
None
1-4
5-25
26-46
>46
References to OCG 
infiltration (N=1,480)
<14%
15-17%
18-19%
>19%
Shadow economy. 
% over GDP
11. Shadow economy is given as percentage of the GDP. The multiple 
indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) modeling approach is used to assess 
the level of the shadow economy in each NUTS 2 region. Two indicators of 
the shadow economy are employed: official GDP per capita and the rate of 
labor force participation. Several cause variables are distinguished: direct 
taxes, indirect taxes, social security contributions, public employment, 
unemployment, self-employment. For further details see Herwartz, Tafenau, 
& Schneider (2013).
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI and Herwartz et al. (2013)
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Figure 6. Number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources and corruption by region (NUTS 2). Comparison 
with the European average12 13 
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI and EQI Index (2013) data
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26-46
>46
References to OCG 
infiltration 
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Mean~Mean+0.5 SD
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Corruption
Table 4. Top 3 and bottom 3 regions (NUTS 2) for shadow economy by country. Comparison with the national average
Country Top 3 regions Bottom 3 regions
Italy Sicilia; Campania; Calabria
Friuli-Venezia Giulia; Provincia Autonoma di 
Trento; Lombardia
The Netherlands Friesland; Groningen; Zeeland Limburg; Zuid-Holland; Flevoland
Slovenia Vzhodna Slovenija; Zahodna Slovenija
Sweden Sydsverige; Stockholm; Mellersta Norrland
Norra Mellansverige; Småland med öarna; 
Västsverige
United Kingdom
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly; Inner London; 
Northern Ireland
West Yorkshire; Berkshire, Buckinghamshire 
and Oxfordshire; Chesire
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Herwartz et al. (2013)
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Figure 6 shows the relationship between references to 
OCG infiltration in legal businesses and corruption in the 
regions of the five countries covered by the project. The 
regions with the highest number of references to OCG 
infiltration seem to be those areas where corruption 
is most widespread. Comparison with the European 
average reveals that the regions characterised by 
the highest levels of corruption are Italian regions, 
followed by Western and Eastern Slovenia, and British 
regions. The Netherlands and Sweden – in particular, 
Stockholm, Östra Mellansverige and Overijssel regions 
– are the territories with the lowest levels of corruption.
Table 5. Top 3 and bottom 3 regions (NUTS 2) for corruption by country. Comparison with the national average
Country Top 3 regions Bottom 3 regions
Italy Campania; Calabria; Molise Valle d’Aosta; Provincia Autonoma di 
Bolzano; Provincia Autonoma di Trento
The Netherlands Noord-Holland; Drenthe; Noord-Brabant Utrecht; Friesland; Overijssel
Slovenia Vzhodna Slovenija; Zahodna Slovenija
Sweden Västsverige; Stockholm;  Östra 
Mellansverige
Mellersta Norrland; Övre Norrland; Norra 
Mellansverige
United Kingdom West Wales and The Valleys; East Wales; 
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly
Kent; Hampshire and Isle of Wight; 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire
Source: Transcrime elaboration on EQI Index (2013) data
The analyses do not clarify the relationship between 
references to OCG infiltration and the regional levels 
of technology and income. When regional values are 
compared with the European average (EU 28), the 
references to OCG infiltration seem to concentrate in 
areas characterised by levels of technology and income 
below the average of European regions. However, 
within each country, the number of references to OCG 
infiltration seems to be higher in the regions with high 
levels of technology and income, compared with the 
national average (Table 6).
Table 6. Relationship between the references to OCG infiltration in open sources and the characteristics of infiltrated 
territories. Comparison with the EU and national average
Technology Income
EU average - -
National average + +
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI and Eurostat data
12. A region’s value is compared with the European average (EU 28). In the 
case of references to OCG infiltration, information is available for the five EU 
MS only. Therefore, a region’s value is compared with the average of the five 
countries. Details on the geographic location of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are 
available for 1,069 references in Italy, 125 references in the Netherlands, 
69 references in Slovenia, 49 references in Sweden, and 168 references 
in the United Kingdom.
13. Corruption values range from -5 (high corruption) to + 5 (low corruption). 
It is one of the three dimensions included in the Quality of Government 
Index. For assessing corruption in a given region, authors carried out a 
survey over 85,000 respondents asking to which extent they perceive and 
experience corruption in such services as education, healthcare services, 
law enforcement and other public sector functions. For further details see 
Charron (2013).
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Figure 7. Number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources and income by region (NUTS 2). Comparison with 
European and national average14
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI and Eurostat data
2.2 Infiltrated business sectors
Figure 8 shows the distribution of references across 
business sectors in the five EU MS. Italy and the 
Netherlands are the two countries with the most 
widespread references to OCG infiltration. Ten business 
sectors (e.g. construction, transportation, wholesale 
and retail trade) have references of criminal infiltration 
in legitimate businesses in all five countries.
The construction industry shows signs of infiltration in 
all the five countries. It is strongly deregulated, and it 
often has an inefficient control system. Furthermore, 
subcontracting procedures and the agreements for the 
purchase of goods and services make it vulnerable to 
infiltration (Savona, 2010). The work is often carried 
out as projects in which different businesses undertake 
different tasks. Reported and unreported labour is 
often mixed, making it harder for authorities to identify 
irregularities (Brå, 2007a, 2011b, 2012b).
The wholesale and retail trade sector plays an important 
role in the concealment of criminal activities and money 
laundering. The vulnerability of this sector is mainly due 
to the fact that it includes multiple sub-sectors that can 
be exploited for different types of illegal activities, such 
as counterfeiting (as in the case of the wholesale and 
retail trade of clothing and textiles) or drug trafficking 
(as in the case of import/export businesses).
Other sectors seem more country-specific (e.g. 
agriculture and fishing, mining and quarrying). This is 
the case, for instance, of infiltration in the renewable 
energy sector and in petrol and gas supply in Italy. 
Infiltration in these sectors fulfils the OCGs’ need 
to increase their control over the territory and gain 
extra profits. In Sweden, there are a few examples of 
organised crime group members that fund the health 
and beauty salons run by their girlfriends (Brå, 2007b).
14. Details on the geographic location of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are 
available for 1,069 references in Italy, 125 references in the Netherlands, 
69 references in Slovenia, 49 references in Sweden, and 168 references 
in the United Kingdom.
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15. Details on the business sector (NACE 0-digit) are available for 1,286 
references in Italy, 558 references in the Netherlands, 74 references in 
Slovenia, 114 references in Sweden, and 248 references in the United 
Kingdom.
Figure 8. Number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by country and business sector15
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
Table 7 reports the references to OCG infiltration 
across business sectors in Italy, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Sectors with 
the highest number of references (i.e. wholesale and 
retail trade; hotels, bars and restaurants; construction) 
are those with evidence in all five countries.
Table 7. Business sectors by number of references of OCG infiltration in open sources
Number of references 
to OCG infiltration
Business sectors
> 184 Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels, bars and restaurants; Construction
127-184 Clubs and gambling activities; Transportation; Real estate activities
70-126
Financial and insurance activities; Support service activities; Waste and scrap 
management; Personal service activities
1-69
Manufacturing; Agriculture and fishing; Hospitals and residential care; Energy supply; 
Mining and quarrying; IT services; Public administration
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
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The results confirm those of previous studies (Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015) highlighting the main characteristics 
of the business sectors with the greater number of 
references of OCG infiltration:
• Cash-intensive sectors (e.g. bars and restaurants) 
(Ferentzy & Turner, 2009; Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004);
• Sectors that are territorially specific (e.g., construction, 
hotels, bars and restaurants, real estate activities) 
(Riccardi, 2014; Transcrime, 2013b; Unger & 
Ferwerda, 2011);
• Labour-intensive sectors characterised by low 
technology (e.g. bars and restaurants; construction) 
(Calderoni & Riccardi, 2011; Gambetta & Reuter, 
1995; Riccardi, 2014);
• Sectors functional to illicit activities (e.g., wholesale 
and retail trade; clubs and gambling activities; 
transportation; financial and insurance activities) 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015);
• Sectors characterised by weak or developing 
regulation (e.g. gambling activities; renewable 
energy; transportation) (Caneppele et al., 2013).
Table 8 reports the number of references to OCG 
infiltration for each country and business sector 
compared with the sector average. Most sectors show 
a higher number of references in Italy. However, some 
business sectors are more represented in countries other 
than Italy. For instance, the references to OCG infiltration 
in the public administration and in legal and professional 
activities concentrate in the Netherlands; references to 
OCG infiltration in financial and insurance activities (i.e. 
cash-in-transit activities) were found in Sweden.
Table 8. Business sectors by country and number of references of OCG infiltration in open sources16
Italy
The 
Netherlands
Slovenia Sweden UK
Agriculture and fishing
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Energy supply
Waste and scrap management
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Transportation
Hotels, bars and restaurants
IT services
Financial and insurance 
activities
Real estate activities
Legal and professional activities
Support service activities
Public administration
Education
Hospitals and residential care
Clubs and gambling activities
Personal service activities
16. In each country, the number of references of OCG infiltration in a 
business sector is compared with the sector average for the 5 EU MS. 
Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 1-digit) are available 
for 1,286 references in Italy, 558 references in the Netherlands, 74 
references in Slovenia, 114 references in Sweden, and 248 references in 
the United Kingdom.
None < Mean-0.5 SD Mean-0.5 SD~Mean Mean~Mean+0.5 SD > Mean+0.5 SD
Legend:
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Table 9. Top 3 business sectors with references to OCG infiltration in open sources by country
Country Top 3 business sectors
Italy Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels, bars and restaurants
The Netherlands Hotels, bars and restaurants; Wholesale and retail trade; Transportation
Slovenia Hotels, bars and restaurants; Transportation; Clubs and gambling activities
Sweden Financial and insurance activities;17 Construction; Wholesale and retail trade
United Kingdom Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels, bars and restaurants; Clubs and gambling activities
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
Characteristics of infiltrated business sectors
Previous studies on OCG investments in the legitimate 
economy state that business sectors with specific 
characteristics present higher risk of infiltration 
(Transcrime, 2013b; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). Table 10 
summarises the main hypotheses on the characteristics 
of infiltrated sectors.
Table 10. Hypotheses on the characteristics of infiltrated business sectors
OC drivers and/or needs Assumptions
Characteristics of 
infiltrated sector
Relationship
Profit maximisation
OCGs invest in sectors with high 
profitability
Profitability Positive
Profit maximisation; Territory 
control
OCGs invest in sectors with low 
competition
Competition Negative
OCGs invest in sectors characterised 
by a low level of foreign investments
Openness to foreign 
investments
Negative
Profit maximisation; Social 
consensus
OCGs invest in sectors characterised 
by low technological levels and low 
R&D rates
Technology Negative
Social consensus; Cultural/
personal reasons
OCGs invest in sectors characterised 
by low capital intensity, high labour 
intensity, and low labour productivity
Labour intensity Negative
Profit maximisation; Social 
consensus; Territory control; 
Concealment of criminal 
activities
OCGs invest in sectors with small-
medium (often unlisted) enterprises
Business entity size Negative
Source: Transcrime elaboration
The literature suggests that OCGs invest in sectors 
with high profitability in order to maximise their profits 
(Albanese, 2008; Calderoni & Caneppele, 2009; 
Riccardi, 2014; Transcrime, 2013b). Criminal groups 
may also favour sectors characterised by an inelasticity 
of demand and where the number of competitors is 
limited (i.e. sectors with low openness to international 
investments and low competition) (Berghuis & de 
Waard, 2011; Calderoni & Caneppele, 2009; Daniele 
& Marani, 2008; Fiorentini, 2000; Gambetta & Reuter, 
1995; Vander Beken, 2005).
17. This includes cash-in-transit activities.                                                        
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OCGs may favour business sectors characterised by 
low labour productivity and high labour intensity, so as 
to create new jobs and increase their social consensus 
(Calderoni & Riccardi, 2011; Gambetta & Reuter, 1995; 
Transcrime, 2013b; Vander Beken, 2005). The consensus 
may also be increased by being active in sectors 
characterised by public utility, such as health care, thus 
ensuring high visibility, social prestige, and legitimation 
by the local population (Transcrime, 2013b; Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015). Traditional activities, or activities 
with low technological levels, may also be vulnerable to 
infiltration by criminal groups because they ensure high 
profits without entailing high research and development 
costs (Becchi & Rey, 1994; Calderoni, Dugato, & Riccardi, 
2010; Lavezzi, 2008; Sciarrone, 2009).
It seems that OCGs frequently infiltrate small, unlisted 
companies in order to reduce their visibility and minimise 
the risk of controls (Becchi & Rey, 1994; Lavezzi, 2008; 
Riccardi, 2014; Transcrime, 2013b; Vander Beken, 
2004). OCGs may also exploit sectors with weak or 
changing regulations that make it possible to conceal 
criminal activities easily (Berghuis & de Waard, 2011; 
Calderoni & Caneppele, 2009; Transcrime, 2000; 
Vander Beken & van Daele, 2008). The relative ease 
of obtaining the permits and licences necessary for 
Table 11. Relationship between the references to OCG infiltration in open sources and the characteristics of 
infiltrated business sectors
Profitability Competition Openness Technology Labour intensity Business entity size
OCG infiltration - - - - +/- -
Legend:
        Correlation                Weak correlation                 Unclear correlation
specific legal activities may also favour OCG infiltration 
(Bra 2011:7; Bra 2014:10). Finally, sectors with a 
high availability of public resources may be infiltrated 
by criminal groups, especially if there exist collusive 
relationships between criminals and public officials and 
politicians (Becchi & Rey, 1994; Centorrino & Signorino, 
1997; Fantò, 1999; Sacco, 2010; Sciarrone, 2009; 
Transcrime, 2013b; Savona & Riccardi, 2015).
For each business sector, the number of references to 
OCG infiltration of legal businesses recorded in the DCI 
was compared with the characteristics of the infiltrated 
sectors. The analysis was performed by comparing a 
sector’s value with both the European and the national 
average. The national average was calculated as the 
average value for all sectors in a specific country; the 
European average was calculated as the average value 
for a specific sector in all European countries (EU 28).
Table 11 summarises the results. Dark brown cells 
indicate that the references of OCG infiltration in open 
sources and a given characteristic are significantly 
correlated. Medium brown blue cells indicate the 
existence of a weak correlation. Light brown cells 
indicate an unclear correlation, i.e. the direction of the 
relationship varies according to the type of basis for 
comparison.
The number of references of OCG infiltration in open 
sources seems greater in those sectors characterised 
by low levels of openness to foreign investments. Low 
levels of profitability, competition, and technology also 
seem to be associated with the number of references 
to OCG infiltration in legal businesses. Finally, OCGs 
seem to favour business sectors with a small average 
business entity size. These results are in line with 
previous findings and the hypotheses identified in the 
literature.
The relationship between references to OCG infiltration 
in open sources and a sector’s profitability is weak 
and negative, although the literature on criminal 
investments in the legal economy suggests that OCGs 
may favour sectors characterised by high profitability. 
Previous empirical studies have suggested an unclear 
relationship between profitability and criminal 
infiltration (Savona & Riccardi, 2015). Table 12 shows 
the top ten business sectors for number of references 
to OCG infiltration in the five EU MS and the levels 
of profitability, competition, openness to foreign 
investments, technology, labour intensity and business 
entity size. 
18. The references recorded in the DCI were used as proxies for OCG 
infiltration. The Methodological Annex describes the proxies used to 
measure the characteristics of the sectors of the 5 EU MS. Correlation tests 
were carried out to assess the relationship between the references of OCG 
infiltration and a given characteristic of the infiltrated sectors. The analysis 
was performed by comparing a sector’s value with both the national 
average and the European (EU 28) average. The former was calculated as 
the average value for all sectors in a specific country, e.g. the value for the 
construction sector in Italy was compared with the average value for all 
business sectors in Italy. The latter was calculated as the average value 
for a specific sector in all European countries (EU 28), e.g. the value for the 
construction sector in Italy was compared with the average value for the 
construction sector in the 28 EU MS.
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Table 12. Top 10 business sectors for number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by sector’s 
characteristics. Comparison with the European average18
Business sector Profitability Competition Openness Technology
Business 
entity size
Wholesale and retail trade
Hotels, bars and 
restaurants
Construction
Clubs and gambling 
activities
Transportation
Real estate activities
Financial and insurance 
activities
Support service activities
Waste and scrap 
management
Personal service activities
The same type of analyses can be performed using 
the national average as the basis for comparison. 
The value for a business sector in a specific country is 
thus compared with the average value for all business 
sectors in the same country. This comparison makes it 
possible to identify whether OCGs favour sectors with 
particular characteristics within the same country.
Table 13. Top 5 business sectors for number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by sector’s 
characteristics in Italy. Comparison with the national average
Business sector Profitability Competition Openness Technology
Business 
entity size
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Hotels, bars and restaurants
Clubs and gambling activities
Waste and scrap management
19. A sector’s value is compared with the European sector average (EU 28). 
In Italy, the top sectors for number of references to 
OCG infiltration are construction, wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels, bars and restaurants, clubs and gambling 
activities, and waste and scrap management (Table 
13). The results are in line with those based on the 
five countries covered by the project. Most sectors 
are characterised by low or medium-low levels of, e.g., 
competition and openness to foreign investments.
None < Mean-0.5 SD Mean-0.5 SD~Mean Mean~Mean+0.5 SD > Mean+0.5 SD
Legend:
None < Mean-0.5 SD Mean-0.5 SD~Mean Mean~Mean+0.5 SD > Mean+0.5 SD
Legend:
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Table 14. Top 5 business sectors for number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by sector’s 
characteristics in the Netherlands. Comparison with the national average
Business sector Profitability Competition Openness Technology
Business 
entity size
Hotels, bars and restaurants
Wholesale and retail trade
Transportation
Real estate activities
Personal service activities
The top sectors for number of references to OCG 
infiltration in the Netherlands are hotels, bars and 
restaurants, wholesale and retail trade, transportation, 
real estate activities, and personal service activities 
(Table 14). The results are consistent with those based 
on the EU MS. Most sectors are characterised by low or 
medium-low levels of, e.g., technology and openness to 
foreign investments.
Table 15. Top 5 business sectors for number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by sector’s 
characteristics in Slovenia. Comparison with the national average
Business sector Profitability Competition Openness Technology
Business 
entity size
Hotels, bars and 
restaurants
Transportation
Clubs and gambling 
activities
Wholesale and retail trade
Support service activities
The top sectors for number of references to OCG 
infiltration in Slovenia are hotels, bars and restaurants, 
transportation, clubs and gambling activities, wholesale 
and retail trade, and support service activities (Table 
15). The relationship between the number of references 
to OCG infiltration and business sectors’ characteristics 
in Slovenia is less consistent with the results based on 
the five EU MS than that of other countries. None of 
the sectors show low or medium-low values for all the 
variables listed in Table 15.
Table 16. Top 5 business sectors for number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by sector’s 
characteristics in Sweden. Comparison with the national average
Business sector Profitability Competition Openness Technology
Business 
entity size
Financial and insurance activities
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Hotels, bars and restaurants
Transportation
None < Mean-0.5 SD Mean-0.5 SD~Mean Mean~Mean+0.5 SD > Mean+0.5 SD
Legend:
None < Mean-0.5 SD Mean-0.5 SD~Mean Mean~Mean+0.5 SD > Mean+0.5 SD
Legend:
None < Mean-0.5 SD Mean-0.5 SD~Mean Mean~Mean+0.5 SD > Mean+0.5 SD
Legend:
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The top sectors for number of references to OCG 
infiltration in Sweden are financial and insurance 
activities, construction, wholesale and retail trade, 
hotels, bars and restaurants, and transportation (Table 
16). The results are in line with the results based on 
the five countries covered by the project. Most sectors 
are characterised by low or medium-low levels of, 
e.g., business entity size and openness to foreign 
investments.
Table 17. Top 5 business sectors for number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by sector’s 
characteristics in the United Kingdom. Comparison with the national average
Business sector Profitability Competition Openness Technology
Business 
entity size
Financial and insurance 
activities
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Hotels, bars and restaurants
Transportation
The top sectors for number of references to OCG 
infiltration in the United Kingdom are financial and 
insurance activities, construction, wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels, bars and restaurants, and transportation 
(Table 17). The results are consistent with those based 
on the five EU MS. Most sectors are characterised by 
low or medium-low levels of, e.g., openness to foreign 
investments.
3. Italy20
3.1 Introduction
The situation of organised crime in Italy is characterised 
by the presence of four historical mafia-type 
organisations: Cosa Nostra in Sicily, the Camorra in 
Campania, the ‘Ndrangheta in Calabria, and the Sacra 
Corona Unita in Apulia. Italian mafias have for long been 
considered the paradigm of organised crime and wholly 
identified with it (Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004; Paoli, 2004a, 
2004b). Nonetheless, the term ‘mafia’ denotes a very 
specific phenomenon, and not all criminal organisations 
can be regarded as mafias (Finckenauer, 2005). Like all 
other OCGs, mafia groups are involved in the provision 
of illegal goods and services, and they seek to maximise 
their profits. However, they cannot be reduced to this 
economic dimension (Paoli, 2002). In addition, and 
even more so than illegal market activities, mafia-
type associations are inspired by political goals. They 
aim at dominating their territory of influence, so as to 
gain control over the economic and political activities 
undertaken within it (Paoli, 2002, 2004b).
Various conceptualisations of the Italian mafia have 
been developed over the years. In particular, since 
the 1980s, a new paradigm has supplanted previous 
interpretations based on organisational and cultural 
factors and describes the mafia as an enterprise 
(Berlusconi, 2014). According to this interpretation 
(Arlacchi, 1983), following the economic and cultural 
changes of the 1950s and 1960s, the Italian mafias 
underwent an entrepreneurial transformation whereby 
they progressively entered the economic sphere and 
accumulated capital (Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004). Other 
interpretations (e.g. Catanzaro, 1988) have rejected 
the idea of a radical transformation from an ‘old’ to a 
‘new’ mafia, suggesting that mafia groups were involved 
in entrepreneurial activities even before the 1960s 
(Berlusconi, 2014; Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004). 
Despite the various interpretations on the evolution 
of the mafia, empirical evidence suggests that Italian 
mafia groups have entered the legitimate economy 
and invested their capital in a wide array of assets, 
including legal businesses. The preferred sectors of 
OCG infiltration in Italy are construction, wholesale and 
retail trade, hotels, bars and restaurants (Transcrime, 
2013b; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). Besides these 
traditional sectors, recent studies have also pointed to 
20. With the collaboration of Valentina Giampietri and Federica Sarno 
(Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore-Transcrime, Italy).
None < Mean-0.5 SD Mean-0.5 SD~Mean Mean~Mean+0.5 SD > Mean+0.5 SD
Legend:
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some emerging sectors, such as renewable energy, and 
petrol and gas supply (Caneppele et al., 2013; Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015). Similarly, Italian mafia groups do not 
restrict their activities to their regions of origin; they 
are also expanding to other Italian regions, as well as 
to other European and non-European countries (Allum, 
2014; Campana, 2013; Transcrime, 2013b; Savona & 
Riccardi, 2015).
Methodological remarks
Most of the research on the infiltration of OCGs into the 
Italian legitimate economy has focused on Italian mafia 
organisations; whereas only a few studies on foreign OCGs 
exist. Among them, a study by Iadeluca (2012) explored the 
organisational structure of foreign criminal organisations 
in Italy, their illegal activities, and their relationships 
with Italian mafia groups. A recent study by Savona and 
Riccardi (Savona & Riccardi, 2015) has instead focused 
on investments by foreign OCGs in the country. 
The issue of infiltration by OCGs – and particularly by 
Italian mafias – into legitimate businesses has long 
been a priority for Italian institutions, law enforcement 
agencies and academic scholars. Over the past thirty 
years, a large number of legislative measures have 
been enacted in the country in order to improve the 
identification and confiscation of criminal assets 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015). Despite these developments, 
the study of OCG infiltration into the Italian legitimate 
economy still has some limitations. 
Most of the existing research consists of qualitative 
studies (Fantò, 1999; Santino & La Fiura, 1990). 
A recent study used data on confiscated assets as 
proxies for mafia investments in the legal economy, 
and analysed the regions and business sectors in 
which infiltrated legal businesses and other assets 
concentrate (Transcrime, 2013b). The analysis of mafia 
investments in the legal economy has been further 
expanded by considering other criminal groups active 
in the country and investments outside Italy (Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015). Nonetheless, only a few studies 
have focused on infiltration by OCGs into legitimate 
businesses, exploring the control and management 
strategies used by OCGs (Transcrime, 2013b; Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015).
Drawing on the methodology developed in previous 
studies (Savona & Riccardi, 2015), different types 
of documents were collected from various sources, 
ranging from the scientific literature to open sources. 
The information recorded was organised in the 
Database on Criminal Infiltration. The DCI collects 1,305 
references to OCG infiltration in legal businesses in Italy 
from judicial evidence, academic studies, institutional 
reports, LEA reports and media sources (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Percentage of references to OCG infiltration 
in open sources by type of source
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3.2 Drivers
The infiltration of legal businesses by OCGs has several 
drivers, although, depending on the specific situation, 
one may prevail over the others (Transcrime, 2013b). 
The literature points to five main drivers of OCG 
infiltration into legitimate businesses. These five drivers 
may influence OCGs in the selection of the business 
sectors and territories to infiltrate. Nonetheless, not 
all drivers are necessarily present at the same time 
(Riccardi, 2014). 
Economic profit. OCGs may invest in legitimate 
businesses in order to maximise profits and obtain 
considerable earnings. In these cases, sectors with 
low levels of technological innovation and professional 
skills are preferred by OCGs because they make it 
possible to maximise profits while reducing the costs 
of research and development (Becchi & Rey, 1994). 
Similarly, sectors with a strong presence of public 
subsidies (e.g. renewable energy) and public contracts 
(e.g. waste disposal, public services and transports) 
may be favoured by OCGs (Fantò, 1999; Transcrime, 
2013b). As regards territories, those characterised 
by a low openness to foreign investments, protected 
economies and low levels of competition are preferred. 
Concealment of criminal activities. Instead of economic 
profit, OCGs may infiltrate legitimate businesses in order 
to conceal criminal activities or to hide the origin of illicit 
funds. When the purpose is money laundering, OCGs 
may decide to infiltrate sectors with a weak or changing 
regulation and territories with high levels of tax evasion 
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and a large underground economy (Transcrime, 2013b). 
Instead, transportation and storage are frequently used 
to conceal criminal activities (Transcrime, 2013b).
Social consensus. Obtaining social consensus from the 
local population is crucial for OCGs generally, and for 
Italian mafias in particular. In order to increase their 
support from the local population, OCGs may decide to 
infiltrate businesses operating in strategic sectors (such 
as education or health care), so as to provide goods 
and services to the population. Similarly, they may 
favour business sectors with a high territorial specificity 
so as to create new jobs and promote a respectable 
image of themselves in contrast with the criminal one 
(Fantò, 1999; Ravenda, Argilés-Bosch, & Valencia-Silva, 
2015; Sciarrone, 2009). For the same reasons, OCGs 
may favour territories with low levels of income or a 
traditional mafia presence (Transcrime, 2013b).
Control of the territory. Control of the territory is a 
distinctive feature of mafia-type organisations and has 
both a physical and a strategic component (Transcrime, 
2013b). The infiltration of sectors with a high territorial 
specificity (e.g. hotels and restaurants, gas and water 
supply, construction) as well as protected sectors, 
enables OCGs to expand their physical control over 
their territory of influence and, at the same time, to 
create strategic links with representatives of the local 
administration and politics (Riccardi, 2014). The same 
driver may induce OCGs to invest in territories with a 
traditional presence of mafias, but also in northern 
regions with previous cases of infiltration (Transcrime, 
2013b).
Cultural and personal reasons. Finally, the decision of 
OCGs to infiltrate legitimate businesses may depend on 
cultural and personal reasons. In these cases, OCGs will 
prefer sectors and/or territories close to their cultural 
and family traditions, e.g. Camorra’s infiltration in the 
wholesale of food products (Riccardi, 2014).
3.3 Infiltrated territories
The geographical distribution of OCG infiltration in legal 
businesses differs if Italian mafias are considered 
alone or together with foreign criminal groups (Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015). Some southern Italian regions (e.g. 
Sicily, Calabria and Campania) have a traditional, 
deep-rooted and almost exclusive presence of Italian 
mafia investments. By contrast, central and northern 
regions (e.g. Lazio and Lombardy) register evidence of 
infiltration by both Italian and foreign OCGs (Iadeluca, 
2012; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). 
Figure 10. Number of references to OCG infiltration in 
open sources by region (NUTS 2)21
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Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
Figure 10 illustrates the geographical distribution of 
the references to OCG infiltration in open sources in 
Italy. Sicily, Calabria and Campania, i.e. the areas of 
origin of the main Italian mafia organisations, show a 
higher number of references of infiltration compared 
with other Italian regions. Together with Lazio and 
Lombardy, these regions account for more than 70% 
of the DCI references to OCG infiltration into legitimate 
businesses. In the past decade, central and northern 
regions have recorded an increasing number of cases 
of participation of criminal groups in legal business 
activities (CPA, 2008). Unlike southern regions, OCGs 
(both Italian and foreign) operating in the northern 
regions do not aim to take control of the territory but 
rather to exploit particular business opportunities 
(Europol, 2013b; Savona & Riccardi, 2015).
Foreign OCGs show a low level of infiltration in the areas 
of origin of Italian mafias and concentrate their activities 
in other regions, such as Tuscany, Lazio, Veneto and 
Piedmont. The control of Italian mafias is weaker in these 
regions, giving other OCGs opportunities to infiltrate 
and take control of local businesses. Furthermore, the 
presence of ethnic communities in these regions may 
facilitate infiltration by OCGs with the same background 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015).
21. Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are available for 1,069 
references.
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3.4 Infiltrated business sectors
Italy records references to OCG infiltration in open 
sources in all business sectors, although with different 
prevalence among the various sectors. In line with 
previous findings, construction, wholesale and retail 
trade, and hotels, bars and restaurants are the ones 
most affected (Figure 11). Other sectors with substantial 
number of references to OCG infiltration are clubs and 
gambling activities, waste and scrap management, and 
support service activities.
Construction is a traditional sector of criminal 
infiltration in Italy. It has characteristics that are 
particularly attractive to OCGs, such as low levels of 
technology, high territorial specificity, and high labour 
intensity (Transcrime, 2013b; Savona & Riccardi, 
2015). Moreover, it registers a large presence of public 
resources and is closely connected with the procurement 
process. Subcontracts and forced recruitment of labour 
are often used to infiltrate public procurement (Savona, 
2010).
The wholesale and retail trade sector is targeted by 
both Italian and foreign OCGs (see also Savona & 
Riccardi, 2015). In particular, it serves the purposes 
of concealment of criminal activities and money 
laundering. The sector, in fact, is characterised by the 
presence of a wide range of subsectors that can be 
exploited for illegal activities of different kinds, such 
as counterfeiting (e.g. in the case of the wholesale and 
retail trade of clothing and textiles) or drugs trafficking 
(e.g. in the case of  import/export companies) (Lo Bello, 
2011; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). Similarly, the means 
of transport owned by the infiltrated companies can be 
used for criminal purposes (Transcrime, 2013b).
Like the construction sector, hotels, bars and restaurants 
have a low technological level and a high territorial 
specificity, and they are cash-intensive businesses. 
These characteristics make them vulnerable to OCG 
infiltration (Transcrime, 2013b; Savona & Riccardi, 
2015). In particular, businesses operating in this 
sector are used for money laundering and as covers for 
criminal activities. Moreover, the infiltration of bars and 
restaurants may be instrumental to the establishment 
of strategic relations with important persons such as 
public officials and professionals (Riccardi, 2014; 
Savona & Riccardi, 2015).
Besides traditional sectors, recent studies have also 
pointed to the growing interest of OCGs in emerging 
sectors like renewable energy and petrol and gas 
supply (Europol, 2013b; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). 
Criminal infiltration in these sectors may serve different 
purposes, such as control of the territory or the 
obtainment of extra profits. For example, the presence 
of EU grants and tax subsidies in the renewable energy 
sector makes it particularly attractive to OCGs (Europol, 
2013b). At the same time, the process of selecting the 
locations in which to develop renewable energy projects 
is vulnerable to criminal exploitation, especially in 
territories where OCGs have strong influence and the 
public institutions are weak (Caneppele et al., 2013). 
Figure 12 describes the distribution of references 
to OCG infiltration in legitimate businesses across 
the Italian regions, with the focus on the three most 
infiltrated sectors. In line with the findings of previous 
studies (Savona & Riccardi, 2015), highly infiltrated 
sectors such as construction, wholesale and retail trade, 
and hotels, bars and restaurants, register references of 
criminal infiltration not only in traditional mafia areas 
but also in non-traditional ones. Among non-traditional 
regions, Lazio and Lombardy are attracting the interest 
of OCGs due to the presence of attractive business 
opportunities and economic activities (CPA, 2008). 
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Figure 11. Number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by business sector22
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
Figure 12. Regions (NUTS 2) with at least one reference to OCG infiltration in open sources in the top 3 infiltrated 
sectors23
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
Construction Wholesale and retail trade Hotels, bars and restaurants
22. Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 0-digit) are 
available for 1,286 references.
23. Details on the region of infiltration (NUTS 2) for construction, wholesale 
and retail, and hotels, bars and restaurants is available for 534 references.
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3.5 Actors and modi operandi
Table 18 provides an indication of the types of OCGs 
involved in the infiltration of legitimate businesses 
in Italy. For each of these groups, the table lists the 
business sectors and geographic regions with the 
highest number of references to infiltration in open 
sources. 
Table 18. Top 5 sectors and top 5 regions (NUTS 2) for number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources 
by OCG24
OCG Top 5 business sectors Top 5 regions (NUTS 2)
Italian mafias Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels, bars and 
restaurants; Clubs and gambling activities; Waste and scrap 
management
Sicilia; Lombardia; Calabria; 
Campania; Lazio
Chinese Financial and insurance activities; Transportation; Real 
estate activities; Personal service activities; Manufacturing; 
Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels, bars and restaurants
Toscana; Lazio; Lombardia; 
Veneto; Campania; Sicilia
Russian/Georgian Transportation; Wholesale and retail trade; Agriculture Lazio; Puglia; Toscana
Other OCGs Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels, bars and restaurants;  Real 
estate activities; Support service activities; Manufacturing; 
Energy supply; Construction; Transportation; Financial and 
insurance activities;  Personal service activities
Calabria; Piemonte; Liguria; 
Lombardia; Toscana
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
Italian mafias represent the most active group in the 
country. They include the ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra, 
the Camorra, Apulian OCGs, and other mafia groups.
The ‘Ndrangheta is the mafia with the largest number of 
references to OCG infiltration into legitimate businesses. 
In line with the findings of previous studies (Transcrime, 
2013b; Savona & Riccardi, 2015), the information 
contained in the DCI show that ‘Ndrangheta OCGs have 
penetrated the legal economy not only in their region 
of origin (namely, Calabria) but also in other Italian 
regions such as Lombardy and Lazio (Figure 13). As 
regards economic sectors, construction, hotels, bars 
and restaurants, and wholesale and retail trade are 
those with the highest number of references. 
Cosa Nostra concentrates its activities in Sicily, 
although there is evidence of infiltration also in other 
Italian regions (Figure 13). In its territory of origin, the 
Sicilian mafia is particularly active in the construction 
sector, which has a leading role in Sicily’s economy 
(Scaglione, 2011). However, there is evidence of Cosa 
Nostra infiltration in other economic sectors as well, 
such as wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, 
energy supply, real estate activities, and bars and 
restaurants (DIA, 2014). 
As already suggested by previous studies (Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015), the Camorra’s infiltration of 
legitimate businesses is particularly widespread in 
terms of territories and economic sectors. From a 
geographical standpoint, besides Campania there 
is evidence of Camorra infiltration in northern and 
central regions such as Lombardy, Lazio and Emilia 
Romagna (Figure 13). As regards business sectors, 
mining and construction, as well as wholesale and 
retail trade and hotels, bars and restaurants, are 
frequently infiltrated by Camorra OCGs. The mafia 
presence in these sectors may be instrumental to 
the commission of crimes such as drug trafficking 
and counterfeiting (Scaglione, 2011).
As regards foreign criminal groups, Chinese 
OCGs prevail over the other non-Italian groups 
in terms of references to OCG infiltration into 
legitimate businesses. The references of infiltration 
concentrate in northern and central regions such as 
Tuscany, Lazio, Lombardy and Veneto; whereas their 
presence in the regions of origin of traditional mafias 
is lower. Contrary to Italian mafia organisations, 
the business sectors most frequently infiltrated by 
Chinese OCGs are financial and insurance activities 
and transportation. As suggested by the CNEL 
(2011), this latter sector may be exploited by criminal 
groups for the purposes of human trafficking or 
the transportation of illicit goods (e.g. counterfeit 
clothes).
24. Details on the region (NUTS 2) and OCG are available for 999 references. 
Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 1-digit) and OCG are 
available for 1,196 references.
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Infiltration and control
OCGs use as their infiltration strategy the metodo 
mafioso, which consists of collusion, corruption, 
intimidation and extortion racketeering (Savona, 2010; 
Transcrime, 2013b). Moreover, the academic literature 
distinguishes three main types of entrepreneurs who 
may facilitate the infiltration of legitimate businesses:
• Entrepreneurs of the first type are actively part of the 
OCG, meaning that at a certain point in time a legal 
entrepreneur has decided to enter in contact with, 
and directly participates in, the criminal organisation 
(Santino & La Fiura, 1990)
• Entrepreneurs of the second type collude with OCGs 
although they are not members of the organisation (Lo 
Bello, 2011). This is the case of businesspersons who 
turn to an OCG in order to increase the distribution 
of their products. As a consequence, the product 
distributed by the colluding entrepreneur will obtain 
exclusivity on the market.
• Entrepreneurs of the third type are victims of the OCG 
because they have been persuaded to cooperate 
through intimidation and violence (Sciarrone, 
2009). This category also includes victims of usury, 
although the first request for money is made by the 
businessperson (CENSIS, 2009). 
The use of indirect ownership strategies is increasing 
among OCGs (Savona & Riccardi, 2015). This means 
that OCGs are no longer directly involved in control of 
the business but influence the decision-making process 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015). The use of figureheads and 
straw men as company shareholders and/or owners 
seems to be the strategy most often used to control 
businesses indirectly because it reduces the risk of 
seizure or confiscation (Fantò, 1999; Graebner Anderson, 
1979; Transcrime, 2013b; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). 
Figure 13. References of Italian mafias infiltration in open sources by location (NUTS 2)25
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCI data
Frequently, figureheads and straw men are selected from 
among relatives in order to maintain in-house control 
over the company. However, professionals (e.g. business 
and financial consultants) and legal entrepreneurs 
may also be selected as figureheads because of their 
privileged relations with the financial, administrative and 
political system (Transcrime, 2013b). 
Moreover, there is evidence of the use of complex 
ownership schemes and cross-shareholdings that 
involve a large number of companies in order to 
complicate the identification of the final owner (Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015). The sale of business units, the merger 
of diverse companies, the acquisition of businesses, as 
well as modification of the business’s legal status or 
name are also used to conceal the beneficial owner 
(Transcrime, 2013b).
As regards the legal form, existing studies suggest that 
OCGs tend to infiltrate limited companies because they 
are easy to incorporate and manage (Savona & Riccardi, 
2015). In particular, limited liability companies (i.e. 
S.r.l.) appear to be the preferred legal form because 
the initial share capital is lower than that of joint-stock 
companies (i.e. S.p.a.) (Transcrime, 2013b). Moreover, 
these companies make it possible to minimise the 
potential impact of seizure and confiscation, because 
the company share capital is divided among different 
shareholders. In the case of seizure or confiscation, 
only the shares of the person indicted are usually 
restricted (Fantò, 1999). 
Other factors facilitating OCG infiltration include business 
size. As suggested by some authors, small and medium-
sized businesses – with a maximum of fifty employees 
– may be more easily infiltrated and managed by OCGs 
(Riccardi, 2014; Santino & La Fiura, 1990).
Cosa Nostra ‘Ndrangheta Camorra
25. Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 2) for Cosa Nostra, 
‘Ndrangheta, and Camorra are available for 732 references.
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Management
As suggested by Arlacchi (2007), companies controlled 
by OCGs have certain competitive advantages compared 
with legal ones:
• The discouragement of competition by using the 
so-called mafia method (metodo mafioso). This 
may sometimes result in the creation of a criminal 
monopoly on certain economic sectors (Riccardi, 
2014). 
• Wage compression, which usually takes the form 
of tax evasion and non-payment of social security 
contributions, insurance and overtime work. This 
enables OCGs significantly to reduce the labour costs 
of controlled companies (Lo Bello, 2011). 
• The high availability of financial resources originating 
from illegal activities carried out by OCGs. 
Despite these advantages, the literature suggests that 
the productivity of OCG businesses is often lower than 
that of legal ones. It seems that these businesses are 
often not well managed (Sciarrone, 2009; Transcrime, 
2013b) and therefore incur, voluntarily or otherwise, 
extra costs which reduce their profits (Becchi & Rey, 
1994). This implies that mafia businesses may be 
primarily used as empty boxes for the purposes of 
money laundering and hiding illicit activities, but with 
no productive intent (Santino & La Fiura, 1990; Savona 
& Riccardi, 2015).
Moreover, OCGs companies are usually short-lived 
(Santino & La Fiura, 1990) because they are exposed to 
two risks in an efficient sector: a judicial risk (due to the 
pressure exerted by the judiciary and law enforcement 
agencies) and an entrepreneurial one (because the 
criminal businesses cannot withstand the competition 
and the rules imposed) (Lo Bello, 2011). 
3.6 Conclusions
The infiltration of OCGs into the Italian legitimate 
economy involves a variety of groups, territories and 
business sectors. 
From a territorial point of view, southern Italian regions 
such as Sicily, Campania and Calabria, concentrate 
almost all the evidence of infiltration by traditional 
mafia groups. Italian mafias exercise close control over 
their territories of origin, with strong penetration of 
the economic and political spheres. This may prevent 
infiltration by other OCGs (Savona & Riccardi, 2015). 
By contrast, Italian regions in the central (e.g. Lazio 
and Tuscany) and northern part (e.g. Lombardy) of 
the country present a more diversified situation, with 
infiltration by both Italian and foreign OCGs. The control 
of Italian mafias is weaker in these regions, which gives 
other criminal groups opportunities to penetrate the 
local economy. 
The business sectors infiltrated vary according to the 
type of OCG considered, especially when traditional 
Italian mafias are compared with foreign OCGs. 
Despite the differences, construction, wholesale and 
retail trade, hotels, bars and restaurants are the most 
infiltrated sectors in Italy, in line with the findings 
of previous studies (Transcrime, 2013b; Savona & 
Riccardi, 2015). Similarly, the infiltration of OCGs into 
legitimate businesses responds to a plurality of drivers, 
including economic profit, concealment of illegal 
activities and money laundering, control of the territory, 
and gaining social consensus. As suggested by previous 
analyses (e.g. Savona & Riccardi, 2015), Italian mafias 
may use the infiltrated businesses primarily as means 
to increase their control over the territory and obtain the 
consensus of the local population. Conversely, foreign 
OCGs may use legal companies as covers for illegal 
activities or for money laundering purposes.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the infiltration of 
OCGs into legitimate businesses is favoured by specific 
vulnerabilities, which include the characteristics of the 
territory (e.g. traditional presence of OCGs; attractive 
economic opportunities; favourable environment), the 
characteristics of the business sector (e.g. high presence 
of public funds; scant or unclear regulation), and the 
characteristics of the businesses infiltrated (e.g. small 
and medium-sized businesses). OCGs may also exploit 
the opportunities created by the current economic 
crisis. On the one hand, legitimate entrepreneurs may 
have difficulties in accessing credit and may therefore 
resort to OCGs for financial support. On the other 
hand, OCGs may use the infiltrated businesses to offer 
otherwise scarce jobs and increase their social visibility 
and prestige.
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4. The Netherlands26
4.1 Introduction
Scientific studies on organised crime in the Netherlands 
were rare before the 1990s. Apart from occasional 
investigations by academics or the Ministry of (Security 
and) Justice, criminologists were not much interested 
in organised crime. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the public and academic attention to organised crime 
increased, although there was much confusion about 
how to define organised crime in criminology and by the 
police. 
In 1995, four professors of criminology were invited 
to study the size and nature of organised crime 
for a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on Criminal 
Investigation Methods with a view to new legislation 
for the police and public prosecution to investigate 
organised crime. The group produced for the first 
time in the Netherlands a structured and empirically 
broad picture of organised crime (Fijnaut, Bovenkerk, 
Bruinsma, & van de Bunt, 1998). The researchers had 
access to all kinds of police and intelligence data and 
interviewed hundreds of detectives, public prosecutors 
and experts in business, labour unions, lawyers and 
civil servants. 
After publication of the five reports by the criminologists, 
the Minister of (Security and) Justice decided that 
developments in the nature and frequency of organised 
crime in the Netherlands should be reported more 
frequently in the future. Therefore, since 1996, 
the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) 
of what is now called the Ministry of Security and 
Justice has irregularly carried out follow-up studies 
by systematically researching organised crime data 
(Kleemans et al., 1998, 2002; van de Bunt & Kleemans, 
2007; Kruisbergen, Kleemans, & van de Bunt, 2012). 
Later, crime analysts of the police and researchers at 
the Police Academy added reports on specific kinds of 
organised crime or on specific geographical areas to 
the body of knowledge. Furthermore, journalists also 
became more active in reporting on organised crime in 
books, newspapers and television programmes.
Methodological remarks
The Database on Criminal Infiltration (DCI) collects 604 
references of OCG infiltration in legal businesses in the 
Netherlands. Figure 14 shows the variety of sources 
used to gather information on OCG infiltration in the 
country. These mainly include academic literature and 
institutional reports. Contrary to other countries covered 
by the project, information from the media constitutes 
only a small portion of the references included in the DCI.
Figure 14. Percentage of references to OCG 
infiltration in open sources by type of source
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Research on organised crime in the Netherlands is 
heavily based on police data. For about 25 years, 
criminologists and crime analysts have in collaboration 
with, or from within, the Dutch police and with the use 
of police data engaged in systematic study of organised 
crime. Scientists have used for their academic research 
official police files on closed and current investigations, 
or police crime analysts’ written analyses of criminal 
groups and intelligence information. The police files 
on OCGs sometimes cover thousands of pages each, 
including confiscated (shadow) financial accounts, 
interrogation reports and wire taps. The data used 
contain information about criminal groups or networks, 
about members of such groups or networks, and about 
individual offenders. Besides these data, police officers 
and public prosecutors have been interviewed about 
investigations and about the files studied. For additional 
data and to avoid possible police selectivity, Dutch 
academics have also interviewed key figures of law 
firms, labour union leaders, catering industry, banks, 
industries, car rentals, real estate agencies, stores, and 
so on (depending on the research question). Research 
on organised crime in the Netherlands has a strong 
empirical emphasis (Tonry & Bijleveld, 2007) and is less 
dependent on incidental news media reports.
26. With the collaboration of Gerben Bruinsma, Adriaan Denkers and Sylvia 
Alberts (Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, 
the Netherlands).
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Based on data from closed police files, wire taps, police 
observations and structured interviews with policemen 
and public prosecutors, in 2012 the WODC published 
its fourth report on organised crime in the Netherlands 
(Kruisbergen et al., 2012).27 This national study28 again 
revealed that the major criminal activities of organised 
crime in the Netherlands are the international smuggling 
of illegal goods and services: drug trade (most 
important), smuggling of illegal immigrants, human 
trafficking for sexual exploitation, and the trafficking 
of arms or stolen vehicles. Besides these activities - 
as a consequence of their profitable crimes - criminals 
are also involved in transnational illegal activities 
like money laundering and tax evasion. Because of 
this involvement in illegal trade, the Netherlands can 
be labelled a destination country, as well as a transit 
country and, with regard to Dutch cannabis (with high 
THC level) and synthetic drugs, a production country. 
Organised crime groups use the legal infrastructure to 
organise and conceal their crimes. 
Organised crime groups in the Netherlands are not 
solely family-based or pyramid-shaped structures with a 
strict hierarchy, a clear division of tasks, and an internal 
sanction system. The concept of flexible criminal 
networks (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Fijnaut et al., 
1998) fits the Dutch situation better. The shape of a 
network reflects its kind of criminal activity (Bruinsma 
& Bernasco, 2004). For instance, car theft, heroin 
trade or illegal prostitution are generally run by criminal 
networks with very distinct shapes. Networks that are 
characterised by high density and a large proportion of 
affective relationships (in short: cohesive networks) are 
pre-eminently suited to criminal collaborations where 
a great deal of mutual trust is needed (heroin trade). 
The shape of criminal networks suited for the smuggling 
and trafficking of prostitutes can be typified as a ‘chain’ 
with some smaller clusters at each end: at one end, 
offenders recruit the women; at the other, offenders 
exploit and sell them to brothels. The social networks of 
organised crime active in car theft can be described as 
a few clusters linked to each other via ‘thin’ lines. 
The flexible nature of criminal project organisation 
makes it problematic for researchers and police 
investigators to assess the actual number of men and 
women belonging to a network or group. Friends, family 
members and acquaintances may work together in 
certain temporary or long-lasting criminal activities and 
move on to other criminal activities with other people, 
introduced by their friends, families or acquaintances. 
Generally, they are introduced to these others by friends, 
family members or acquaintances. Criminal networks 
avoid unknown outsiders. To be known and trusted is 
very important in a risky world with high chances of 
being cheated or betrayed. 
Compared to twenty years ago, criminal networks 
more often consist of offenders of mixed ethnic 
origins. The average age of the members of criminal 
networks is about 27 years old. Adolescents and other 
young offenders are almost absent in these networks 
(Pennings, Bruinsma, & Weerman, 2006). The Dutch 
police have no information on the criminal records of 
about 30% of the criminals. This may be due to the 
fact that these criminals are mainly foreigners and 
the Dutch police have no (easy) access to police files 
of other countries. Those who have been arrested as 
members of an organised crime group often have earlier 
criminal records, although their criminal careers seem 
to start relatively late (van Koppen, de Poot, Kleemans, 
& Nieuwbeerta, 2010). 
Key players in criminal networks can be identified by 
the fact that other offenders are dependent on them. 
They hold a position of status within the network and 
exercise power because they have financial resources, 
know-how about the organisation of criminal activities, 
and essential contacts in the conventional world 
(notaries, law firms, brokers, facilitators in the transport 
sector, airports and harbours). Despite their power, 
these key players are still very locally embedded. This 
local alignment combined with a generally low level of 
education limit them in their international scope: they 
lack the requisite skills and specialist knowledge to be 
attractive to partners outside the Netherlands or even 
outside their own locality. If necessary to maintain 
‘order’ within their network, or for fear of losing respect, 
they resort to the use of violence, but in a restricted 
manner: only against accomplices, illegal business 
partners, or unwilling partners in the legal world 
(Kruisbergen et al., 2012). Dutch organised criminals 
seem to be more interested in protecting their everyday 
criminal activities than in achieving a long-standing 
dominant position in the (inter)national ‘underworld’ 
(Kleemans, 2007; Kruisbergen et al., 2012, 2015). 
Recently, motorcycle gangs (like chapters of Hells Angels, 
Bandidos, Satudarah or No Surrender) have attracted 
the attention of the media and politicians because of 
their emphatic public presence in cities and the publicly 
displayed and increasingly violent gang warfare (DLIO, 
2014; Hagen, 1998). These gangs have for many 
years been suspected of involvement in the trafficking 
and exploitation of humans for illegal prostitution, in 
27. The definition of organised crime in Dutch criminology is broader than 
the legal definition of criminal organisation in Criminal Law (see also: 
Fijnaut, et al., 1998).
28. The description of the organised crime characteristics in this 
introduction relies heavily on the latest report of the WODC.
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the arms and drugs trade, and in all kinds of dubious 
‘protection’ activities in pubs, restaurants or dance halls 
(Fijnaut, Bovenkerk, Bruinsma, & van de Bunt, 1996). 
A recent report on motorcycle gangs did not reveal 
any major economic or financial infiltration other than 
gangs ‘hanging out’ in so-called ‘club houses’ and cafes 
or bars in order to shelter from police investigations or 
inquiries by municipalities (DLIO, 2014).
4.2 Drivers
The nature and size of Dutch organised crime do not 
compare to those of countries like Italy, Russia, Japan, 
Colombia, or the US. Mafia dynasties like Cosa Nostra, 
Camorra or Yakuza are absent in the Netherlands 
(unless they are visiting the country for leisure or illegal 
business). Dutch organised crime consists mainly of 
internationally trading networks with no tradition of, or 
apparent interest in, ‘racketeering practices’. They do 
not aim at systematic infiltration of legal branches or 
in geographical areas. There is no empirical evidence 
of the regular extortion of local shop owners and small 
businesses, and there is no empirical evidence of 
regular corrupt ties with politicians, businessmen or 
labour union leaders in combination with (the threat 
of) excessive violence. Dutch society scores high 
on Transparency International, indicating a very low 
level of corruption. When we describe infiltration by 
organised crime of legal sectors in the Netherlands, 
this must be seen more as occasional collaborative 
activities for the purpose of illegal trading than gaining 
control over those legal sectors. Van de Bunt, Siegel 
and Zaitch write concerning the social embeddedness 
of organised crime: ‘Between organised crime and the 
legitimate societal context, there are usually all sorts 
of ‘interfaces,’ and the relationships between legality 
and illegality are by no means necessarily antagonistic 
or aimed at avoiding one another. Instead of operating 
in a social vacuum, organised crime has a habit of 
interacting with its social environment’ (van de Bunt, 
Siegel, & Zaitch, 2014, p. 321). 
In the past twenty years no report on the organised 
crime situation in the Netherlands has observed serious 
financial or economic infiltration (Fijnaut et al., 1998; 
Kleemans et al., 1998; Kleemans, 2007; Kruisbergen 
et al., 2012; van de Bunt & Kleemans, 2007; van de 
Bunt et al., 2014). However, some economic sectors, 
like the transport sector, harbours and airports, are by 
their very nature important for the logistics of e.g. drug 
trafficking. In such sectors, some signs of collaboration 
can be found. There is, however, no empirical evidence 
that criminal groups play a permanent role of any 
significance in the transport sector. Second, in hotels, 
restaurants, nightclubs and bars, organised crime 
seems sometimes to play a role that goes beyond using 
the facilities for illegal activities. Criminal groups have 
been found to provide ‘protection’ services. However, 
the empirical data offer no support for the suggestion 
that criminal groups control any significant proportion 
of legal business. 
Recent research has focused specifically on the profits 
of organised crime groups, and how they spend and 
invest their profits earned from drug trafficking, human 
trafficking and smuggling, illegal arms trade, fraud or 
the production of XTC (Kruisbergen et al., 2015). Using 
data on 150 criminal groups and 1,196 individual 
members, the researchers revealed that many of the 
offenders spent their illegal revenues on exuberant 
consumption. The illegal profits, however, were higher 
than they were able to spend on expensive cars, 
boats, jewellery, holidays, and girlfriends. Some of the 
criminals turned to investments in real estate and legal 
firms. The authors presented six reasons why criminal 
groups invest in real estate and legal business: 
• It is a safe investment that will pay off in the long run;
• Real estate purchases absorb a great deal of illegal 
money;
• The real estate market is characterised by a lack of 
price transparency;
• Ownership of real estate property can be concealed 
(e.g. by using legal entities);
• No (effective) control and supervisory institutions 
govern the real estate market;
• Criminals, too, need somewhere to live. 
The researchers indicated an increase in the purchase 
of real estate property, but it was predominantly for the 
purpose of obtaining a personal or family residence 
or laundering money, and less as a means to gain 
control over a neighbourhood: ‘Almost 45 % of the 
243 individual real estate objects that were found in 
those cases, concerns property for residential use. 
It includes houses and flats used by the offenders 
themselves or their relatives, but also houses and 
flats rented out to others. The property varies from 
very modest dwellings to very roomy and luxurious 
villas’. The researchers found, as in all research on 
organised crime in the Netherlands, no confirmation 
for the ‘infiltration hypothesis’ (Kleemans, 2014). In 
general, organised crime in the Netherlands tends to 
avoid contacts with and the attention of the police and 
governments, instead of engaging in (open) conflicts 
for power in society, municipalities, neighbourhoods or 
legal sectors.
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4.3 Infiltrated territories
Similar remarks can be made about the geographical 
areas. According to the information recorded in 
the Database on Criminal Infiltration (DCI) only six 
of the twelve Dutch provinces have references to 
OCG infiltration. Limburg (in the south-east of the 
Netherlands), North Holland and South Holland run the 
highest risks of infiltration because of their transport 
facilities (harbours and airports). The production of XTC 
and cannabis requires space and air, and this is the 
only reason why criminal groups actively rent or buy 
barns and storage buildings in rural areas to produce 
synthetic drugs (Huisman, 2005). XTC production 
barns are more commonly found in the south of the 
Netherlands (provinces of Brabant and Limburg) as 
well in the eastern part (Gelderland and Overijssel, 
mentioned in police reports and Dutch research on 
organised crime).
Figure 15. Number of references to OCG infiltration in 
open sources by region (NUTS 2)29
Source: NSCR elaboration on DCI data
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4.4 Infiltrated business sectors
On considering the Dutch literature, it should be borne 
in mind that the results presented in Figure 16 are to 
be seen in the context of Dutch organised crime. The 
DCI contains information on OCGs ‘making use of the 
legal sector’ rather than infiltrating an entire economic 
sector. Furthermore, it should be noted that the level 
of evidence of each business sector is calculated in 
comparison with the other sectors in the same country. 
Therefore, sectors such as hotels, bars and restaurants 
or transportation present several references to OCG 
infiltration but only if compared with other business 
sectors in the Netherlands, where fewer cases of 
infiltration were found in the literature.
Some legal sectors are more vulnerable to criminal 
infiltration than others. The research group of the 
Parliamentary Inquiry Committee suggested that the 
following characteristics are important for infiltration 
(Bruinsma & Bovenkerk, 1996):
• In most cases, criminal groups are technically 
and financially familiar with these sectors (like the 
catering industry, car rentals and garages, transport);
• Sectors with low barriers to entry (high qualifications 
and education are not necessary);
• Sectors characterised by a small number of very big 
companies and many small, short-lived companies 
that are very competitive with each other;
• Economic sectors that are complicated for outsiders 
with few general rules and are under-regulated (like 
the toxic waste industry);
• Sectors with levels of undetected crime and 
victimisation higher than those of other sectors, 
seducing regular business people also to commit 
crimes. 
The research group found another kind of infiltration 
in the files: a small number of businessmen with well-
established positions in the legal economy had set up 
criminal activities after observing criminals making a 
great deal of money.
At present, the government (local or national) has no 
specific policy against OCG infiltration of legal society. 
Besides the obvious law enforcement practice by 
which OCG are handled, governments give priority 
to the administrative prevention of OCGs through the 
continuous inspection of rules, regulations and the 
administrations of businesses, bars, restaurants, real 
estate agencies, notaries, and so on. The aim of the 
government is to make it as difficult as possible for 
criminals to settle more or less permanently in legal 
society. Coffee shops and prostitution are also subject 
to inspections by local governments to check that rules 
and regulations are being followed. The police are little 
involved in such inspections.
29.  Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are available for 604 
references.
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Figure 16. Number or references to OCG infiltration in open sources by business sector30
4.5 Actors and modi operandi
Distinctions among different OCGs in terms of targeted 
business sectors and regions are difficult to draw, 
given the method used to create the DCI and the scant 
availability of information on the types of criminal 
groups involved in infiltration cases. Dutch OCGs seem 
more active in the wholesale and retail trade and in the 
management of hotels, bars and restaurants. Evidence 
of Italian mafias infiltrating legal businesses in the 
country was also found.
The current literature on OCG infiltration in the legal 
economy provides scant information on the methods 
used by criminal groups to infiltrate and manage legal 
businesses. Analysis of the case studies provided some 
insights. In general, the infiltration process seems very 
straightforward, with OCG members directly owning a 
legal business after having regularly purchased it from 
a legal entrepreneur.
Source: NSCR elaboration on DCI data
In a few cases, an OCG member approached a legal 
entrepreneur who had already acquired or set up a 
business in order to start a partnership. The legal 
business was then used to commit frauds. In these 
cases, the legal entrepreneur could be either an 
accomplice or unaware of the illicit activities of his new 
business partner. Another option is the acquisition of a 
legal business by a straw man who acts on behalf of the 
members of the criminal group. The straw man can be 
either a relative of the OCG member or a person without 
a criminal record who is promised money in exchange 
for his/her service.
4.6 Conclusions
The Dutch literature on organised crime is quite clear on 
infiltration and racketeering. In the last Dutch Organised 
Crime Monitor the researchers concluded as follows: 
‘Considering the available evidence of two decades 
of research into organised crime in the Netherlands, 
30. Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 0-digit) are 
available for 558 references.
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one may conclude that … criminal groups are primarily 
involved in international illegal trade, using the same 
opportunity structure that facilitates legal economic 
activities. The Netherlands could be either a destination 
country, a transit country, or, especially in the case of 
synthetic drugs, a production country. Rather than 
controlling certain regions or certain sectors of the 
economy, criminal groups use the legal infrastructure 
and legal commodity and money flows. As the 
Netherlands is an important logistical node in Europe 
(Amsterdam- Schiphol Airport, the port of Rotterdam), 
this also creates an excellent opportunity structure for 
organised crime. Economic sectors are used to commit 
or to conceal crimes or to spend criminal proceeds’ 
(Kruisbergen et al., 2012, pp. 288–289). Because of 
this absence of infiltration or racketeering by OCGs, the 
legal and economic sectors are not harmed or affected 
in general (except in rare cases). 
Source: Slovenian Police
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5. Slovenia31
5.1 Introduction
Experts and institutions whose work concerns organised 
crime agree that Slovenia’s geostrategic position is the 
main factor that influences the development and form 
of organised crime in Slovenia. Despite being a country 
traversed by the Balkan route and the one which is 
currently the southern entry point into the EU zone, 
the figures in the official police statistical records for 
organised crime occurrences in Slovenia are relatively 
low. Figure 17 presents the official statistics regarding 
organised crime in Slovenia for the period between 
2002 and the first half of 2014.
Figure 17. Criminal charges with references to organised crime groups, 2002-mid 201432
The statistics show that organised crime groups are 
particularly involved in drug-related crimes, followed by 
illegal trespassing of the state border and various types 
of grand larceny (though both are on the decrease). 
Since 2002 there have been 305 cases labelled as 
simultaneously organised and economic crimes, with 
forgery of documents predominating.
Slovenian OCGs can be generally divided into two 
categories. The first includes groups that engage 
in classic activities (e.g. drug trafficking, human 
smuggling); the second includes organised white-collar 
crime groups. In this latter case, economically-themed 
crimes are committed by the top echelons of Slovenian 
society.
31. With the collaboration of Gorazd Meško, Andrej Sotlar, Bojan Dobovšek, 
Katja Eman, Maja Modic, Branko Ažman and Boštjan Slak (University of 
Maribor-Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, Slovenia).
32. Slovenian police use EUROPOL's method to characterise organised 
crime (Policija, 2003). Since the method is perception and knowledge 
based, the numbers sometimes differ from those released in annually 
published police reports, since additional clarifications of circumstances 
reveal that criminal offences were not, in fact, related to organised crime. 
The calculations of the percentages of OCG occurrences in relation to total 
criminal charges per year were performed by the FCJS research team using 
the data provided; however, the results were not confirmed by the Slovenian 
police.
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33. ‘[COBISS] is a model of a system representing the platform for the 
national library information systems in Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Albania. All these systems are 
interconnected into the COBISS.Net regional network‘. COBISS.SI includes 
and searches the databases of Slovenian libraries only.
34. The key words used were Slovenian terms and derivatives of ‘organised 
crime’, ‘money laundering’, ‘criminal organisation’, and ‘criminal group’.
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Organised crime research in Slovenia has never focused 
on the economic behaviour of organised crime groups. 
Some academic papers (e.g. Dvoršek, 1993, 1995, 
2002) in the early years of Slovenian independence 
did, however, discuss and comment on police insights 
into such matters to a certain extent, but these insights 
were never empirically tested or critically reviewed. 
The general public believes - due to media reporting 
and hearsay - that OCGs have certain bars and kiosks 
in their possession. Yet they perceive the extent of 
ownership as non-threatening; therefore, no pressure 
is exerted on policy makers in regard to these matters.
Some limited insights into the interpenetration of 
organised crime groups and official economic activities 
can be obtained from the graduate theses of police 
officers, which are often seen as perception based, 
and some research on human trafficking (Pajnik & 
Kavčič, 2008). However, since the main focus is often 
elsewhere, the economic and entrepreneurial behaviour 
of organised crime groups and their members is still 
only indicated.
Methodological remarks
The literature on OCG infiltration was collected 
from COBISS.SI (Co-operative Online Bibliographic 
Systems and Services),33 Academic Search Premier 
databases, and by searching the online archives of 
three newspapers, namely, Večer, Delo, and Dnevnik.34 
Newspapers were also monitored daily for the most 
current cases of interest. 
More than 2,500 documents including academic 
papers, LEA reports, newspaper articles, research 
reports and theses were reviewed. Any document that 
offered enough information on classic organised crime 
group connections with legitimate businesses was 
entered into the Database on Criminal Infiltration (DCI), 
which collects 74 references to OCG infiltration of legal 
businesses in Slovenia. Figure 18 shows the variety of 
sources used to gather information on OCG infiltration 
in the country.
35. Tycoons in Slovenia are seen as the main culprits for the bad economic 
situation, and since there are several stories involving tycoons that ’went 
out of business‘ and destroyed the company that they led in the process, 
the public and investigative institutions believe that a problem with 
’tycoonisation’ exists in the country.
Figure 18. Percentage of references to OCG 
infiltration in open sources by type of source
Source: FCJS elaboration on DCI data
5.2 Drivers
Since the previous literature on organised crime 
in Slovenia had never focused on OCGs’ economic 
behaviour, the review did not find any works furnishing 
conclusive or direct statements that would undisputedly 
indicate the underlying reasons for infiltration by 
criminal groups of legitimate businesses. Even during 
the analysis of case studies, our research could not 
always give definitive reasons for organised crime 
members’ engagement in entrepreneurship. 
Profit. In the case of white-collar organised crime groups 
mainly consisting of top managers of Slovenia’s largest 
construction firms and merchant enterprises – often 
involved in ‘tycoonisation’35 – the main driver appeared 
to be financial gain, either through gaining a state 
contract or acquiring ownership (e.g. majority or total 
shareholding). The same applies to construction firms 
engaged in cartel de ling and bribery. They becam  
managers, CEOs, or owners of these later-exploited 
companies either through revolving door phenomena 
or by climbing the corporate ladder. Only later do they 
exploit the possibilities, the positions, and influence for 
their deviant behaviour. 
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The cases on these matters have mostly not yet been 
finalised because not all legal means have been 
exploited.36
Money laundering and concealment of illegal 
activities. In the case of classic organised crime 
groups, the literature suggests a constant perception 
that they mostly invest their criminal proceeds in bars 
(Dvoršek, 1995) and/or fruit and vegetable stores. The 
case studies identified and collected during the project 
confirmed the interest of OCGs in bars, whereas only 
a few cases of infiltration involving fruit and vegetable 
stores were found. The motives in some cases were 
undoubtedly money laundering or facilitating the 
commission of crimes (e.g. managing or owning a bar 
where prostitution takes place), while in other cases the 
drivers were inconclusive. The overall low number of 
identified cases also indicates that the majority of illegal 
profits earned by members of classic organised crime 
groups is used to improve the quality of life and, later, 
to fund otherwise expensive lifestyles. This is similar to 
van Duyne’s (1996) research findings that many OCG 
members earn enough to afford a lavish lifestyle without 
needing to launder money (van Duyne, 1996). To some 
extent, this is also seen in Figure 19 showing that the 
majority of criminal charges of money laundering in 
Slovenia do not have characteristics of organised crime.
Figure 19. Filed criminal charges for money 
laundering offences, 2002-mid 2014
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In some instances, one could even hypothesise that 
those involved in organised crime business were at 
first legitimate businessmen who, perhaps due to poor 
performance of their firms or merely to make some 
additional profit, became involved in criminal acts as 
’jobs on the side‘. This mainly applies to taxi drivers or 
bar owners and managers that engaged in illegal drug-
related activities. Since they have been caught, they 
may not be the best examples of an organised crime 
perpetrator definition, which Ruggiero (2000) has 
already noted in his study on crime markets and those 
employed in them. Finally, indications of non-financial 
profit-related motives such as social consensus or 
control of the territory were not found. 
In both cases (white-collar and classic OCGs), the choice 
of location and the sector of infiltration/exploitation 
is based on easiness - they infiltrate or engage in a 
business that is easy to set up or obtain - and availability 
- they exploit the business that they already manage. 
Location does not seem to play an important role. OCG 
members engage in or set up businesses that are often 
registered near their home residences. In addition, 
considering the smallness of Slovenia, such dispersed 
locations are not surprising.
5.3 Infiltrated territories
The majority of evidence on OCG infiltration in 
businesses found that they were located and registered 
in the Slovenian capital, Ljubljana; and this affects the 
number of references to the region where Ljubljana is 
located (Osrednjeslovenska). In nine Slovenian regions 
out of twelve, cases of questionable businesses 
were found, only excluding the Koroška, Zasavska 
and Notranjsko-kraška regions. In nineteen cases of 
questionable business practices, it was not possible to 
establish the location of registration. Such distribution 
may in part be due to the tendency of the media to 
report illegal activities in major cities and of OCGs to 
conduct more activities in the cities in order not to ’stick 
out‘ in the Slovenian countryside.37
36. Or have not been used until recently. For instance, the CEO of one of 
Slovenia’s biggest merchants was involved in  failed tycoonisation attempts 
in which he abused his position and was, in 2013, sentenced to more than 
six years of imprisonment. He was released in the autumn of 2014, when 
the Supreme Court of Slovenia granted his request in connection with an 
appeal in cassation. Moreover, the Supreme Court will now have to decide 
on similar requests filed by the CEOs of what were formerly the most 
important Slovenian economic power players (Ni Č., 2014a; STA, 2014). 
Another former CEO involved in a similar takeover story and sentenced 
for abuse of position to more than five years’ imprisonment is appearing 
in a separate trial for abuse of position in another company. The latest 
modification of the indictment states that he supposedly illegally acquired 
some €77 million worth of benefits to the company (it was previously stated 
that the sum was €109,15 million that he gained for himself). The third story 
of a former CEO describes the case of an important figure in the executive 
and legislative branches of governance since the time of Slovenian 
independence (Stojiljković, 2014a) who was also convicted of incitement 
to abuse of office and money laundering and sentenced to seven years of 
imprisonment. He will also have to return more than €20 million that he 
made by chaining shares or reselling them through several companies. 
His accomplices will have to return the profit, although their earnings were 
very much lower. Three CEOs of Slovenia’s biggest construction firms came 
under investigation in the so-called Clean Shovel case. The Clean Shovel 
case began in February 2008 with a high-profile police action in which 
the CEOs were arrested. In the subsequent trial they were found guilty of 
attempting to rig a public tender in 2007. More specifically, they were found 
guilty of paying bribes in order to secure a public contract for construction of 
a new air traffic control tower at Ljubljana airport. After the defendants' and 
prosecution's appeals, the verdict was final in 2013, and all three above-
mentioned defendants were sentenced to prison (P., 2012; STA, 2013).
37. The absence of metropolises in Slovenia has substantial benefits for 
crime repression, and Slovenian experts on organised crime also believe 
that the smallness of Slovenian cities disables OCGs to hide or to conduct 
their activities undetected (Logonder, 2013).
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Figure 20. Number of references to OCG infiltration in 
open sources by region (NUTS 3)38
Source: FCJS elaboration on DCI data
Real estate activities - sometimes used for money 
laundering and sometimes for other purposes - are 
often conducted in ex-Yugoslav countries such as 
Croatia (Modic & Vuković, 2014), Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Predanič, 2008). From the 
interview with Janko Goršek, a Slovenian police officer 
attaché in Sarajevo, it can be deduced that there is 
an increase in economic crime activities by Slovenian 
businessmen in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stojiljković, 
2014b).
5.4 Infiltrated business sectors
In the Database on Criminal Infiltration only a handful 
of business sectors appear to be infiltrated by OCGs. 
However, it should be emphasised that identification of 
the business sectors for infiltrated businesses reported 
in the literature proved to be somewhat problematic.39 
Legal companies, when registered in the early days 
of Slovenian independence, listed countless and 
unconnected activities, sometimes even more than 
some hundreds. Yet the volume of their business often 
proved to be very small. This practice was discarded after 
the improvements made to the company registration 
procedure, when use of the NACE classification became 
more regulated. Figure 21 shows the economic sectors 
where references to OCG infiltration were found.
Figure 21. Number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by business sector40
Source: FCJS elaboration on DCI data
38. Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 3) are available for 55 
references.
39. In Slovenia the NACE classification replaced the Standardna klasifikacija 
dejavnosti (SKD), which can be translated as Standard Classification of 
Activities (SCA).
40.  Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 0-digit) are 
available for 74 references.
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Bars and night clubs. Among the sectors identified as 
infiltrated by OCGs, beverage serving activity strongly 
dominates. Two different socially perceived forms of 
legal subjects can be found in this category. Though 
not officially recognised as a category or actual legal 
classification, the term ‘night club’ (nočni lokal) is used 
by both the visitors and owners of such clubs to indicate 
the ‘form’ of the bar. These bars are usually open 
through the night, and the majority of bars that provide 
erotic artistic performances also include the term ‘night 
club’ in their registration name in AJPES. Bars, on the 
other hand, are usual business subjects that serve 
beverages until about 10 pm and do not usually provide 
other services or amusements. 
Night bars (or ‘strip bars’) were often found to be 
connected with forced prostitution. A bar is ostensibly a 
legitimate business where girls perform various dance 
routines; but there is often hidden (forced) prostitution 
in the background (e.g. Furlan-Rus, 2009; Lovšin, 2013; 
Žist, 2006). Also frequent are signs of human trafficking. 
In most cases, such businesses are small-scale: bars 
managed by a couple of perpetrators with connections 
to a human trafficking network. In relatively few cases, 
bar owners themselves manage the recruitment and 
transportation of the women. ‘Classic’ bars, on the 
other hand, were found to be often managed by an 
OCG member engaged in drug trafficking (e.g. Lovrenc, 
2010). In some relatively few cases, indications were 
found that bars were used also for the actual exchange 
of drugs; however, in the majority of cases the deal was 
discussed in the bar but the actual exchange was made 
at another location.
Owning or renting a bar is popular partly because of 
Slovenian culture and partly because the entire process 
of establishing an entity is not particularly difficult, since 
the majority of the businesses in question only serve 
beverages without food (thus decreasing the number of 
required standards). 
Box 2. Slovenia’s largest prosecuted organised crime 
case: infiltration in bars and restaurants
This frequent connection of bars and their 
owners’ or managers’ involvement in drug 
activities is well illustrated by Slovenia’s largest 
prosecuted organised crime case. The OCG 
came under scrutiny when several investigative 
and security agencies, including the Slovenian 
police, the Serbian Security Information Agency 
(BIA), and The United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), had concluded the 
Balkan Warrior operation (balkanski bojevnik) 
and presented the results (Bilefsky, 2014). 
These agencies found that there was an 
OCG in Slovenia closely connected with a 
Montenegrin/Serbian crime boss engaged in 
drug-type (cocaine) criminal activities and with 
connections throughout the Balkans and even in 
some EU countries. 
The leader of Slovenian ‘branch’ was listed as 
the owner of several bars and restaurants: if 
the ownership was not listed in the registers 
under his name, it was listed indirectly through 
a company which he and his wife own(ed). 
The business activities included management 
of bars and restaurants. After the arrest, the 
ownerships of businesses and real-estates were 
changed immediately: they were transferred to 
his closer relatives or friends. Similar transfers 
of ownership were performed by other people 
involved, i.e. by the owners of a construction 
company, a catering company, and an energy 
provider company. All of them were registered 
as micro companies (M. Č., 2011; Ropac, 2014).
Another frequent NACE classification among infiltrated 
businesses in Slovenia is Amusement and recreation 
activities, which is used by businesses that engage in 
‘providing artistic (erotic) services’ to bars. This usually 
means that they provide documents for foreign women 
employed in such bars.
Taxi services and trucking. The variable ‘transportation 
and renting of motor vehicles’ was used to group the 
activities of taxi services and trucking. The Slovenians’ 
fascination with cars (Plevnik, Rejec Brancelj, & Zupan, 
2008; Zupančič, 2011) and Slovenia’s location (i.e. on 
the Balkan route, access to the sea), knowledge of ex-
Yugoslavian languages and locations, relative ease of 
obtaining the permits and licences necessary for such 
activities41 enable taxi and truck drivers or companies 
to engage in such businesses. The amount of cargo 
transferred by Slovenian trucks has been on the 
increase since 1994 and especially so since Slovenia’s 
accession to the EU (Plevnik et al., 2008). However, 
a warning is in order: there are shortcomings in the 
measuring methodology, because the data include only 
the cargo transferred in Slovenia by Slovenian trucks, 
thus excluding data on Slovenian trucks transferring 
cargo abroad and the data on foreign trucks transferring 
cargo in Slovenia (Plevnik et al., 2008). The data also 
41. In the case of taxi services, for the requirement that applied in the 
period of our analyses with regard to the selected cases (see Uradni list 
Republike Slovenije, 1996a, 1996b).
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show that the Slovenian cargo transportation sector 
in 2008 and 2011 accounted for up to 7% of GDP 
(Ključevšek, Fiehn, Hiršl, Knafelc, & Peterca, 2012). 
The number of taxi companies has also increased 
since 2004, although even previously it was not a small 
sector (see Žužek, 2014).
Taxi companies have been used for human smuggling 
(e.g. Furlan-Rus, 2004). Due to their high mobility, 
familiarity with roads, traffic, the terrain, and generally 
well-informed taxi drivers, the design of Slovenian taxi 
services is suitable for various activities. The media 
and police also often report the common belief that 
taxi drivers also drive clients to and from prostitutes 
or supply clients to various night bars (throughout 
Slovenia) in which (forced) prostitution takes place (Žist, 
2006). Cargo transportation businesses have often 
been used for drug smuggling (Ni Č., 2014b; Possnig, 
2012). However, it should be emphasised that in these 
cases the business is not always set up as a front. The 
owners, though more often drivers (especially if private 
entrepreneurs), only exploit the opportunity for some 
additional profit. In some cases, owners are totally 
unaware of the criminal activities of their drivers. It is 
possible that, in some cases, the drivers are not aware 
of the drugs hidden in their vehicles.
Figure 22. Regions (NUTS 3) with at least one reference to OCG infiltration in open sources in  the top 3 infiltrated 
sectors42
Source: FCJS elaboration on DCI data
5.5. Actors and modi operandi
References to infiltration indicate that business 
entities in Slovenia are established by only two types 
of OCG groups. The first category includes OCGs mainly 
constituted by members of Slovenian origin; the second 
category includes OCGs connected to the groups or 
perpetrators located in the Balkans, mainly coming 
from ex-Yugoslav countries. However, there are no 
major differences in selection of the type of legitimate 
business that they have infiltrated. The only slight 
differences are due to the form of illegal activity in which 
they engage. Since OCGs with members of Slovenian 
origin are more often engaged in forced prostitution 
and human smuggling,43 the infiltrated activities are 
those more suitable for their modi operandi, that is, taxi 
Transportation Hotels, bars and restaurants Clubs and gambling activities
services and night bars. On the other hand, the OCGs 
with ex-Yugoslav origins/connections are more often 
engaged in drug trafficking activities, which is why bars 
suit their needs better.
The literature and the case studies on criminal infiltration 
indicate that the methods used for the acquisition of 
ownership of a business are quite straightforward and 
simple. Usually, OCG members merely set up a new 
business (register it) in accordance with bureaucratic 
requirements or simply buy an existing business and re-
register it in their name. No indication was found that 
previous owners were threatened or forced into sale. 
If OCG members are more ‘careful’, the assets are 
registered in the names of their spouses or relatives. 
42. Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 3) for transportation, 
hotels, bars, and restaurants, and clubs and gambling activities are 
available for 46 references.
43. Human smuggling requires more familiarity with the terrain near 
Slovenia’s borders. However, the Slovenian police states that the 
organisation of the groups engaged in people smuggling has reached a 
level where local ‘help’ is less and less needed (SOJ SGDP GPU, 2014).
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Strong evidence was found that members of classic OCGs 
tend to own and/or manage small-scale businesses 
directly. The majority of firms for which data were found 
in AJPES declared themselves as micro firms.44 The 
reviewed cases on white-collar OCGs also indicate a 
direct involvement of the CEOs of the firms in the majority 
of criminal cases. Straw men mainly appeared in missing 
trader cases and in real-estate manipulations. 
A mixture of success rates was noted. Some set-up 
businesses were and still are operational and seem 
profitable, while some have already been deleted from 
the Slovenian business registers. No general rule can be 
applied here.
5.6 Conclusions
There are some obvious and self-evident conclusions 
to be drawn from the literature. The first is that in 
Slovenia the literature on the criminal infiltration of 
legal businesses is scarce. 
On using the newly-developed online application named 
SUPERVIZOR (Komisija za preprečevanje korupcije, 
2014), it was found that some of the companies and 
businesses managed or owned by the subjects arrested 
for their involvement in classic activities of organised 
crime had provided services to the Slovenian public 
sector for a long period of time. Although the earnings 
were relatively low, it is the accumulative aspect that 
is worrisome, as the number of the companies was 
not particularly small. Secondly, in the case of white-
collar organised crimes (construction and merchant 
affairs) the damage was extensive, not to mention that 
the Slovenian infrastructure and everything connected 
to it have been damaged and will be handicapped for 
decades.45 
The main facilitating factors of OCG infiltration are 
the lack of administrative screening and the belated 
involvement of state economic institutions (e.g. Ministry 
of Economy, Tax Administration) in investigation and the 
development of preventive measures, as well as better 
developed and properly used regulatory powers. Some 
good practices are described in Levi & Maguire (2004). 
Public administration workers are not obliged to conduct 
basic searches on credit ratings, previous criminal 
involvement, and the possibility of a mailbox address 
scheme, before issuing a certain permit or licence. 
Moreover, the opening of numerous firms registered 
at the address where numerous other firms have 
already been registered without sounding the alarm46 is 
becoming a frequent problem in exploitation of workers 
as well (Bučar-Ručman & Frangež, 2014; Modic & Kralj, 
2014). Such straw companies are established in order 
to acquire the papers necessary for foreign workers to 
enter Slovenia. Once in Slovenia, they can move freely 
inside the EU and become victimised by exploiters from 
other countries (Bučar-Ručman & Frangež, 2014). 
Other facilitating factors can be attributed to the 
inspection services, which are often criticised for being 
lazy and toothless. The finding that many women in 
forced prostitution have been paid with cash-in-hand, 
have worked overtime, and have lived at a location 
not listed on their entrance permits, shows that the 
Slovenian inspection services are ineffective. The 
GRETA (Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking 
in Human Beings), in its latest country report, also 
urges the Slovenian authorities to develop and 
implement periodic training programmes that would 
enable the development of identification skills and 
deepen the knowledge on human trafficking of all 
relevant professionals (e.g. the staff of administrative 
units responsible for issuing residence permits, labour 
inspectors, judges, lawyers) (GRETA, 2014). Thus, in 
their research on human trafficking and exploitation 
of men for what could almost be regarded as slavery, 
Bučar-Ručman & Frangež (2014) have found a similar 
modus operandi of exploiters, who used economic 
violence, had their workers registered at one address 
while they really lived at another, and in various ways 
misled state agencies. 
Finally, the information collected during the project has 
provided support for claims on organised crime groups 
involvement in bars and restaurants (Dvoršek, 2002).
The slow paced improvement of Slovenian legislation 
on asset recovery and of investigative and preventive 
measures may favour corruption activities, which also 
involve the Slovenian economic elites (Klemenčič, 
Praprotnik, & Selinšek, 2013). Such measures may – 
in the long run – limit the commission of sophisticated 
forms of crime.
44. The classification is based on the provisions given in the Uradni list 
Republike Slovenije (2006). According to article 55 of the act: a ‘micro 
company shall be a company meeting two of the following criteria:
- average number of employees in a financial year does not exceed 10,
- net sales income does not exceed 2,000,000 euros, and
- value of assets does not exceed 2,000,000 euros.’
45. Slovenia’s healthcare system is under heavy accusations regarding 
corruption. Due to the fact that water, energy, and road management 
are all controlled by the State or/and the local public sector, the state 
and local politicians extend their influence and improperly control 
public procurements and funding, hence exploiting the companies and/or 
the Slovenian budget. The recent cases include the notorious TEŠ6 project 
(the construction of a new lignite block at the existing thermal power plant) 
and various healthcare corruption schemes. The directors of the Slovenian 
Commission for Prevention of Corruption (CPC) resigned in protest on 
November 29, 2013, claiming that Slovenian political elites blocked any 
attempts to remedy the situation described. As the CPC often emphasises, 
Slovenia is in thrall to political and economic elites (Klemenčič, Praprotnik, 
& Selinšek, 2013).
46. No alarm is sounded also if the same person frequently opens and 
closes businesses. The person declares bankruptcy on one firm but opens 
another with a ‘clean slate’.
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6. Sweden47
6.1 Introduction
The organised crime situation in Sweden is more focused 
on networks than on stable organisations, hierarchies 
or environments. For this reason, the border between 
organised crime and economic crime (committed by 
perpetrators in networks) is sometimes rather blurred. 
This is also a problem for this chapter because it can be 
difficult to distinguish between organised and network-
related economic crime. To complicate matters further, 
law enforcement agencies report that notorious white-
collar criminals are teaming up with organised crime in 
joint criminal projects (EBM, 2013a; RKP, 2012b).
During the past ten years, asset recovery has been a 
major topic in criminal policy. Several law enforcement 
and regulatory agencies, such as the tax authority and 
the enforcement authority, have developed routines 
for asset recovery and hired economists to carry out 
financial investigations in the intelligence phase as 
well as during pre-trial investigations. Since July 2014, 
a new anti-money laundering law has introduced the 
ability to freeze funds in accounts and ‘self-laundering’.
However, the seized assets have more to do with cash, 
cars, motorcycles, boats, jewellery and watches than 
investments in businesses, real estate or bonds. This 
is of course a result of the rather low level of organised 
crime investments in the Swedish economy. But there 
are some well-known cases where Swedish organised 
crime offenders have made investments in the legal 
economy. Research on the financial management of 
drug crime and organised tax fraud suggests that profit 
from crime is indeed invested in legitimate businesses 
(Brå, 2007b, 2011b). Some investments take place 
in Sweden, some abroad – usually in places where 
the offender has family, friends or other ties. It seems 
very rare that foreign organised crime groups invest in 
Swedish businesses.
While infiltration in the legal economy is an unfamiliar 
concept in the Swedish context, experts who 
participated in seminars organised during the project 
had experienced how people in - and affiliated with - 
organised crime are becoming increasingly involved in 
legitimate businesses (see RKP, 2012b). By tradition 
it is relatively easy to start a business in Sweden; 
something that organised crime take advantage of 
(EBM, 2012; Larsson, 2008).
Research on the ways in which organised crime groups 
take over and use legitimate businesses is scarce. There 
is also an absence of a penal code that targets the act 
of infiltration. Instead, relevant ‘infiltration crimes’ in 
the Swedish context are likely to include various types 
of forgery, fraud, tax evasion, accounting offences, and 
extortion.
Furthermore, Swedish constitutional law has a relatively 
permissive approach to freedom of association, 
according to which organisations cannot be criminalised. 
Hence, membership of outlaw motorcycle gangs and 
other organisations viewed as ‘criminal’ by both the 
police and the general public is not illegal in Sweden. 
Consequently, members of those organisations are 
free to own, set up, and acquire businesses. Another 
aspect is that Swedish law does not penalise legal 
persons such as businesses and associations. Rather, 
the law targets individuals and their actions, which was 
a challenge in identifying suitable cases for the study.
Methodological remarks
This chapter is based on what little research was 
available – largely conducted at Brå. Added to that 
research are strategic reports from law enforcement 
agencies and newspaper articles. The oldest reports 
and articles were from 2006, the most recent ones 
from 2013. The literature and the newspaper articles 
were organised and coded in the Database on Criminal 
Infiltration (DCI). With the help of some newspaper 
articles, a good number of case studies was also found 
and analysed in-depth during the project. Out of the 140 
references, 45 originated from newspaper articles. Only 
23% references originated from around 10 academic 
publications. The remaining sources can be classified 
as analysis and situation reports by authorities and 
in some cases member organisations for companies 
(Figure 23).
47. With the collaboration of Helena Rönnblom, Johanna Skinnari and Lars 
Korsell (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention - Brå, Sweden).
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Figure 23. Percentage of references to OCG 
infiltration in open sources by type of source
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To gain a better picture of the concept of infiltration, we 
invited two reference groups to follow the project, one 
consisting of experts from law enforcement agencies 
and one with experts from the private security sector. 
A seminar was held with each group at the beginning 
of the project, and another halfway through the project. 
The reference groups also provided us with case studies 
to be analysed during the project. 
6.2 Drivers
Profit. Unsurprisingly, financial gain is a frequent 
motive for infiltration. In a sense, all the drivers listed 
below concern profit from either legal or illicit business 
activities. While some arrangements require a lot of 
time and preparation, others are made rapidly and 
target easy money. As we shall see, business set-ups 
may also vary in complexity. 
The infiltrated business may be targeted for the sake 
of its assets or for the purpose of making money by 
running the business. Companies may also be targeted 
because they are business competitors of other 
infiltrated businesses. In these cases, the purpose 
of disturbing a business competitor is to increase 
the profit of one’s own company. Although there are 
many prosperous companies, research suggests 
that perpetrators often have unrealistic ideas of their 
profitability and underestimate the costs of running 
the business. Instead of reading the annual reports, 
their impression of profitability is based on simple 
observations of the number of customers or clients in 
a business, and turnover rather than actual profit (Brå, 
2012b).
In some cases, organised crime seeks to take over 
certain segments of the business and run these as 
separate operations. A typical example is provided 
by cloakrooms at restaurants and night clubs (Brå, 
2012b). Another is security outside restaurants: by 
controlling this, organised crime also controls who 
enters the restaurant to do business.
Money laundering. Another reason for taking over 
or starting up a new business is to launder money. 
Money laundering may be carried out in different ways. 
According to the FIU, organised crime may have direct 
or indirect connections to businesses which they use 
for money laundering (RKP, 2012a). One arrangement 
is to start a business in order to mask criminal money 
as legal turnover and profit.
Whilst not all money laundering involves infiltrated 
businesses, the money laundering act stipulates that 
businesses that handle transactions of large sums in 
cash are obliged to report suspicious transactions to 
the FIU at the NBI. These actors include banks and 
other financial institutions, exchange offices and other 
money transfer companies, real estate agencies, 
insurance agencies, accountants, tax advisors, and 
traders with goods whose value exceed €15,000. 
About 15,000 businesses in Sweden are affected 
by this regulation; however, less than one per cent of 
them report transactions to the FIU. In other words, in 
addition to the 10,000 transactions that are reported 
annually, there are large numbers of unreported cases 
(Brå, 2011a; RKP, 2012a, 2013).
Banks and other financial institutions have become 
more likely to report suspicious transactions and deny 
transactions (Brå, 2011a). Therefore organised crime 
shows an increased interest in infiltrating currency 
exchange offices (Brå, 2008b, 2011a, 2011b; EBM, 
2013a; RKP, 2013). There are examples of organised 
crime placing or recruiting insiders at currency 
exchange offices in order to reduce the risk of being 
reported (Brå, 2007b, 2011b, 2012b; RKP, 2012b). 
Another method is to start one’s own exchange office 
where both one’s own criminal returns and those of 
others may be laundered (Brå, 2008b; Noroozi & Lind, 
2013).
Obtain information. Research suggests that organised 
crime members with little experience of economic crime 
may need expert help when entering this crime field 
(Brå, 2014a). The motive for infiltrating small accounting 
firms is to obtain knowledge about accounting and 
taxation, and other financial competences. This 
information is used to create new crime plans and to 
find opportunities to conduct business in the grey area. 
Self-employed accountants and financial advisors, as 
well as small firms, thus become targets for infiltration. 
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Gain access to social benefits. The Swedish 
social welfare system is relatively comprehensive 
by international standards. Being employed, or at 
least having a taxed income, provides many types of 
benefits such as parental insurance, sickness benefit, 
pension, and unemployment benefit. Employers receive 
the largest payments; in this case organised crime 
members can, as business owners, get subsidies to 
hire staff. There are even certain subsidies for those 
who hire people with a criminal record. In the event of 
bankruptcy, a guaranteed wage is paid by the County 
Administrative Board to employees to cover the first 
three months of unemployment, which may create 
an incentive for organised crime to start businesses, 
pretend to create job opportunities, and then lead the 
company to bankruptcy. 
For organised crime running a business, the social 
welfare system also offers opportunities for employers 
to keep the illicit wages low. This is because the 
employees can survive on low wages and at the same 
time claim unemployment and sickness benefits (Brå, 
2011b; ISF, 2011; RKP, 2012b). They do not demand 
more from the employer, especially not one helping 
them into the welfare system by providing the necessary 
fake documentation. There are indications that doctors 
may sometimes be part of the arrangement, producing 
fake medical certificates for those not sick enough to 
qualify for benefits (Brå, 2011b). In these cases, the 
doctor is acting in the interest of organised crime. 
Create employment for friends and relatives. A study 
on unlawful influence on business owners has identified 
cases where criminals take over companies simply to 
become employers (Brå, 2012b). In these few cases, 
job offers to friends or family members are real in the 
sense that the employees carry out actual work and are 
paid. Being an employer may also be part of an identity 
as a businessperson, and offering job opportunities a 
way to obtain services and favours from others. This 
driver may be connected to the motive to exploit the 
social welfare system because several benefits are 
income related. Thus a high salary (on paper) leads to 
a high benefit.
Gain status within the criminal or legal sphere. 
Running a business and being an employer may also 
strengthen one’s influence in the community, be it a 
town, guild or ethnic group. It may also legitimise and 
mask one’s illegal activities and facilitate establishing 
oneself in society as a business owner, rather than as a 
criminal (Brå, 2007b, 2012b).
Restaurants and bars are examples of sectors in which 
this may be particularly relevant, and previous research 
indicates that owning a restaurant is highly regarded in 
criminal circles (Brå, 2007b, 2011a; Korsell, Skinnari, 
& Vesterhav, 2009). Running a business also creates 
an interface with other actors, both criminal and legal, 
which may be useful in future criminal enterprises.
Gain access to markets for stolen or illicit goods. 
Finally, organised crime is interested in infiltrating 
legitimate businesses because this facilitates the use 
of markets for stolen or otherwise illicit goods and 
services such as drugs, smuggled or untaxed alcohol, 
and sex (Brå, 2006; Korsell et al., 2009). Organised 
crime groups are often involved in the above-mentioned 
illegal activities, and controlling a legitimate business, 
such as a restaurant, creates an opportunity to sell for 
example smuggled or untaxed alcohol and cigarettes. 
Night clubs may be used for prostitution. Mixing stolen 
goods with legal products in a legitimate business also 
reduces suspicions of both authorities and customers 
(Brå, 2006; Korsell et al., 2009).
6.3 Infiltrated territories
Knowledge about organised crime investment in legal 
businesses (stocks, shares or other kinds of ownership) 
is rather scarce. According to both research and seminar 
participants, offenders seem to invest in ‘familiar’ and 
low key technological sectors like restaurants, bars, 
transport and construction businesses. There are also 
investments in real estate. The volume of investments 
is hard to assess, but compared to consumption levels 
investments are rare (Brå, 2007b, 2011b, 2014a). 
There are also investments abroad, in former domestic 
countries or in countries popular for tourists or retired 
persons such as Spain and Thailand.
Both the literature and the expert seminars suggest 
that organised crime infiltration in Sweden mainly takes 
place in the three metropolitan regions: the county of 
Stockholm, Skåne (with Malmö) and Västra Götaland 
(with Gothenburg). This has of course to do with the fact 
that Sweden is highly urbanised and that most economic 
activities are conducted in these regions. However, 
organised criminals operate throughout the country, 
and according to seminar participants, infiltration takes 
place where these perpetrators find opportunities. 
Especially middle-sized cities and surrounding, rural 
areas are targeted. 
The high concentration in the three city regions is 
replicated by reports of suspicious transactions (signs 
of money laundering): these cities account for 84% of 
the reports (61% are reported in Stockholm County) 
(Brå, 2011a). It should be mentioned that another 
concept related to infiltration – extortion of businesses 
– is also overrepresented in Stockholm; more than 50% 
of the reported extortion cases concern businesses in 
Stockholm, while only 24% of all job opportunities are 
located in that city (Brå, 2012c).
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Figure 24. Number of references to OCG infiltration in 
open sources by region (NUTS 2)48
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Source: Brå elaboration on DCI data
There are other ways in which geography plays a role 
in infiltration. For example, there are cases in which 
infiltrated companies use different registered addresses 
in order to confuse the law enforcement agencies. In a 
recent large-scale case of fraud involving false invoices, 
it is alleged that the suspects deliberately reported a 
false address to the tax authorities in order to keep the 
business hidden from the latter. The business owners, 
at least according to press reports, were members of an 
outlaw prison gang (Strömberg, 2012). 
Some organised crime groups are more geographically 
restricted than others. An example of one such group 
using infiltration is an ethnic criminal group based in 
a medium-sized city in the Stockholm region. Its main 
source of income was extortion of small, local business 
entrepreneurs belonging to the same ethnic group. 
Some of these businesses were eventually taken over by 
the criminal group (cf. Brå, 2012b; Brodin & Appelgren, 
2013). Several of the group members also started their 
own, legal companies. 
6.4 Infiltrated business sectors
Infiltration by organised crime of legitimate companies 
is found in a wide variety of economic sectors, from 
publicly funded private care providers to construction 
and cash-in-transit (see Brå, 2011b; EBM, 2010, 2012; 
RKP, 2012b, 2013). Both the literature and seminars 
confirm that organised crime is highly interested in 
cash-intensive businesses such as hairdressers, beauty 
salons, cafés, and restaurants (Brå, 2011b; EBM, 
2010, 2012; RKP, 2012b, 2013). In cash-intensive 
sectors, it is easier to avoid registration of payments 
and tax on services and goods. With large sums of 
unaccounted-for cash, untaxed salaries can be paid to 
employees. For these reasons and for the purpose of 
money laundering, cash-intensive businesses attract 
organised crime. 
Figure 25 ranks business sectors according to the number 
of references to infiltration by organised crime groups. 
The information is based on the documents recorded in 
the Database on Criminal Infiltration and its limitations 
should thus be considered when interpreting the results.
The view that all sectors are in some sense at risk 
of infiltration was confirmed by several seminar 
participants. Transportation and logistics, online 
gaming and regular betting, travel agencies used for 
human trafficking and money laundering, marketing/
telemarketing, recycling, retail and wholesale in gold, 
import of alcohol and cigarettes are some examples 
mentioned at the seminars. There are also examples 
in the literature of drug couriers who own haulage 
firms and smuggle drugs and regular goods on the 
same trucks (Brå, 2007b). Some sectors, however, 
are more exposed to infiltration than others. A factor 
that seems to increase the risk is rapid change, such 
as deregulation or privatisation, in a sector but control 
mechanisms have not yet been developed. 
Sectors in which subcontracting is common, such 
as construction and cleaning, are also identified as 
vulnerable to organised crime (Brå, 2011b, 2012b). 
The same applies to sectors that lack transparency, 
such as healthcare work carried out in private homes 
(ISF, 2011). Several studies highlight that economic 
sectors in which cash is widely used are very attractive 
to organised crime (Brå, 2011b, 2012b; EBM, 2012).
Financial and insurance activities. Currency exchange 
and money transfer as well as banks and cash-in-transit 
play an important role in combatting money laundering 
and other economic crimes related to infiltration. 
Consequently, infiltration of these sectors is regarded 
as particularly serious and harmful (Brå, 2011b; RKP, 
2010).
The financial sector is subject to a number of regulations, 
some of which aim at curbing money laundering. For 
example, a permit from the Financial Supervisory 
Authority is needed in order to start a business in cash-
in-transit (CIT). In both seminar discussions, however, it 
was argued that once the permit is issued, there is little 
control over the business activities. 
48. Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are available for 140 
references.
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Figure 25. Number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources by business sector49
The literature identifies several cases of organised 
crime groups starting companies in the financial sector. 
One example is an exchange office in Stockholm that 
was used to launder money from crimes such as drug 
dealing and robbery (Dagens Industri, 2007). In Malmö, 
the Police initiated a specific project targeting fraudulent 
exchange offices, and several were closed as a result 
(Noroozi & Lind, 2013). Another large-scale case is that 
of Panaxia, a CIT-company transporting cash for the 
Riksbank (Central Bank), other banks and businesses, 
which went bankrupt in 2012 and is subject to no 
fewer than six police investigations. According to the 
liquidator, the equivalent of approximately €60 million 
may have been embezzled (EBM, 2013a).
Another financial service at risk of infiltration is factoring. 
There are different types of factoring services, all of 
which may be combined with debt collection. According 
to the Economic Crime Authority, factoring companies 
are often at the centre of complex criminal enterprises 
involving several actors and businesses (EBM, 2013b). 
Factoring may also be essential for certain crime 
plans, since it enables fast cash flow to the infiltrated 
Source: Brå elaboration on DCI data
company when buying the invoices before payment 
default. Sometimes, owners of factoring businesses 
are unaware of their participation in criminal activities. 
They can also take an active role by offering a package 
solution including consulting, debt collection, factoring, 
false invoices, and cash supply. As with currency 
exchange, an organised crime group may also start up 
its own factoring company (EBM, 2013b).
Construction. The construction industry is a recurrent 
risk sector in the research and newspaper articles 
related to infiltration. Frequent use of contractor levels 
is part of the problem. Another aspect is that the 
work is often carried out as projects in which different 
companies undertake different tasks. In addition, 
reported and unreported labour is often mixed, making 
it harder for authorities to identify irregularities (Brå, 
2007a, 2011b, 2012b).
49. Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 0-digit) are 
available for 114 references.
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Both the literature and seminars confirm that the 
construction industry attracts people from e.g. outlaw 
motorcycle gangs (Brå, 2009, 2011b). It is not unlikely 
that many of these individuals were construction 
workers before they became members of organised 
crime groups. As organised crime groups in Sweden are 
not criminal in a legal sense, a respected construction 
company which discovers that staff members are 
affiliated with organised crime has limited opportunity 
to act on this information. Doing so, for example 
by terminating a contract, may lead to a lawsuit or 
conflict with the labour union. The same applies to 
cases where members of an organised crime group 
start a construction company. A few cases have 
been highlighted in the media, but since this is not 
criminalised, the police have little room for manoeuvre 
(Brink, 2003). 
In the construction sector, widespread tax evasion is 
said to have affected market pricing. This means not 
only that criminal individuals and organisations make 
profits, but also, some argue, that their actions may 
force other, honest entrepreneurs to do the same (Brå, 
2011b). The result is said to be that even some honest 
entrepreneurs are considering the use of illicit labour 
in order to compete with criminal entrepreneurs in this 
market. The honest entrepreneurs thereby become 
vulnerable to infiltration because they become involved 
with organisers and facilitators in the illicit part of the 
construction sector.
Restaurants, bars, and related business. The fact that 
restaurants and bars attract criminal individuals is well-
established in organised crime research (Brå, 2007b, 
2011a, 2012b; EBM, 2010; Korsell et al., 2009; RKP, 
2012b). The reasons are many: first, frequent visits to 
restaurants and bars are part of the criminal identity. 
Hence, when investing criminal assets, it is logical to 
invest in a business that one understands and is familiar 
with. Second, research suggests that the planning of 
future crimes, such as drug smuggling, sometimes 
takes place in restaurants or bars between people that 
know each other from this environment (Brå, 2007b). 
Restaurant owners are also overrepresented as victims 
of extortion (Brå, 2012b). Finally, the frequent use 
of cash in restaurants and bars means that they are 
useful for laundering money, paying for illicit labour, 
and selling untaxed, illicit or stolen goods (Brå, 2007b, 
2011b; EBM, 2010).
Infiltrated businesses are sometimes used to provide 
restaurants and small shops with smuggled or untaxed 
alcohol and cigarettes. The fact that alcohol and 
tobacco are subject to excise tax enables large-scale 
tax fraud when importing the goods legally but failing 
to pay tax when reselling them to other actors such 
as restaurants, bars, and kiosks. Having control over 
or running a business with a licence to import alcohol 
or tobacco thus presents an opportunity to carry out 
excise tax fraud. This type of crime requires expertise, 
international connections, as well as buyers of the 
imported goods (the restaurants and shops mentioned 
above) (EBM, 2010). 
Hairdressers and beauty salons. The trade organisation 
for Swedish hairdressers argues that the sector is so 
exposed to tax fraud that pricing has been affected. 
Honest businesses are being outcompeted by cheaters 
and some even argue that it is virtually impossible 
for honest businesses to match market prices. Thus, 
owners are forced to shut down or ‘forced’ into tax 
evasion (Eriksen, 2012). As a consequence, more 
than individual businesses infiltrated by organised 
crime groups, the entire hairdressing sector might be 
considered as infiltrated. There are also a few examples 
in the literature of organised crime group members that 
fund health and beauty salons run by their girlfriends 
(Brå, 2007b).
In one of the cases identified in the literature, a 
hairdressing salon only reported half of the purchases. 
The estimated tax evasion amounted to at least 3.3 
million SEK over two years. The manager of the salon 
was affiliated with an ethnic organised crime group 
in the Stockholm region and was also involved in an 
investigation regarding fraud in a residential care 
business (Granström, 2013). This example illustrates 
how people in organised crime are often involved in 
different types of crime and are not limited to a specific 
business sector. 
Residential care. Some seminar participants argued 
that deregulation of the residential care sector is part of 
the reason for organised crime’s interest in this sector. 
The deregulation has resulted in several private, profit-
driven actors (SOU, 2012, 2014). Residential care for 
disabled and elderly persons is publicly financed but 
may be carried out by private enterprises. A lump sum 
for each hour of care delivered to the beneficiary is 
given to the company, and the company is responsible 
for ensuring that the care is furnished. In 2014 the sum 
per hour was 280 SEK. By providing less care than 
reported to the authorities, or keeping costs very low, 
the company can make a great deal of money illegally 
(benefit fraud). Seminar participants underlined the 
difficulty of identifying organised criminals in the 
larger pool of active profit-driven actors who want to 
increase the granted hours for their clients. In addition, 
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this sector is characterised by scant transparency 
because care is delivered in private homes. Therefore, 
regulators such as the Social Insurance Agency or social 
administrations have little ability to verify that rules are 
complied with and reported work is actually carried out. 
Until January 1, 2011, personal care assistance was 
characterised by a greater lack of control mechanisms; 
no permits were needed in order to start a business 
in this sector (SOU, 2012, 2014). At present, a permit 
from the National Board of Health and Welfare is 
needed. Some argue that prior to the reform there were 
little incentives for organised crime to infiltrate existing 
companies, since starting new ones was relatively 
easy. Seminar participants were concerned that after 
the reform it may become more appealing to infiltrate 
a business with a licence to deliver personal care 
assistance.
Residential care for the disabled provided by so-called 
‘personal care assistants’ is sometimes highlighted 
as especially vulnerable to irregularities (ISF, 2011; 
SOU, 2012). While some approaches only require one 
person to fabricate or exaggerate his or her disability 
and a couple of care assistants to take part in the 
fraud, large-scale and organised arrangements require 
a legitimate company. The latter approach requires 
higher levels of organisation, involving a company 
and multiple employees. Other fraud designs involve 
a disabled person who exaggerates the need for care. 
Others involve people who in fact have no disability at 
all. In both cases, the care assistants do not carry out 
the work, but the company still reports the work to the 
Social Insurance Agency and is paid by the latter (ISF, 
2011; SOU, 2012).
There are also examples of beneficiaries that are 
unaware of the fraud. In these cases, they are also 
often unaware of their right to care. If so, relatives, 
friends or others are orchestrating the fraud. In other 
circumstances, the company organising the care is the 
instigator, often taking advantage of the fact that the 
disabled person and his or her relatives are unaware 
of the legal framework and the right to care assistance. 
Sometimes, relatives of the disabled person carry out 
the work with very little pay, unaware of the amount 
of the lump sum for each hour of care delivered. The 
lower the wages, the larger the profit, regardless of 
whether or not the company is infiltrated. In some of 
these cases there are also suspicions that, instead of 
using human smuggling, some foreigners have been 
‘imported’ (using work permits issued for employment 
as assistants) to play a part in these organised benefit 
fraud set-ups (ISF, 2011).
Cleaning and maintenance. The cleaning and 
maintenance industry has for decades been known as 
a sector at risk of economic and organised crime. The 
sector shares a risk factor with construction: namely 
sub-contracting (Brå, 2011b; Skatteverket, 2009b). In 
an analysis on known tax evasion set-ups in this sector, 
the National Tax Authority has identified the following 
process (Skatteverket, 2009b): 
• A cleaning company provides cleaning services to a 
client. 
• The cleaning company hires illicit labour, paying only 
a small fraction in salary compared to what it charges 
the client. 
• The cleaning company appoints a factoring company 
that sells fraudulent invoices from an imaginary sub-
contractor, making it seem that it has legitimate 
expenses for the cleaning work, when in fact it does 
not.
There are some factors that make the cleaning and 
maintenance industry attractive to organised crime. 
First, the work is unskilled. One does not need to 
understand the language and there is no need for 
training. Therefore, illicit workers and illegal immigrants 
– with low salaries – can be hired. Second, the work is 
mostly carried out during the evening, at night and in 
the early morning, when control is low. 
Sport clubs. While not identified as a risk sector in the 
literature, the relationship between sport club supporter 
groups and organised crime has been established in 
investigative journalism (Johansson, 2013; Laul, 2013). 
An evaluation of sport-related criminality establishes 
that so-called ‘risk supporters’ are sometimes also 
involved in organised crime, although the author of the 
report draws a clear distinction between sport-related 
criminality (hooliganism) and organised crime (Nordh, 
2013).
Some sport clubs are run as joint-stock companies, 
i.e. legitimate businesses. As such, sport clubs handle 
large amounts of cash from, for example, sales of 
souvenir t-shirts, caps, and other merchandise at 
games. In addition, sport clubs offer money laundering 
opportunities through sponsorship. One such case was 
identified in the literature review, and other suspicions 
have been mentioned in seminars (Kayhan, 2013).
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But sport clubs also attract organised crime for a 
completely different reason. Violent supporter groups, 
or ‘firms’, attract passionate youths and thus provide an 
opportunity for members of organised crime groups to 
establish an intimidation capital which in turn enables 
them to advance up the criminal hierarchy (Brå, 2008a, 
2009, 2012b; Skinnari & Stenström, 2012). It should 
also be mentioned that several investigations into 
match fixing are currently being conducted by the 
national criminal police; however, it is not yet possible 
to determine whether this can be seen as infiltration 
(Bratell, 2013; Henning, 2013).
Real estate activities. Although investment in real 
estate per se is excluded from the definition of infiltration 
in this study, the real estate sector comprises legitimate 
businesses that may be infiltrated. Several reports and 
seminar participants also indicate that the real estate 
(and property) sector is an emerging risk sector for 
infiltration (EBM, 2012; RKP, 2012b, 2013). Infiltrated 
real estate agents overvalue property. Bankers assist 
members of organised crime groups by approving loans 
despite insufficient creditworthiness and even help 
them to leverage the same property several times at 
different banks. One case has been identified in which 
multiple bank loans were in turn invested in a restaurant 
run by the same criminal group.
Organised crime infiltration of property management, 
i.e. businesses with commercial real estate, is unclear. 
One hypothesis is that infiltration in high-value 
businesses of that kind is possible for very few actors. 
Besides temporary speculations in real estate, property 
management in the form of a company is by its nature a 
long-term commitment.
6.5 Actors and modi operandi
Given the method used to create the DCI and the 
scant availability of information on the type of criminal 
groups involved in the cases of infiltration, we do 
not have sufficient information to draw distinctions 
among different OCGs. There are certainly many cases 
of infiltration that are never reported in the media. 
Seminars and literature suggest that most organised 
crime infiltration is ad hoc and takes place in the 
businesses closest at hand for the criminals. Most 
organised crime groups have members who are at least 
suspected of infiltrating businesses. In other words, 
there are no systematic differences. The groups range 
among outlaw motorcycle gangs, smuggling networks, 
territorial groups, groups with ties to former Yugoslavia, 
and networks that commit organised and economic 
crime and sometimes use infiltration. 
There are known cases of outlaw motorcycle gangs 
being active in the construction sector (Brå, 2011b). 
Outlaw motorcycle gangs, ethnic organised crime 
groups, and local groups have shown an interest in 
targeting restaurants for infiltration (Brå, 2012b). A 
hypothesis is that the territorial groups tend to target 
mainly visible companies within their own territories. 
In a previous study, an offender explained that visible 
businesses, where one could just walk in and make 
one’s demands, were seen as more suitable targets 
than industries, office buildings, etc., where one 
would never gain access to the manager, who holds 
the money (Brå, 2012b). In small businesses like 
restaurants, shops and hairdressers the offender often 
found the manager/owner working alongside the other 
employees. 
Infiltration and control
Infiltrators encounter various levels of cooperation 
when approaching companies with the intention to 
acquire influence. Infiltration may be characterised by 
different levels of voluntariness, ranging from mutual 
benefits to coercion, threats, and extortion. Depending 
on the methods used, companies may be more or less 
aware that infiltration is taking place. 
One general strategy is to use straw men, especially 
in formal and visible positions. Sometimes the straw 
man is the former business owner; at other times it is 
someone recruited for the position. Their key role is to 
be responsible for taxes and other claims against the 
legal entity. In some regulated sectors, the straw man 
needs a clean record and good economy if the business 
is to receive the necessary permits. 
Start-up of new businesses. While the concept of 
infiltration suggests that an actor step by step takes 
control over an organisation from the outside, research 
claims that it is not uncommon for persons engaged 
in organised crime to start up their own businesses 
in Sweden. This observation was confirmed by several 
seminar participants. Indeed, starting a new business 
in Sweden is relatively easy, although some sectors, 
such as CIT, currency exchange, restaurants and bars 
are regulated by permits and licences (Brå, 2011b).
The benefits of newly-started companies, however, 
are disputed. Research shows that some criminals 
avoid start-ups because they attract the attention 
of both authorities and possible business partners. 
However, acquiring established companies with good 
creditworthiness may require time and financial 
resources, so that this is likely to be limited to actors 
with high capacity (Brå, 2011b).
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Legal acquisition of already-existing businesses. 
Whilst infiltration involves irregularities at best and 
illegal actions at worst, methods to take over and 
assume control of companies may be perfectly 
legal, although the intention of the infiltrator may be 
insincere. In the case of so-called ‘long firm fraud’, a 
company with good creditworthiness is purchased and 
the irregularities begin only afterwards. Sometimes, the 
former owners, knowingly or unknowingly, are used as 
frontmen. 
As previously mentioned, in sectors that require 
permits, it may be more attractive to take over existing 
businesses with the associated permits or licenses. 
Even in these cases, the infiltrators may have different 
time horizons; some intend to do business for a long 
time, while others only use available credits and push 
the company into bankruptcy. 
Another positive aspect of acquiring an existing business 
rather than starting up a new one is that it is possible 
to take advantage of the company’s good reputation in 
future business and criminal set-ups. Depending on the 
sector, this factor may be more or less crucial. Research 
on large-scale tax fraud and the seminar discussions 
indicate that companies with good creditworthiness 
and spotless records are highly sought after in criminal 
circles. People engaged in organised crime also seem 
willing to pay accordingly, since these companies 
attract better clients and postpone suspicion from the 
authorities (Brå, 2011b). Retiring company owners (and 
their consultants) sometimes have an interest in selling 
their company quickly to avoid tax claims. Therefore, 
there is a market in which organised crime can buy this 
kind of trustworthy company with a long history.
Threats and extortion. People in organised crime 
have different levels of intimidation capital that they 
use to enforce their demands; however, studies on 
the extortion of entrepreneurs indicate that the actual 
use of violence is rare (Brå, 2012b). One strategy used 
by organised crime groups is to offer insurance or 
protection to business owners. This is not real insurance 
but rather a regular payment made to the group in order 
to keep its members from vandalising the business or 
setting it on fire (racketeering) (Brå, 2012b; Skinnari 
& Stenström, 2012). Several interviewees in the study 
painted a similar picture: the insurance premium is 
constantly increased to the point that the business 
owner assumes the role of a straw man for his or her 
own company. Interviews with practitioners of extortion 
suggest that extortion sometimes leads to demands for 
ownership of the company (Brå, 2012b). It should also 
be mentioned that threats and extortion are not always 
explicit. If the group has high intimidation capital, direct 
threats are not necessary.
Bribery and mutual benefits. Not all infiltration 
happens through coercion. By offering financial 
compensation, perhaps a percentage of the profit from 
the crime – a service at a currency exchange office for 
instance – organised crime groups persuade business 
owners to cooperate. These can be seen as a win-win 
arrangement. There are also examples of financial 
advisors and consultants whose business idea is to 
design crime plans for organised crime, and that these 
collaborations are voluntary (Brå, 2008b, 2011b).
Instead of a lengthy infiltration process, organised 
crime probably prefers simply to buy services, i.e. by 
bribing officials or business owners. As long as the 
cooperation runs smoothly, both parties gain, and 
organised crime has no reason to start infiltration 
proper. Should the business owner hesitate or stop the 
cooperation, organised crime can use more forceful 
methods. Research and seminar participants mention 
such cases (Brå, 2012b, 2014b). Besides being easy, 
one advantage for organised crime is the flexibility of 
cooperation with many businesses instead of focusing 
on infiltrating a few.
Hijacking. Temporarily taking control of a business for 
a short period of time – so-called ‘hijacking’ – seems 
to be an up and coming method for organised crime 
to make money illegally but within the frame of a legal 
business. In these cases, control over decision-making 
processes may be limited and short-term, but still 
enough to complete the fraud (Åkergren, 2013).
One strategy to hijack a business is to create false 
documents and submit these to the Companies’ 
Registration Office and change the board of directors. 
If the registration office has no reason to suspect 
irregularities, the change goes through with no 
questions asked (Carlsson, 2013). Another, more rapid, 
way is to hack into a company’s customer database and 
send out false invoices – identical copies except that 
the bank number for payment has been changed.
Management
Management strategies to infiltrate companies 
constitute perhaps the least studied aspect of 
organised crime infiltration. That said, a factor that is 
likely to affect the choice of the management strategy is 
the amount of time that the perpetrator plans to spend 
on the infiltrated business, i.e. different strategies 
require different time horizons. As previously discussed, 
bankruptcy alone may be sufficiently profitable, 
although profit increases further if the company is 
also emptied of all its resources. As we shall see, 
the management strategies chosen often mirror the 
methods of infiltration discussed above.  
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Short-term business strategies. Both research and 
LEA reports suggest that when organised crime groups 
infiltrate legitimate businesses, their involvement 
is often short-lived (Brå, 2012a). As described in 
a research report, a typical fraud set-up involves 
acquiring a company, taking credits and loans, followed 
by the emptying of all assets and eventually bankruptcy 
(Brå, 2011b, 2012a; RKP, 2012b). In these cases, ‘the 
faster the better’ is probably an adequate description 
of the business strategy. In one case, the process and 
cash flow was accelerated through use of a factoring 
company before the business was closed and the 
principals disappeared with the crime proceeds. In 
cases where a company is hijacked, time is even more 
crucial because the fraud needs to be completed before 
the real owners suspect that they have been victimised. 
Long-term business strategies. Members of organised 
crime groups are sometimes instead interested in 
running the infiltrated business in the long term. This 
is particularly crucial in crime set-ups where the illicit 
profit cannot be retrieved all in one, but is spread 
across a longer time period. Typical examples include 
restaurants, hairdressers, and other small businesses 
that generate profit over time by using illicit labour and 
failing to register cash payments. Another example is 
provided by social insurance frauds based on monthly 
payments which pile up over time. In an identified case 
currently before a district court, the fraud has been 
going on since 2007. The prosecutor in the case argues 
that more than 30 million SEK have been wrongly paid 
to the company by the Social Insurance Agency. 
‘Family business’. In some sectors, research indicates 
that the infiltrated business is kept within the family. This 
is perhaps not surprising since this reduces the risks of 
leaks, disloyalty and cheating (Korsell et al., 2009). A 
study concludes that in several cases of personal care 
assistance fraud, the beneficiary has been related to 
the care takers. In some cases, the care takers have 
been family members (ISF, 2011; SOU, 2012).
Bankruptcy as a management strategy. As mentioned 
above, in the event of bankruptcy, the Salary Guarantee 
Act compensates the employee for the loss of wages 
during redundancy. In 2014, the maximum sum per 
employee amounted to 177,600 SEK. The strategy 
behind the fraud is to incorrectly indicate that one 
has been employed in a bankrupted company and is 
entitled to this benefit (Brå, 2011b; SAMEB, 2011). The 
benefit is often paid to several employees, who share 
the profit with the principal. 
The literature and seminars identify different strategies 
and fraud set-ups related to bankruptcies, ranging 
from ‘all-fake set-ups’ in which all documentation is 
false (including court decisions and certificates from 
liquidators) to strategies involving real, legitimate 
companies acquired solely for the purpose of salary 
guarantee fraud (KFM, 2010). In one case, people had 
unknowingly been ‘employed’ in an infiltrated company 
and paid salary guarantees which were ‘collected’ by 
members of organised crime groups (KFM, 2010).
6.6 Conclusions
Although the term ‘infiltration’ is not used in the Swedish 
context, the phenomenon of organised crime starting 
up or taking over legal businesses is a reality in Sweden 
and, according to law enforcement agencies, a problem 
on the rise. The use of businesses for the purpose of tax 
fraud has a long history in the construction and cleaning 
sector. What is new is the use of companies for large-
scale frauds and to abuse the welfare system. To some 
extent, organised crime has become more intertwined 
with economic crime.
In Sweden, several sectors are influenced by quite 
extensive tax fraud that seems to have affected 
competition (see Skatteverket, 2009a). Moreover, 
organised crime is not involved in those sectors. 
In some high-profile and rare cases, this has led to 
shootings and arson attacks, which make the illicit 
sector more visible to the general public. The tax 
system can handle a few more cheaters without being 
threatened, but when methods from organised crime 
enter legal sectors, these sectors may feel worse off 
than is actually the case.
The most well-researched aspect of infiltration in Sweden 
is risk sectors. Here, the challenge is rather to determine 
which sectors are most at risk. While some sectors are 
recurrent, such as restaurants and other cash-intensive 
businesses, financial services, and construction, some 
reports highlight new trends, such as consultants and 
real estate. Many risk sectors have characteristics or 
functions that are attractive to organised crime: access 
to cash, transportation, and markets for stolen goods or 
illegal substances. Some risk sectors are linked to the 
welfare system. As regards risk sectors, several seminar 
participants argued that there is a danger in letting 
law enforcement agencies define risk sectors, since 
these analyses often mirror what the agency is already 
targeting in its work. Thus, both LEAs and researchers 
run the risk of neglecting sectors at risk that are not 
known or prioritised by the authorities. An example of 
such a sector is waste disposal and recycling, where 
seminar participants, especially from the private sector, 
had seen cases of infiltration.
67
As for methods of infiltration, the literature suggests 
that the choice of starting a new business or infiltrating 
an existing company may depend on the crime plan 
and business sector infiltrated. Licences, permits, 
the importance of creditworthiness and an existing 
customer base are some factors that make taking 
over an existing business preferable to starting a new 
one. Quick credit or telemarketing frauds, on the other 
hand, may be more suitable for new businesses. Both 
the literature and seminars underline that starting up a 
new business in Sweden is relatively easy. Some even 
argue that constantly starting up new businesses has 
become a strategy for organised crime groups. 
Management strategies to infiltrate businesses are 
perhaps the least researched aspect of infiltration. 
This may have to do with the fact that some infiltrated 
companies are used to conduct credit fraud, and 
when this is done, they simply go bankrupt. Moreover, 
management strategies may be of limited importance 
in the legal process. Research suggests, however, that 
the longer the time frame of the criminal group, the 
more careful it is to keep the company in general, and 
the records in particular, in order (see Brå, 2011b). 
Keeping the accounting by the book is less important in 
shorter crime plans.
7. United Kingdom50
7.1 Introduction
The Home Office (2013) estimated that around 5,500 
organised crime groups are currently operating in the 
United Kingdom and involve approximately 37,000 
individuals, mostly generalist career criminals (Francis, 
Humphreys, Kirby, & Soothill, 2013). The socioeconomic 
cost of organised crime is estimated at approximately 
£24 billion every year. The groups involved in serious 
and organised crime in the UK are heterogeneous 
in terms of personal characteristics and offending 
histories and trajectories (Francis et al., 2013), and 
have different ethnic and national origins. Cross-ethnic 
partnerships have also been documented (Ruggiero 
& Khan, 2006). While more traditional, hierarchically 
structured groups do exist, research shows that 
many British criminal groups have a loose structural 
organisation, more typical of a network than a family 
(Hornsby & Hobbs, 2007; Levi & Maguire, 2004). In 
other words, they tend to be individuals who decide to 
join forces for the duration of their criminal activities 
and dissolve afterwards.
The UK is exposed to organised crime group investments 
in, and infiltration of, legal businesses, which tend to 
be used to cover, support and/or facilitate criminal 
activities. While most business sectors have been 
targeted at some point in time, the financial sector and 
cash-rich overt businesses are particularly vulnerable 
and have been exploited, typically to launder money 
and invest illicit profits (Home Office, 2013). Whilst 
most organised crime groups investing in British legal 
economies are either based or have ‘headquarters’ in 
the UK, the literature highlights a number of cases of 
investments from organised crime groups based outside 
of (or branching out to) the UK (e.g. Campana, 2011; 
Home Office, 2013; Macaulay, 2011; D. Silverstone, 
2011). Furthermore, British-based organised crime 
groups have invested abroad (e.g. in Spain and the 
Netherlands) and, in particular, have laundered illicit 
proceeds elsewhere - both in Europe and outside 
Europe (e.g. Hobbs, 1998; Siddle, 2013; Thompson, 
2002).
The general extent which organised crime poses a 
serious threat to British national security is debatable 
(Campbell, 2014). The context in which ‘the extent 
to which both the criminal actors and the impact of 
their crimes in their totality (sic) represents a threat 
to national security … remains contested […although] 
countermeasures are needed to monitor and inhibit 
their growth’ (Levi, 2014, p. 12). In this sense, the 
establishment of the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA) in 2006 and its replacement in 2013 with the 
National Crime Agency (NCA) are indicative of a strong 
institutional push towards fighting organised crime in 
all its forms. This push is supported by the introduction 
of direct and indirect legislation dealing with financial 
crimes committed by organised crime groups and 
including, for example, powers to confiscate criminal 
assets under the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002, 
the criminalisation of frauds under the Fraud Act 2006, 
and stronger anti-money laundering measures under 
both the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 and the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.
50. With the collaboration of David Wall and Stefano Bonino (University of 
Durham, United Kingdom).
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Methodological remarks
Information on organised crime groups’ investments 
in British legal economy is limited. Although, subject 
to Home Office direction and funding, the UK Police 
forces tend to operate independently from one another 
and researchers need to access them separately. The 
British policing system therefore lacks a structured 
centralised repository of accessible data on organised 
crime. Furthermore, inter-agency and public-private 
partnerships tend to be inhibited by ‘differences in formal 
performance objectives, culture and even personalities’ 
(Levi, 2014, p. 12), which further complicates research 
on organised crime in general and on investments in 
the legitimate economy in particular.
Figure 26. Percentage of references to OCG 
infiltration in open sources by type of source
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The Database on Criminal Infiltration (DCI), compiled for 
this research, collected 257 references to OCG infiltration 
in legal businesses in the United Kingdom. Figure 26 
shows the variety of sources used to gather information 
on OCG infiltration in the UK.51 These include: academic 
literature, government strategies, policy reports, police 
investigations, judicial evidence, institutional reports 
(e.g. UK Border Agency, HMRC, Organised Crime 
Taskforce, Financial Action Taskforce), press releases 
and online newspapers. While the quality of data offered 
by online newspapers varies, and a lack of centralised 
data on organised crime groups’ investments in legal 
economies presents methodological limitations, the 
broad variety of sources has provided a useful, albeit 
preliminary, understanding of organised crime groups’ 
infiltration in British legitimate economies. The DCI is a 
starting point for assembling a nation-wide overview of 
infiltration. 
7.2 Drivers
The economic downturn and post-2008 austerity 
measures, combined with the growth of modern 
technologies provide new opportunities, incentives and 
avenues to engage in criminal activities that respond 
and adapt to the changing environment, thus making 
organised crime an evolving and dynamic threat (Home 
Office, 2009). According to the Serious Organised Crime 
Taskforce (2010), profit and power are the over-riding 
priorities of organised crime groups, whose criminal 
activities happen to be means to achieve such ends. 
The current literature on criminal infiltration in the 
UK demonstrates that profiting from illegal activities, 
laundering money (this being an indirect form of profit) 
and concealing illicit activities are the main reasons why 
organised crime groups infiltrate legitimate businesses 
in the UK. The literature also highlights that organised 
crime groups infiltrate economic sectors and businesses 
that are most conducive to supporting, facilitating and 
hiding their criminal activities of choice. While small, 
local organised crime groups tend to operate within 
their own territories, larger groups operate nationally, 
often in areas populated with business activities or 
historically linked to organised crime, and sometimes 
internationally, taking advantage of the possibility to 
connect with foreign criminals, to launder money and 
to commit crimes, such as frauds, that are difficult to 
detect.
The United Kingdom Threat Assessment (UKTA) 
identifies the main threats originating from organised 
crime groups as: ‘[1] trafficking of controlled drugs; [2] 
organised immigration crime (people smuggling and 
human trafficking); [3] financial crime (fraud); and [4] 
organised acquisitive crime (e.g. armed robbery, road 
freight crime and organised vehicle theft)’ (Home 
Office, 2011, p. 9). According to the same report, drug 
trafficking and distribution is carried out by around half 
of organised crime groups. Money laundering is also 
connected with many organised crime groups’ activities. 
The observations are in line with the information 
recorded in the Database on Criminal Infiltration and the 
references collected show a disproportionate amount of 
criminal activities clustering around money laundering, 
51. References were identified through key words such as: 1) organised 
crime OR criminal organisation OR criminal group AND infiltrat* (infiltration, 
infiltrated); 2) organised crime OR criminal organisation OR criminal group 
AND compan* (company, companies); 3) organised crime OR criminal 
organisation OR criminal group AND business; 4) organised crime OR 
criminal organisation OR criminal group AND money laundering.
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drug trafficking and fraud. Other criminal activities 
include human trafficking, arms sale, prostitution, 
counterfeiting, cigarette smuggling, handling of stolen 
goods, illegal waste disposal. 
This is not to say that a traditional goal of organised 
crime groups - control of the territory - has been 
completely abandoned. Yet, as research conducted by 
Hobbs (2001, 2013) demonstrates, the boundaries 
between the local and the global have intersected 
and blurred, and as a consequence, the activities of 
OCGs have diversified and extended beyond clearly 
demarcated territories. In fact:
[…] unlike previous eras, contemporary 
organised crime with its emphasis 
upon drugs, fraud and counterfeiting, 
simultaneously occupies both the local 
and global. Further, these criminal 
activities offer the possibility of moving 
from one sphere to another (Hobbs, 
1998, p. 419).
Certainly, British organised crime groups might seek 
to control an illicit market, for example the drug 
distribution in Liverpool and in London (Lavorgna, 
Lombardo, & Sergi, 2013), or particular communities, 
such as Chinese criminals intimidating communities of 
fellow countrymen to expand their interests in the UK 
(Adamoli, Di Nicola, Savona, & Zoffi, 1998). They may 
also seek to control a business sector, for example 
the Bikers’ partial control of the real estate sector 
(Adamoli et al., 1998). However, there is no indication 
that UK OCGs primarily intend to control a territory 
or to monopolise a business sector when infiltrating 
legitimate economies. This may well be a consequence 
of their criminal activities, which often occur without 
investments in legal businesses.
It is true that organised crime groups, such as ‘Tuckers 
Firm’, used security companies and resorted to 
violence to control the London and Essex territories 
by extorting licensed businesses and discouraging 
competitors’ encroachment (Windle, 2013). It is also 
true that criminal networks appear to have infiltrated 
the food industry (Elliott, 2013). Nevertheless, many 
organised crime groups simply trade in the market 
instead of intending to govern it. This observation 
relates to the idea of ‘functional diversification’ of mafia 
activities that Campana (2011) uses to describe the 
different purposes of the Italian La Torre Clan’s various 
activities, that is, governing territories and sectors in 
Italy while simply trading in markets in Scotland and the 
Netherlands.
Money laundering. The DCI showed a high number of 
cases in which organised crime groups have laundered 
money through a broad range of legitimate businesses. 
Whether it be a local gang, a wider national, more 
sustained criminal group or a network of criminals 
operating internationally, money laundering remains 
a prime motivation for investing in legal businesses, 
especially money service businesses and other cash-
intensive businesses (Organised Crime Task Force, 
2013), as they can be used as front companies to 
legitimise cash obtained from illegal activities. Money 
has been laundered through businesses within sectors 
such as bars and restaurants, construction, wholesale 
and retail trade, transportation and renting of motor 
vehicles, hotels and other tourist accommodation.
Profit and concealment of illicit activities. The DCI 
suggests that profit is a key reason behind the infiltration 
of legitimate businesses and is predominantly made 
through fraud, drug trafficking and a range of other 
crimes. These criminal activities often intersect with 
money laundering insofar as the former might require 
the latter to legitimise illicit profits. The literature also 
demonstrates that organised crime groups invest in 
businesses which make it easy to conduct fraudulent 
activities ranging from local, smaller frauds (e.g. 
insurance frauds) to global, multimillion frauds (e.g. VAT 
frauds). 
Box 3. A fraud conducted through a car hire company 
in the South East
Between 2008 and 2009 a small group of 
criminals with different roles (director, leaseholder 
of the office premises, and odd-man) worked in 
a legal car hire business in the South East and 
started using the company to conduct frauds. By 
exploiting the transportation and renting of motor 
vehicles sector and by using the legal ownership 
of, and involvement in the car hire company, they 
rented £500,000 worth of cars from reputable 
vehicle hire companies using false details and 
false credit cards. Then, they sold on these cars 
to other companies in the UK and abroad. All but 
two vehicles were recovered by the police. The 
four members of the group were given prison 
sentences of between 14 months and 4.5 years.
Profit can also be made through other criminal activities 
for which legitimate businesses can offer support, 
facilitation and cover. These activities include the sale of 
counterfeit tobacco in pubs (von Lampe, 2006), human 
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trafficking in the catering sector (D. Silverstone, 2011), 
the aiding and abetting of prostitution within escort 
agencies, illegal waste dumping and avoiding landfill tax 
and other costs as part of the infiltration of the waste 
industry (Mills, 2013). Furthermore, criminals have also 
used sham companies to legitimise corporations that 
are involved in arms trafficking outside the UK; they 
have counterfeited currency at printing businesses and 
vehicle garages; and they have sold both counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals online and other counterfeit products 
in retail stores.
Drug trafficking is the main source of profit of many 
organised crime groups, however, the main reason for 
infiltrating a legal business is often to conceal the illicit 
activity of drug trafficking and other crimes. Examples 
of such are the use of sham cafés, both to plan and 
deliver drugs, or as centres for illegal gambling; luxury 
goods companies to hide heroin dealing or to launder 
dirty money (or both); clothing companies to cover 
drug trading activities or to sell counterfeit goods; 
hairdressing salons to deal cocaine and grocery shops 
to import and distribute drugs (Hales & Hobbs, 2010). 
7.3 Infiltrated territories
According to the Home Office, ‘organised criminal 
activity is concentrated in London and the South East, 
the North West and the West Midlands, but all areas of 
the country suffer the effects of this criminality’ (Home 
Office, 2011, p. 9). The Home Office further observes 
that organised crime groups operate across territories 
policed by different police forces, therefore making it 
hard to identify the precise location of their activities. 
Also, far from it being only a nationally and locally 
situated phenomenon, the infiltration by organised 
groups also operates transnationally. This is the case 
when UK-based criminals infiltrate companies abroad 
to conduct illegal activities abroad and/or in the UK. It is 
also the case where foreign criminals infiltrate business 
sectors in the UK and then conduct illegal activities in 
the UK and/or abroad. 
The DCI indicates geographical differences in the 
infiltration of legitimate businesses. Although we 
must be wary of the potential bias caused by such low 
levels of data, the DCI does provide some evidence of 
a geographical distribution of OCG infiltration in legal 
businesses, with thriving business areas and territories 
historically connected with organised crime being 
particularly represented (Figure 27). Parts of Scotland, 
for example, appear prone to be targeted (though these 
findings must be treated with some caution because of 
low levels of data and possible reporting biases).
Figure 27. Number of references to OCG infiltration in 
open sources by region (NUTS 2)52
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7.4 Infiltrated business sectors
British organised crime groups infiltrate business 
sectors that are more easily exploitable in order to 
support, facilitate and hide their criminal activities of 
choice. The financial sector is especially vulnerable to 
money laundering and ‘in excess of £1 billion a year 
is laundered through money service businesses (MSBs) 
and informal value transfer systems alone’ (Home Office, 
2013, p. 19). Both aggregate level data and specific 
cases recorded in the DCI confirm that organised crime 
groups in the UK have heavily infiltrated the financial 
sector and have made use of money service businesses 
to launder money (Levi & Maguire, 2004). As 
identified in the case studies selected for the analysis, 
weaknesses include structural fragmentations, lack of 
communication between companies, the exploitability 
of regulations on intra-European transactions, and 
problems in the early detection of the criminal activities 
of small businesses. 
Furthermore, ‘illicit profits are often laundered through 
cash-rich overt businesses, which very often operate 
on the high street and typically include nail bars, food 
and licensed premises, companies offering security 
services, taxi firms and car washes’ (Home Office, 
2013, p. 19). The literature, summarised in the DCI, 
confirms the Home Office’s findings and records a 
disproportionate number of cases in which organised 
crime groups have used cash intensive businesses to 
52. Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are available for 168 
references.
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launder money, conduct or conceal drug trafficking 
activities and undertake other illegal activities, such 
as prostitution, sale of counterfeit or smuggled goods, 
handling of stolen goods, human trafficking, and illegal 
waste disposal. Cash-rich overt businesses present 
opportunities for crime: they can be set up quickly and 
cheaply, with a few criteria to be satisfied by the director, 
and can help legitimise crime proceeds. 
Cases of infiltration to facilitate, support and/or hide 
drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud and other 
crimes have been recorded within various sectors, 
such as: personal service activities; hotels, bars and 
restaurants (Annison, 2013; Boff, 2013; Hales & 
Hobbs, 2010; Hobbs, 1998; D. Silverstone & Savage, 
2010; Webb & Burrows, 2009); clubs and gambling 
activities (FATF, 2009a, 2009b; Gambling Commission, 
2013); transportation (Home Office, 2013; Organised 
Crime Task Force, 2013); support service activities (e.g. 
private security) (Windle, 2013); wholesale and retail 
trade (Hales & Hobbs, 2010); construction (Campana, 
2011; L’Hoiry, 2013); financial and insurance activities 
(CIFAS, 2013); waste and scrap management (Mills, 
2013); and manufacturing (Elliott, 2013). Figure 28 
ranks business sectors according to their level of 
evidence of infiltration by organised crime groups.
Figure 28. Number of references of OCG infiltration in open sources by business sector53
Source: UDUR elaboration on DCI data
Some sectors tend to be targeted in specific locations, 
although it is hard to make a strong connection between 
sectors and territories, especially in a country where 
organised crime groups are not as deeply embedded 
in social and political structures as is the case in other 
European countries (e.g. Mafia groups in Italy). Therefore, 
the most targeted sectors have been infiltrated across 
very different locations, including thriving business 
areas, both well-off and deprived areas, and areas 
where British organised crime groups have historically 
had a foothold (e.g. Liverpool, Glasgow, London). 
Figure 29 identifies the regions with at least one 
reference of OCG infiltration in the top 3 sectors for 
number of references found in open sources: wholesale 
and retail trade; hotels, bars and restaurants; and clubs 
and gambling activities..
53. Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 0-digit) are 
available for 248 references.
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Figure 29. Regions (NUTS 1) with at least one reference to OCG infiltration in open sources in the top 3 infiltrated 
sectors54
Transportation Hotels, bars and restaurants Clubs and gambling activities
Source: UDUR elaboration on DCI data (N.B. low levels  of data)
7.5. Actors and modi operandi
Using ethno-national labels to categorise organised 
crime groups is very problematic in multicultural 
countries such as the UK. Ethno-national categories 
are not homogeneous per se, and their members 
may not be nationals of the countries whose label 
is attached to them or may not affiliate with such a 
label. Privileging ethnicity, race and nationality over 
other social categories does not provide a strongly 
reliable explanation for organised crime activities in 
the UK (Murji, 2007). Despite the difficulties in inferring 
organising principles through ethno-national labels, an 
attempt is made to provide a very preliminary mapping 
of the activities of different organised crime groups 
across different sectors and different territories.
The most active group are British career criminals 
who are responsible for the infiltration of all the major 
sectors within all the major territories where references 
of criminal infiltration were found. ‘British’ may include 
a good number of people born abroad and who acquired 
British citizenship years after migrating and living in 
the UK (around 6% of the total British population in 
the Census 2011). All other groups tend to infiltrate 
London, but also Scotland (Italians), North West and the 
West Midlands (Chinese), and the South East (Turkish). 
Most of these groups infiltrate business sectors with a 
relatively high number of references of infiltration, and 
possibly those in which they would normally engage 
in legal activities. For example, the Italian La Torre 
clan infiltrated Scottish, as well as Dutch and Italian, 
territories, setting up food and alcohol import-export 
businesses, restaurants, pubs, health and fitness 
centres and construction companies in Scotland to be 
used to launder money that they had obtained from 
illegal activities in Southern Italy (Campana, 2011; 
Forgione, 2009). Similarly, the London-based Baybasin 
family invested in British cafés and seaside resorts and 
foreign exchange businesses to launder money and 
cover drug-related offences. Table 19 summarises the 
top five sectors and locations for number of references 
of criminal infiltration by different types of OCGs.
Given that investigations mostly focus on criminal 
activities, it is not always possible to ascertain the 
exact methods of infiltration, control and management 
of infiltrated companies because each stage may take 
place legally before the criminal activity begins. There 
are, however, some trends that are observable in the 
British context and regular (legitimate) acquisition 
appears to be the main method of infiltration. Criminals 
tend to purchase companies legally, or employ existing 
legitimate businesses already owned by a member of 
the group to subsequently support, facilitate and hide 
criminal activities. While it is difficult to identify at what 
exact point a business turns from legal activities to 
illegal activities and the extent to which organised crime 
groups target legitimate businesses in which they do 
not already have any existing participation, the analysis 
of the case studies has not identified cases in which 
organised crime groups placed one of their members in 
an existing legitimate businesses without some sort of 
pre-existing connection. 
54.  Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 1) for wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels, bars and restaurants, and clubs and gambling activities are 
available for 110 references.
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Table 19. Top 5 sectors and top 5 regions (NUTS 1) for number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources55
OCG Top 5 business sectors Top 5 regions (NUTS 1)
British56 Wholesale and retail trade; Transportation; Hotels, bars 
and restaurants; Financial and insurance activities; Clubs 
and gambling activities
Scotland; North East; London; North 
West; East Midlands
Italian Hotels, bars and restaurants; Wholesale and retail trade; 
Clubs and gambling activities; Construction; Real estate 
activities
Scotland; London
Chinese Hotels, bars and restaurants; Wholesale and retail trade; 
Clubs and gambling activities; Personal service activities
London; North West; West Midlands
Russian/
Georgian
Wholesale and retail trade; Clubs and gambling activities; 
Financial and insurance activities
London
Other OCGs Wholesale and retail trade;  Hotels, bars and restaurants; 
Financial and insurance activities; Transportation; Con-
struction
London; Scotland; South East; North 
East; North West; East Midlands
Source: UDUR elaboration on DCI
As far as infiltration at management level is concerned, 
the number of case studies that offer such a level of 
detail are extremely small in number. Therefore the 
findings need to be treated with great caution. There 
seems to be a mix of profitable and non-profitable 
companies: that is, some companies would survive 
even without the criminal activities - which may just 
be a way to increase profit. Other companies, however, 
would collapse if profits from criminal activities were to 
be removed, whereas other companies are set up and 
run illegally from the outset.
Box 4. An unprofitable car hire company partners 
with a profitable claims management company to 
conduct insurance frauds in the North East
In what is believed to be the largest ‘crash for 
cash’ fraud (court case still ongoing) in the 
UK, a group of criminals scammed insurance 
companies for hundreds of thousands of British 
pounds sterling between 2008 and 2010. 
The owner of a car recovery, storage and hire 
company formed a partnership with the owner of 
a claims management and taxi hire/replacement 
company. Together with the two businesses’ 
employees, family members and friends, the 
group defrauded insurance companies as part 
of a scam that involved staging and voluntarily 
causing car accidents and fabricating and/
or manipulating circumstances. The claims 
management company could operate legally 
without criminal activities, and frauds were simply 
a way to accelerate business and increase profit 
levels. However, the car recovery, storage and 
hire company would collapse once the criminal 
activities were eliminated. The two companies 
merged their activities in order to place, layer and 
integrate cash through personal and business 
bank accounts and they obtained assets with the 
aim of legitimising cash gained from fraudulent 
insurance claims. Economic profit was the main 
reason for infiltration. The targeted sector was 
the insurance one, which appears to suffer from 
structural fragmentation and to be exploitable 
by criminals. Some members of the group had 
been active as local criminals in the area for years 
before this case.
55.  Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 1) and OCG are available 
for 166 references. Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 
1-digit) are available for 206 references.
56. This includes English, Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish organised 
crime groups.
Further and more systematic research is needed in this 
area, but the DCI as a whole suggests that business 
sectors are chosen for their capacity to support, 
facilitate and hide criminal activities. Hence, cash-rich 
intensive businesses and the financial sector are the 
main targets of infiltration. Equally, small businesses 
with low margins of profit and competition from bigger 
businesses could drive owners to look for illegal ways to 
increase their revenues. The preference for small sized 
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companies by many organised crime groups may also 
be a ploy to avoid early detection. Similarly, the growing 
number of missing trader intra-community frauds, the 
vulnerable nature of VAT-free import/export trades to/
from Europe may actively encourage infiltration. The 
use of off-shore bank accounts also helps hide money 
and assets outside the UK, ensuring that criminals 
have financial supply to continue their activities and 
making it hard for law enforcement agencies to follow 
the money. Finally, criminals often use interconnected 
companies under the ownership of different members 
of the criminal groups both to increase the effectiveness 
of their business and criminal activities and to avoid 
raising suspicions whilst giving the impression of 
legitimacy about their activities.
7.6 Conclusions
British organised crime groups operate at various 
intersecting levels which include local, national, 
transnational and global territories. These groups 
are diverse and their members can be, for example, 
English, Welsh, Scottish, Turkish, Chinese, Vietnamese, 
Colombian, Russian, or Italian in origin, although these 
characteristics may not necessarily be relevant to the 
formation or structure of organised crime groups in a 
strongly multicultural country. Within the UK, organised 
crime groups appear to operate predominantly in the 
London area, the North West and in parts of Scotland. 
Here, it should be noted that the use of aggregate data 
and a potential bias in the sources (including news 
reporting biases) may have coloured these findings. 
The criminal activities of choice mostly involve money 
laundering, drug trafficking and fraud. Some organised 
crime groups also engage in crimes, such as human 
trafficking, illegal immigration, arms sale, prostitution, 
corruption, counterfeiting, cigarette smuggling, and 
handling stolen goods. They infiltrate business sectors 
that can be more easily used to support, facilitate and 
cover such activities. The main reason behind the 
infiltration of legitimate businesses is profit and/or to 
conceal illegal activities and to launder money. There 
is little evidence to suggest that the infiltration is to 
achieve the higher and longer term goal of controlling 
territories or core business sectors.
Organised crime in the UK has had a greater impact 
on the financial sector, private security, transportation 
and renting motor vehicles, bars and restaurants and 
the wholesale and retail trade sector. As highlighted 
by Home Office reports, cash-intensive businesses 
are extremely vulnerable to infiltration, especially 
money laundering, while money service businesses are 
allegedly contributing to the laundering of £1 billion 
every year. The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 
have introduced stricter regulations and responsibilities 
for MSBs and banking companies, although its success 
in deterring organised crime groups is to be seen.
Organised crime groups participate in businesses 
through ownership and management: for example, 
setting up a business using dirty money or to launder 
money, or by using an existing business where one or 
more OCG members is already in place to conduct and 
cover criminal activities. The drivers for infiltration are 
many and opportunity plays a major role, especially 
during a bleak economic climate in which some sectors, 
for example, cash-intensive businesses such as bars 
and restaurants experienced a reduction in profits and 
margins. A number of organised crime groups turn 
their legal activities into illegal businesses in order to 
boost their profits. The use of small companies, the 
exploitable intra-European trade regulations, off-shore 
bank accounts, etc., all drive and sustain infiltration.
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PART II. 
Assessing the risk of 
infiltration in 
legitimate businesses
The second part of this report focuses on case 
studies on organised crime investments in Italy, 
the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. It combines analyses of different types (e.g. 
script analysis, financial and accounting analysis) 
and provides a detailed description of the process of 
infiltration in legal businesses and the methods adopted 
by OCGs to control and manage infiltrated businesses.
Several case studies were identified in each of the five 
countries covered by the project. The identification of 
case studies was conducted through a review of the 
scientific literature, reports by national authorities and 
institutions, and newspaper articles referring to criminal 
infiltration in legal businesses. Relevant institutions 
(e.g. LEAs and national authorities involved in the fight 
against organised and economic crime) were contacted 
to gain access to court and judicial archives.
According to data availability, 8 to 21 case studies were 
selected in each country for further analyses (Figure 
30). The selection of case studies was based on the 
following criteria.
Representativeness of case studies: the case studies 
encompassed different types of infiltration (e.g. 
acquisition of the ownership of an already existing 
business, start-up of a new legitimate business).
Completeness of information: case studies with 
information available on the entire process of infiltration 
were favoured, as well as those with information on 
the names or VAT identification numbers of infiltrated 
businesses (or the name of owners/shareholders) 
to retrieve the financial statements and conduct the 
financial and accounting analysis.
Temporal proximity of the events: more recent case 
studies were favoured.
Diversification in terms of characteristics, areas and 
sectors: case studies encompassed different types 
and methods of infiltration in different territories and 
economic sectors.
Figure 30. Number of case studies by country
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
Database on case studies on OCG infiltration
The Database on Case Studies (DCS) contains 
information on 70 case studies of OCG infiltration in 
legal businesses and 299 infiltrated businesses in the 
five EU MS (Figure 31).
Figure 31. Number of infiltrated businesses by 
country
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Operation Athena
An OCG acquires the ownership of two already existing businesses (Alpha s.r.l. and Beta s.a.s.) and sets up a new 
legitimate one (Gamma s.p.a.). Several members of the criminal group are targeted by LEA during operation Athena 
and sentenced.
Alpha s.r.l.
Acquisition of the 
ownership of Alpha s.r.l.
Beta s.a.s.
Acquisition of the 
ownership of Beta s.a.s.
Gamma s.p.a.
Set up of Gamma s.p.a.
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A case study on OCG infiltration refers to the event of 
an organised crime group infiltrating the legitimate 
economy to participate in the decision-making process 
of one or more legal businesses. Each case study on 
OCG infiltration may include more than one infiltrated 
business when a criminal group infiltrates several legal 
companies (Figure 32).
The DCS stores information on each infiltrated business 
related to the 70 case studies. It records details on 
the registered address, the criminal organisation 
involved, the process of infiltration, the owners and 
shareholders, and the availability of financial and 
accounting documents. Judicial documents (e.g. arrest 
warrants, judgements, documents, and seizure and 
confiscation measures) constitute the primary source of 
information. Information from judicial documents was 
integrated with secondary sources of information, such 
as interviews with state prosecutors and police officials, 
reports by national authorities, newspaper articles, and 
financial and accounting documents retrieved from 
business registers.
Figure 33. Distribution of infiltrated businesses in the 
case st dies analysed
Box 5. One case and five individual unconnected 
businesses
In one case study, the members of an organised 
crime group ran businesses as individuals 
and not as part of the overall organisation. 
A case study on an OCG engaged in people 
smuggling illustrates how four crucial members 
of this organised crime group at some time had 
businesses registered in their names. All the 
businesses were declared as micro enterprises. 
The ownership, funding and management of 
these businesses were entirely individual. No 
evidence was found that in the case of poor 
business performance would a business loan, 
managerial advice or other help be officially 
provided by the other criminal group members. 
Friendly gestures were not excluded, since family 
ties are the bases of frequent connections among 
various businesses. Family members were also 
found to be business partners, or just employees 
in the business.
All the businesses registered to specific 
organised crime group members were acquired 
in accordance with legislative and administrative 
requirements, and they were also managed and 
deleted in such manner. Although the business 
of the leader raised suspicions of money 
laundering, and although GAMMA was registered 
at a household address where numerous other 
construction businesses were also registered, 
thus indicating possible malice, no measures 
were taken. 
Figure 32. Case studies and infiltrated businesses
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
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The main reason why the business of the leader 
was deleted from registers is that the leader went 
to prison and no one took over management of 
the business. Moreover, debt to some services 
providers had accumulated. This indicates that no 
financial injections were made in the businesses 
and that there was no interest in continuing them. 
The deletion of the other businesses seems to 
have been connected to similar reasons, or to 
bankruptcy. 
OC group involved in people smuggling, mainly from Croatia 
to Slovenia and then Italy and beyond, including USA
+ other 
members
+ other 
taxi drivers
EPSILON s.p.
taxi services
DELTA s.p.
bar & pastry shop
OCGM 
5
OCGM 
4
OCGM 
3
OCGM 
2
OCGM 
1 (leader)
some of 
it owners
owner
owner
owner
owner
owner
GAMMA s.p.
construction
BETA itc
management 
of bars
ALPHA itc
management 
of bars
employed
The case studies were intended to be representative 
of various types of infiltration in the five EU MS. 
However, they are not a statistical sample of all cases 
of infiltration in the five countries, and this should be 
taken into account in discussion of the results.
The case studies on OCG infiltration of legal businesses 
are analysed through different types of analyses (e.g. 
script analysis, financial and accounting analysis) 
and provide insights into various aspects of criminal 
infiltration of legal businesses:
• The drivers of infiltration (Chapter 8);
• The process of infiltration (Chapter 9);
• The control and management strategies of infiltrated 
businesses (Chapters 10 and 11, respectively).
8. Drivers of infiltration57
OCGs are induced to infiltrate legitimate businesses by 
several drivers. The maximisation of profit can coexist 
with other drivers, such as political, social, and cultural 
motivations. The objective of organised criminals in 
the legal economy is, in fact, to maximise the benefits, 
which include benefits other than economic (Becker, 
1968).
The analysis of the case studies on criminal infiltration 
of legal businesses helped identify five main drivers: 
money laundering, profit through formally legal 
activities, profit through frauds, concealment of illegal 
activities, other reasons (Figure 34).
Money laundering. OCGs may invest money in legal 
businesses to launder the profits from criminal 
activities (Organised Crime Task Force, 2013). 
OCGs may have direct or indirect control of the 
businesses used to launder money (RKP, 2012a). 
Such businesses may be used by criminals as layers 
to hide the proceeds of crime and conceal incoming 
and outgoing illicit flows (Riccardi, 2014). In the case 
of commercial activities, inflated bills and falsified 
financial statements may enable criminals to justify 
the money earned from illicit activities (Becchi & Rey, 
1994; Bini, 1997; Gratteri, 2011).
57. With the collaboration of Lorella Garofalo and Giulia Berlusconi 
(Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore-Transcrime).
79
figure 1
figure 2
figure 3
figure 10
figure 15
figure 18
figure 19
figure 20
Figure 24
figure 27
figure 31
figure 32
figure 34
figure 35
figure 36
figure 37
figure 39
figure 40
figure 41
figure 42
figure 43
figure 45
figure 46
figure 47
figure 48
figure 49
figure 50
figure 51
9.2%
49.8%
1.3%
17.1%
22.5%
54.8%
25.4%
3.1%
5.9%
10.8%
27%
25%
1%
15%
32%
43%
33%
20%
3% 1%
20%
1%
3%
5%
70%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2002
4
1
3
2
3
1
1
4
15
1
62
2
47
1
139 89 40
2
5 3 39
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
21%
15%
1%
4%
59%
21
11
8
20
10
164
34
35
43
23
20
25
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
21%
16%
22%
21%
19%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
Italy 
(N=21)
Slovenia
(N=8)
Sweden
(N=20)
UK
(N=10)
The
Netherlands
(N=11)
Italy Slovenia Sweden UKThe
Netherlands
70% 14
5
6
2
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0.20%
0.30%
0.10%
0.50%
0.60%
0.70%
0.80%
0.40%
0.00%
2002
0.72%
0.51%
0.26%
0.47%
0.56%
0.33%
0.44% 0.47%
0.39%
0.36%
0.58%
0.52%
0.24%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
38
6
10
5
7
70%
80%
90%
100%
94
25
19
35
2
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
Public 
limited companies
Private 
limited companies
Partnerships
Sole traders
Other legal forms
NA
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
figure 44
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60% 90
11
22 26
17
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
10
12
6
8
4
2
14
16
0
Money 
laundering
Fraud OtherFormally legal 
activities
Concealment 
of illegal 
activities
4 4
3
5
15
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
40%
50%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=137)
Slovenia
(N=32)
Sweden
(N=34)
UK
(N=18)
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=21)
Slovenia
(N=8)
Sweden
(N=20)
UK
(N=10)
The
Netherlands
(N=11)
Italy
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
Italy
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
30%
24.9%0.8%
Academic study Judicial evidence
LEA report Media Other
N = 2,380 
N = 2,380 
N = 2,380 
N = 1,305
N = 604
Institutional report
15%
29%
0.4%
Local OCGs Motorcycles gangsItalian mafias
Other OCGs NA
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
Academic study
Judicial evidence LEA report Media
Institutional report
Academic study
LEA report Media
No. criminal charges with references to OCGs % OCGs in relation to all criminal charges
%
 O
CG
s 
in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 a
ll 
cr
im
in
al
 c
ha
rg
es
Other
Institutional report
N
o.
 c
rim
in
al
 c
ha
rg
es
 w
ith
 re
fe
re
nc
es
 to
 O
CG
s 
Academic study
Judicial evidence LEA report Media
Institutional report
N = 74
23%
24%
20%
32%
1% N = 140
N = 257
N = 70
N = 299
Academic study
LEA report Media Other
Institutional report
No. filed criminal complaints for money laudering offences with references to OCGs 
No. filed criminal complaints for money laudering offences without references to OCGs 
Academic study
Judicial evidence LEA report Media
Institutional report
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
Money laundering FraudFormally legal activities
Concealment of illegal activities Other
Money laundering FraudFormally legal activities
New business NAAlready existing business
Concealment of illegal activities Other
90
53
19
24
9
14
4
30
1
5
29
21
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
Public limited
companies
Private limited
companies
Partnerships
Sole traders
Other legal forms
NA
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
UKSweden
Public limited
companies
Private limited
companies
Partnerships
Sole traders
Other
legal forms
NA
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
Cosa Nostra (N=14) Camorra (N=74)‘Ndrangheta (N=47)
Other Italian (N=13)Chinese (N=16)
Money laundering Fiscal fraudFormally legal activities
Corporate fraud OtherConcealment of illegal activities
Relatives Legal entrepreneursProfessionals
Women among shareholders Women as majority shareholders
Legal companies
53
7
6
14
9
8
3
1
8
4
1
Small LargeMedium Very large NA
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
0 4-101-3 11-20 >20 NA
Figure 34. Drivers of OCG infiltration
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
Box 6. Money laundering in South Western Scotland
A bar in South Western Scotland originally owned 
by Ms. A, the widow of a Scottish gangster, was 
purchased by an accomplice (Mr. B) through a 
loan secured on a personal asset. The loan was 
secured over the bar by falsely pretending to a 
bank that the bar had been transferred to Mr. B 
for value. Mr. B finally acquired the bar through 
a c mbination of payments directly to Ms. A and 
the settlement of an outst nding tax liability; the 
payment period of three years was reduced to 
less than one year. Mr. C, a Scottish gangster who 
had worked with the family of the late husband of 
Ms. A, was behind the business and influenced 
its criminal activities. He refurbished the bar. He 
had a bank account under his own name trading 
for the bar, and on which Mr. B was a signato-
ry. The bank account had been originally opened 
when Ms. A first purchased the bar to help her 
with the loan. The bar was used to launder money 
made by Mr. C through drug trafficking and extor-
tion; therefore, Mr. B’s bar technically operated 
as a front for Mr. C’s criminal activities.
The trading account of the bar was also used 
to fund the purchase of a filling station in Scot-
land (about £90,000 of the £151,000 total 
pric ), whil  most of the r maining funds came 
from money extorted from a local taxi company. 
The links between Mr. C and Scottish gangsters 
(the family of Ms. A’s late husband) are also ev-
idenced by the purchase of additional ground 
adjacent to the filling station, partly with money 
from the purchase and sale of a flat above the 
bar. The flat was originally bought at auction, by 
paying a £2,500 cash deposit and then a balance 
of £21,000 and about £227,000 of interest in re-
spect of late settlement. It was then sold on to a 
member of the criminal gang. Most of the money 
used to purchase the flat came from drugs and 
extortion, while the whole transaction of buying 
and selling the flat was a device used to launder 
money.
Profit from (formally) legal activities. OCGs may invest in 
businesses to obtain considerable earnings and benefit 
from their profitability. Contrary to shell companies used 
as covers for illicit activities, these businesses engage 
in production activities and are profit oriented, although 
organised criminals often have unrealistic ideas about 
a company’s profitability and underestimate the costs 
(Becchi & Rey, 1994; Bini, 1997; Brå, 2007b, 2012b; 
Catanzaro, 1988; Costantino, 1986). Legal activities 
are only formally legal when their profitability is linked 
to illicit activities such as the discouragement of 
competition or irregularities in the labour market, e.g. 
when a company is targeted because it is a business 
competitor of other infiltrated businesses (Brå, 2012b). 
Profit from frauds. OCGs may control legal businesses 
and exploit them to perpetrate frauds. Legal businesses 
may be used for various types of corporate fraud (e.g. 
insurance fraud, insolvency and bankruptcy-related 
fraud) and fiscal fraud (e.g. VAT and tax fraud, benefit 
fraud).
Box 7. A ‘carousel’ fraud in the trade of computer 
processing units
A MTIC VAT fraud was conducted in 2002 with the 
help of both genuine companies and infiltrated 
ones. DELTA, a company based in London and 
trading in CPUs, acted as second buffer trader 
in a line of five companies during 32 fraudulent 
transactions. At least one (GAMMA, the first buf-
fer trader) was a genuine company not directly 
involved in the fraud.
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The companies allegedly exported large 
quantities of VAT-free CPUs to BETA, a missing 
trader registered in the UK. The missing trader 
was either a registered company which had gone 
missing or a genuine company whose identity was 
hijacked by the fraudsters. BETA then sold the 
goods to GAMMA, the first line buffer company. 
The VAT invoice issued by BETA to GAMMA 
enabled the latter to deduct the amount shown 
as VAT as input tax from the amount due by BETA 
to customs in respect of output tax on the onward 
sale to DELTA, the second line buffer company 
(owned by the members of the criminal group). 
DELTA then sold the goods to the broker EPSILON 
for an amount that included VAT. Finally, EPSILON 
resold them to the original seller in Ireland 
(ALPHA) and claimed VAT for the purchase. In 
many cases the whole chain of transactions took 
place on the same day. No VAT was payable on 
the export. Yet the broker then reclaimed the VAT 
which it had paid to DELTA. The fraud amounted 
to at least £13 million.
EPSILON 
Broker
DELTA 
2nd Buffer Trader
GAMMA 
1st Buffer Trader
BETA
Defaulting Trader
ALPHA
Irish Supplier
Ireland United Kingdom
Box 8. Benefit fraud in the health care sector
Between 2006 and 2012 a legitimate company 
operating in the health care sector was used to 
conduct a large-scale organised benefit fraud. 
In Sweden it is possible for private companies 
to furnish publicly-funded health care. In the 
case of care assistance for disabled persons, a 
company is paid 275 SEK (approximately €30) 
per hour of care provided, and then pays the 
salaries to the employees. Benefit fraud is based 
on the company submitting a report to the Social 
Insurance Agency stating that employees have 
provided care when in fact they have not. Salaries 
are paid to employees, and then parts of them are 
returned to the owners of the infiltrated company.
Social Insurance
Agency
Payment 
for
care
Salary
Employee
Beneficiary
Part of salary 
repaid to Alpha
No work is 
carried out
False 
documentation 
of care 
being 
carried out
ALPHA
Thirty-one personal care assistants were charged 
with either fraud or abetting it by signing timesheets 
claiming to have carried out work, and being paid 
when no work had been carried out. In several 
cases, the salary constituted grounds for other 
benefits (e.g. parental and sickness benefits).
Concealment of illegal activities. OCGs may use legal 
businesses to conceal illicit activities such as drug 
trafficking or prostitution. For instance, the members 
of a criminal organisation may use the vehicles and 
storehouses of their transport company to conceal 
and smuggle illegal goods. Similarly, restaurants may 
facilitate the sale of untaxed alcohol, and night clubs 
may conceal prostitution (Dvoršek, 1995). Other 
examples include the use of bars to deliver drugs and 
as centres for illegal gambling; luxury companies to 
cover heroin dealing; clothing companies to cover drug 
trading activities or hairdressing salons to deal cocaine 
(Hales & Hobbs, 2010). Infiltrated businesses may 
also be exploited to perform transactions which would 
otherwise be considered suspect and conceal them as 
production costs (Fiorentini, 1999; Graebner Anderson, 
1978).
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Box 9. Concealment of prostitution through bars in 
Slovenia
By the same principle of complying with the 
administrative and bureaucratic requirements, 
members of an organised crime group 
established several small (ZETA) and micro (ETA) 
businesses, which were used to provide the 
documents and licences that foreign women 
need to enter Slovenia legally. In Slovenia, they 
were accommodated in various bars across the 
country, where they were supposed to perform 
erotic artistic shows or striptease. However, 
they were often forced to prostitute themselves. 
The women often knew that prostitution would 
be demanded even though it is not legalised in 
Slovenia; however, the earnings were anticipated 
to be higher and the conditions better. 
The businesses (ZETA and ETA) used to acquire 
the papers were registered to the two main OCG 
members, Mr. A and Mr. B. Family members of 
Mr. A were employed in ZETA, and when he was 
absent, the business was run and managed by 
his family members. Even though only one night 
bar owner was prosecuted in this particular 
case, other bar owners or managers were often 
investigated and/or prosecuted independently. 
In this case they were more ‘business partners’. 
These bars across Slovenia have a resilient 
capacity for survival. Their staff and managers 
change (even exchange), but the locations and 
bar names are more or less constant. These bars 
are often rented or owned by a person who later 
also manages them; and in some cases, family 
members or women (formerly) employed in such 
bars help them.
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trafficking and forced prostitution
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recreation activities)
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used for 
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Official owner(s) or manager(s) 
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Box 10. The manufacture of precursors for ecstasy
Chemicals are essential for the production 
of ecstasy. The trade in these chemicals is 
regulated by law and can only take place under 
strict conditions. This case is an example of 
how a criminal organisation made use of a legal 
company to commit fraud without any coercion or 
intimidation.
One of the main suspects, Mr. A, had worked in 
the past as head of an environmental depart-
ment of a Dutch university, and had slowly but 
steady become involved in the production of ille-
gal drugs. Prior to the current criminal case, Mr. A 
had already been sentenced for violating the Law 
Preventing Abuse of Chemicals and the Opium 
Act. In recent years, Mr. A had officially worked as 
a consultant in the field of environmental certifi-
cation and as the director of a chemical distillery. 
The second main suspect, Mr. B, had previously 
been active in oil trading (inland shipping). During 
that period he had been sentenced several times 
for forgery, tax fraud, and for committing econom-
ic offences. At the time of the current case, Mr. B 
was officially unemployed. Mr. B, however, effec-
tively managed a company that on paper was run 
by his son and daughter-in-law. Mr. B probably did 
not officially head his company in order to avoid 
attracting regulatory attention due to his criminal 
history. 
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The two main suspects, together with their 
relatives (wives, sons and daughter-in-law), used 
their legal companies to conceal illegal trade in 
hazardous waste, the production of illegal fuel, 
the manufacture of excise goods outside an 
excise warehouse, trade in registered chemicals 
without notification of suspicious  transactions, 
and preparatory actions for the manufacture of 
illegal drugs (XTC).
To commit their crimes, the suspects, with the aid 
of their companies, traded with legal businesses. 
For instance, a contaminated batch of ethanol 
was purchased through official channels by Mr. 
B’s company. Under the supervision of customs 
officers, the batch was denatured with methanol 
and MEK. The contaminated ethanol was then 
transferred to Mr. A’s chemical distillery. The 
ethanol was distilled, and the purified ethanol 
was intended to be sold to Mr. B’s company. The 
purified ethanol would later be partly sold for 
the purpose of human consumption, partly as 
a processing aid in the production of synthetic 
drugs, and partly for blending into fuels. 
Thanks to the input of information originating 
from a related XTC police investigation, the FIOD 
had already started their investigation of a related 
criminal organisation by the time the batch was 
distilled. Before the batch of ethanol was sold, 
the FIOD arrested the group and confiscated the 
batch.
The infiltration process in this case, as in many 
others, was simple: members of the criminal 
group used a legal company that they themselves 
ran, or they used a straw man (in this case a 
relative) to commit fraud.
Other reasons. Cultural or personal reasons may drive 
OCGs to infiltrate legal businesses and influence the 
choice of the business sector (Savona & Riccardi, 2011). 
Criminals may invest in certain businesses because 
they are close to their culture, education background, 
family tradition. This may explain, for instance, the 
infiltration of vehicle repair garages, sex shops, and 
tattoo parlours by some Nordic motorcycle OCGs 
(Police College of Finland, 2013) or the acquisition of 
companies engaged in the wholesale of typical local 
food products by Camorra groups (Riccardi, 2014). 
OCGs may infiltrate legal companies to create new jobs 
and to assign subcontracts to other enterprises, thus 
maximising their social consensus (Arlacchi, 2007; 
Becchi & Rey, 1994; Bini, 1997; Fantò, 1999). Finally, 
OCGs may aim to achieve control over a particular 
sector of the local economy through participation in 
legal market activities, e.g. by infiltrating the public 
construction industry and manipulating subcontracts 
(Fantò, 1999; Savona, 2010).
This distinction - useful for analytical purposes - does 
not imply that OCGs infiltrate legal businesses to fulfil 
one driver at a time. For instance, the same infiltrated 
business may be used to launder the profits from illicit 
activities and gain revenues from legal activities (Fantò, 
1999; Fiorentini, 1999; Graebner Anderson, 1978). 
Furthermore, these five drivers constitute the reasons 
why OCGs may infiltrate legal businesses. The choice 
of a particular territory and business sector, as well as 
the business to be targeted, are influenced by both their 
characteristics and the drivers of OC infiltration.
Figure 35. Drivers of OCG infiltration by country
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Not all drivers of OCG infiltration were found in the five 
countries covered by the project. OCGs active in the 
Netherlands, in Sweden, and in the United Kingdom 
mainly infiltrate businesses to perpetrate frauds. For 
instance, Swedish OCGs use businesses to provide 
restaurants and small shops with untaxed alcohol 
and cigarettes. The fact that alcohol and tobacco are 
subject to excise tax enables large-scale tax fraud 
when the goods are imported legally and then resold 
to restaurants and kiosks without paying taxes. Having 
control over or running a business ith a licence to 
import alcohol or tobacco is thus an opportunity to carry 
out excise tax fraud (CSD, 2015).
Box 11. MTIC VAT fraud in the wholesale mobile 
phone trade sector
A ‘business celebrity’ in London orchestrated a 
MTIC fraud involving 200 companies importing/
exporting mobile phones in the UK, Spain and 
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the Netherlands between 2001 and 2008. He 
used his own firm (ALPHA) as an umbrella for 
firms under similar names, but he also infiltrated 
other companies. One of these companies was 
an import-export business (BETA) which had an 
estimated turnover in excess of £100,000 and 
did not expect to receive regular VAT repayments. 
In mid-2005 BETA was lured by an advertisement 
placed by ALPHA stating that it was looking for 
partners to act as brokers in the export of mobile 
telephones to overseas customers. BETA was 
assured that there would be no risk of MTIC fraud 
as ALPHA would be importing the goods itself 
(although it did not) or sourcing them directly from 
manufacturers. The reputation of both ALPHA and 
its famous owner lulled BETA into a sense of false 
security that the deals were legitimate. ALPHA 
expected its brokers (e.g. BETA) to purchase the 
goods on credit and transfer them ‘ship on hold’ 
pending payment from the customer. 
BETA started trading with ALPHA and, shortly 
afterwards, requested that HMRC allow it to 
change from quarterly to monthly VAT returns as 
it was a repayment trader. HMRC refused this 
request because they were concerned about 
MTIC frauds in the wholesale mobile phone trade 
sector. To overcome this obstacle, one of the 
two shareholders of BETA acquired a company 
exporting mobile phones (GAMMA), which already 
submitted monthly VAT returns and would enable 
repayments to be received quickly. 
GAMMA started acting as a broker by purchasing 
goods from ALPHA which provided them with a 
European customer and dictated the profit margin 
for the sale. Between April and May 2006 GAMMA 
purchased over 36,000 mobile phones from 
ALPHA (which itself was supplied by a chain of 
buffer companies) and resold them to a company 
based in Spain (DELTA). In some of these deals, 
despite the customer being based in Spain, the 
goods were transported to an address in the 
Netherlands (a fictitious company which was a 
house with no storage facilities in a residential 
part of the city) albeit on a ‘ship on hold’ basis 
until payment was received by GAMMA. Payments 
for these deals were processed through a 
secretive offshore bank in Curacao which offered 
anonymous and fast transfers, so that fraudsters 
could create immediate false paper trails of 
trades and reclaim VAT on transactions which did 
not exist. 
Most of the Slovenian case studies concerned legal 
businesses infiltrated to conceal illegal activities, 
mainly prostitution. These cases confirmed the OCGs’ 
interest in bars and night clubs with the purpose 
to perpetrate forced prostitution. The bars give the 
outward impression of legitimate businesses providing 
dance routines for their customers; meanwhile, forced 
prostitution occurs in the background (e.g. Furlan-Rus, 
2009; Lovšin, 2013; Žist, 2006). Evidence of human 
trafficking was also found in connection with the 
provision of women to be employed in such bars.
In Italy, some case studies concerned OCGs investing 
in legal business entities to maximise their social 
consensus and to control a particular market of the 
local economy. OCGs may decide to infiltrate businesses 
operating in sectors that provide goods and services to 
the population (e.g. education, healthcare) and create 
new jobs to promote a respectable image of themselves 
in contrast with that of mere criminals (Fantò, 1999; 
Ravenda et al., 2015; Sciarrone, 2009). Italian mafias 
also infiltrate sectors with high territorial specificity 
(e.g. hotels and restaurants, gas and water supply, 
construction) to control an area physically and to create 
strategic collusive relationships with politicians and 
local entrepreneurs.
9. The step-by-step 
process of infiltration58
Chapter 9 presents the results of the script analysis 
of the case studies on infiltrated business entities in 
Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom. The aim is to analyse the modi operandi 
adopted by criminal groups during the infiltration 
process and identify the vulnerabilities of the territories, 
business sectors, legitimate businesses, and legislation 
exploited by criminals.
Crime scripts are ‘step-by-step accounts of procedures 
used by offenders through the entire crime process’ 
(Chiu, Leclerc, & Townsley, 2011). Scripts can be divided 
into scenes involving smaller units of action. Each 
scene is characterised by particular actions, as well as 
by actors, roles, props, and locations. Scripts can also 
be distinguished into specific tracks which describe the 
crime-commission process in different circumstances 
(Cornish & Clarke, 2002). 
58.  With the collaboration of Giulia Berlusconi (Università Cattolica del 
Sacro Cuore-Transcrime-Italy).
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Two tracks can be identified in the script of OCG 
infiltration of legal businesses. The first involves the 
acquisition of an already-existing legal business by 
the members of the criminal group; the second occurs 
when organised criminals start a new business.
Figure 36. Type of infiltrated business by country
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
Figure 36 shows the number of new and already 
existing businesses infiltrated by criminal groups in the 
five countries covered by the project. There is a balance 
between the two types of infiltrated businesses in Italy, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Dutch organised 
criminals are more prone to infiltrate already-existing 
businesses. This may be due to the need for company 
creditworthiness to perpetrate fiscal frauds. The ease 
of starting a new business in Slovenia may instead be 
among the reasons why criminal groups in that country 
tend to start new businesses rather than acquire 
existing ones.
Box 12. Setting up new businesses to conduct fake 
invoice fraud in Sweden
figure 1
figure 2
figure 3
figure 10
figure 15
figure 18
figure 19
figure 20
Figure 24
figure 27
figure 31
figure 32
figure 34
figure 35
figure 36
figure 37
figure 39
figure 40
figure 41
figure 42
figure 43
figure 45
figure 46
figure 47
figure 48
figure 49
figure 50
figure 51
9.2%
49.8%
1.3%
17.1%
22.5%
54.8%
25.4%
3.1%
5.9%
10.8%
27%
25%
1%
15%
32%
43%
33%
20%
3% 1%
20%
1%
3%
5%
70%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2002
4
1
3
2
3
1
1
4
15
1
62
2
47
1
139 89 40
2
5 3 39
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
21%
15%
1%
4%
59%
21
11
8
20
10
164
34
35
43
23
20
25
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
21%
16%
22%
21%
19%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
Italy 
(N=21)
Slovenia
(N=8)
Sweden
(N=20)
UK
(N=10)
The
Netherlands
(N=11)
Italy Slovenia Sweden UKThe
Netherlands
70% 14
5
6
2
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0.20%
0.30%
0.10%
0.50%
0.60%
0.70%
0.80%
0.40%
0.00%
2002
0.72%
0.51%
0.26%
0.47%
0.56%
0.33%
0.44% 0.47%
0.39%
0.36%
0.58%
0.52%
0.24%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
38
6
10
5
7
70%
80%
90%
100%
94
25
19
35
2
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
Public 
limited companies
Private 
limited companies
Partnerships
Sole traders
Other legal forms
NA
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
figure 44
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60% 90
11
22 26
17
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
10
12
6
8
4
2
14
16
0
Money 
laundering
Fraud OtherFormally legal 
activities
Concealment 
of illegal 
activities
4 4
3
5
15
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
40%
50%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=137)
Slovenia
(N=32)
Sweden
(N=34)
UK
(N=18)
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=21)
Slovenia
(N=8)
Sweden
(N=20)
UK
(N=10)
The
Netherlands
(N=11)
Italy
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
Italy
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
30%
24.9%0.8%
Academic study Judicial evidence
LEA report Media Other
N = 2,380 
N = 2,380 
N = 2,380 
N = 1,305
N = 604
Institutional report
15%
29%
0.4%
Local OCGs Motorcycles gangsItalian mafias
Other OCGs NA
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
Academic study
Judicial evidence LEA report Media
Institutional report
Academic study
LEA report Media
No. criminal charges with references to OCGs % OCGs in relation to all criminal charges
%
 O
CG
s 
in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 a
ll 
cr
im
in
al
 c
ha
rg
es
Other
Institutional report
N
o.
 c
rim
in
al
 c
ha
rg
es
 w
ith
 re
fe
re
nc
es
 to
 O
CG
s 
Academic study
Judicial evidence LEA report Media
Institutional report
N = 74
23%
24%
20%
32%
1% N = 140
N = 257
N = 70
N = 299
Academic study
LEA report Media Other
Institutional report
No. filed criminal complaints for money laudering offences with references to OCGs 
No. filed criminal complaints for money laudering offences without references to OCGs 
Academic study
Judicial evidence LEA report Media
Institutional report
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
Money laundering FraudFormally legal activities
Concealment of illegal activities Other
Money laundering FraudFormally legal activities
New business NAAlready existing business
Concealment of illegal activities Other
90
53
19
24
9
14
4
30
1
5
29
21
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
Public limited
companies
Private limited
companies
Partnerships
Sole traders
Other legal forms
NA
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
UKSweden
Public limited
companies
Private limited
companies
Partnerships
Sole traders
Other
legal forms
NA
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
Cosa Nostra (N=14) Camorra (N=74)‘Ndrangheta (N=47)
Other Italian (N=13)Chinese (N=16)
Money laundering Fiscal fraudFormally legal activities
Corporate fraud OtherConcealment of illegal activities
Relatives Legal entrepreneursProfessionals
Women among shareholders Women as majority shareholders
Legal companies
53
7
6
14
9
8
3
1
8
4
1
Small LargeMedium Very large NA
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
0 4-101-3 11-20 >20 NA
This case study concerns a telemarketing 
company selling advertisement space that issued 
false invoices to hundreds of primarily self-
employed elderly people, threatening to contact 
the enforcement agency if they did not pay. 
Even an pplication to the enforcement agency 
would be registered for self-employed/business 
owners, and they could experience problems in 
obtaining credits and loans from banks, renting 
apartments, or getting new contracts. For these 
reasons some people just paid although they 
knew that the invoice was false. The organisers of 
this fraud extorted more than 4 million SEK from 
the victims. 
The company ALPHA was registered as a new 
company, with a name suggesting that it was an 
empty company created in order to be re-sold. 
Only a few days later the company was bought for 
50,000 SEK by two of the three organisers, who 
changed its name to ALPHA. A few months later 
they were replaced by frontmen on the company 
board. One interviewed policeman suspected that 
they had been given the idea of this fraudulent 
set-up by someone else, or alternatively they 
were acting on behalf of someone.
A second company, BETA, was established 
approximately one year after ALPHA, and 
seemingly took over ALPHA’s business activities. 
By this time, a frontman (a drug addict) had 
been installed as CEO at ALPHA. BETA was a UK 
subsidiary and was registered for both F-tax and 
VAT. BETA was registered at the same address 
as ALPHA, and the three instigators were jointly 
prosecuted for actions in both ALPHA and BETA, 
suggesting that there was no clear division 
between the companies. 
Considering that ALPHA was used as a tool in 
the fraud, it did make much sense to acquire an 
existing business with good creditworthiness. This 
would probably have been more expensive and 
would not have paid off. Hence a new business 
was probably established simply because it was 
relatively easy, and a serious ‘track record’ was 
not necessary in this crime set-up. 
The choice of sector was probably a strategic one. 
Telemarketing may be very profitable because 
it has little or no need for skilled labour, low 
costs, and potentially high profits, especially if 
questionable methods are used. 
In many case studies, the infiltration process was 
quite straightforward and involved one member of 
the criminal group regularly starting a new business 
or acquiring an already-existing one from a legal 
entrepreneur. This process was facilitated by the scant 
requirements needed to set up a company or the lack of 
regulation on the process of acquiring a business (e.g. 
in Sweden a notary is not required in the process).
85
Figure 37. Crime script of OCG infiltration of legal businesses
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Legal 
entrepreneur 
starts business
Identify 
business
Start  
business
Recruit 
clients
Recruit 
employees
Obtain 
licence
Rental of 
premises
Partnership 
in other 
businesses
Falsify 
documents
Trade in 
other 
businesses
Use of premises 
for criminal 
activity
Deposit money in 
offshore bank 
accounts
Use of business 
for criminal 
activity
Use of business 
for legitimate 
activity
Establish 
subsidiary
Create 
bogus 
companies
Register 
business
Legal entr. 
approaches 
OCG member
OCG acquires 
business
OCG 
approaches 
legal entr.
OCG gets 
involved in 
business
Pretend to 
acquire 
business
Manipulate 
owner
Change 
name
Change 
business 
activity
Change 
representatives
Register straw  
man as 
shareholder 
Company 
registration agent 
starts business
86
When the infiltration process involved an already-
existing business, the choice of the targeted business 
depended on the drivers that the OCG wanted to fulfil 
with the infiltration. In some cases, companies with 
good credit histories that had been operating for some 
years were needed to conduct tax credits fraud (Box 
13). Certain types of benefit fraud instead required the 
infiltration of insolvent companies (Box 14).
Box 13. The acquisition of already-existing companies 
with good credit histories
The Swedish authorities discovered a large-scale 
organised fraud against the Tax Authority based 
on a specific tax reduction for the renovation of 
existing properties. When the work is completed, 
the customer ordering the renovation can apply 
for a tax refund whereby the Tax Authority repays 
the tax on the work carried out. The method 
of the fraud is that the construction company 
reports work that has not been done, and the Tax 
Authority re-pays tax to the company. Hence, the 
crime set-up requires a legitimate construction 
company and a customer who agrees to feign 
renovations, or – as in this case – people that 
are used unknowingly.
The criminal group acquired already-existing 
businesses that were later converted to criminal 
activities. Before infiltration, the companies 
had real businesses, and some of them had 
been registered for many years. On the wiretaps 
included in the police files, the suspects 
discussed what type of companies were needed 
for the crime, i.e. companies with good credit 
histories that had been operating for some years.
Box 14. The acquisition of insolvent companies to 
conduct benefit fraud
The case study involves six infiltrated companies 
and 54 persons belonging to different criminal 
groups who were prosecuted. The crime plan 
involved the purchase of legitimate, although 
insolvent, companies, reporting relatives and 
friends as employees, placing straw men on the 
board of directors, filing for bankruptcy, and having 
the ‘employees’ apply for salary guarantees 
which were later partly repaid to the organisers 
of the fraud. The members of the criminal group 
targeted companies in difficulties whose owners 
wanted to get rid of them. There is no evidence 
of threats or extortion in the acquisition of the 
businesses. The criminals simply bought the 
companies from their former owners. After the 
purchase, several employees were registered, 
although no signs of actual business activities 
were found. When the company went bankrupt, 
the employees had access to salary guarantees. 
Income benefits amounting to several million SEK 
were embezzled from the County Administrative 
Board.
In some cases, targeting businesses with economic 
difficulties facilitated the infiltration process, since the 
owners of the companies were eager to sell their shares 
before leading their business to bankruptcy (Box 15). 
In these cases, the OCG members simply acquired the 
shares of the targeted business, and the acquisition 
process did not involve any illegal activity (e.g. threats, 
violence, corruption).
Box 15. Infiltration of businesses in economic 
difficulties to misappropriate their assets and bring 
them to bankruptcy
The members of a Camorra clan acquired 
shares in a series of legal businesses operating 
in the retail food sector in the Veneto region. 
They misappropriated the assets by defrauding 
the creditors, and brought the companies to 
bankruptcy. Before infiltration, all the targeted 
businesses had been in financial difficulties. The 
members of the criminal group approached the 
owners of the companies, who were often willing 
to sell their shares to a person acting on behalf 
of the criminal organisation. The organised 
criminals used the companies to buy goods 
on credit, and then cheated the suppliers and 
brought the businesses to bankruptcy. The goods 
and some of the illicit profits were transferred 
abroad. Another part of the revenues was 
reinvested in the acquisition of other businesses 
with the same characteristics in order to continue 
the fraud.
In a few Italian case studies, usury was the means 
used to infiltrate legal businesses (Box 16). Business 
entities penalised by the legal financial system are 
vulnerable to OCG infiltration. The lack of regulation 
of the financial system that provides an early warning 
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system, low capitalisation of family-run companies, and 
the segmentation of the credit market are factors that 
make businesses with certain characteristics more 
vulnerable to financial crises and, therefore, vulnerable 
to organised crime. These companies were mainly 
small traders and service companies, craftsmen and 
small family firms (Bertoni & Rossi, 1997). When these 
businesses are unable to obtain bank loans and are 
therefore in financial difficulties, criminal organisations 
may take the place of banks and offer their usurious 
loans. These loans enable the OCGs to infiltrate the 
companies in difficulties until they can take them over 
(Ciconte, 2008).
Box 16. Infiltration through usury
Sixteen suspects were accused of criminal 
conspiracy with the aim of controlling food and 
beverage service activities on the Ostia coast, 
near Rome. The members of the criminal group 
knew persons working in banks and financial 
societies. These persons gave them the names 
of entrepreneurs in economic difficulties and 
unable to obtain credit from banks. The OCG 
approached the legal entrepreneurs and offered 
to lend them money at usurious rates. When the 
legal entrepreneur was no longer able to pay, he 
was forced to hand the company over to the OCG, 
which managed it through straw men.
Different methods of infiltration can also be identified 
on the basis of the relationship between the legal 
entrepreneurs (i.e. the owners of the targeted 
businesses before infiltration) and the organised 
criminals. On the one hand, OCG members directly 
owned and managed a legal business; on the other 
hand, they created a partnership with the legal 
entrepreneur who was the formal shareholder and 
director of the infiltrated business and became involved 
in the illicit activities (Fantò, 1999). In some Swedish 
case studies, the organised criminals pretended to 
acquire an already-existing business by signing the 
documents to change the board members but never 
submitted them to the Companies Registration Office. 
The legal entrepreneur, unaware that the property had 
not been transferred, thus became a straw man for the 
OCG in his former business entity (Box 17).
Box 17. ‘Fake’ acquisition of a legal business in 
Sweden
In this case study, a taxi company was acquired as 
a front to buy cars, report them stolen, and obtain 
both insurance for the stolen cars and payment 
for the cars when sold abroad. The taxi company 
ALPHA was started by a legal entrepreneur in 
2008. In 2010 the owner Mr. A decided to sell the 
company and placed an advertisement on a buy-
and-sell website. Mr. B, a member of the criminal 
group, contacted Mr. A to buy the company. He 
convinced Mr. A to accept payment on credit 
and claimed that he had signed and submitted 
the papers to the CRO, although he had not. 
Therefore, Mr. A remained the frontman of his old 
company. Mr. A also signed the documents to buy 
the cars. Only when he received notification from 
the CRO that Mr. B had cancelled the registration 
as owner of ALPHA did Mr. A discover that the 
cars were stolen and filed a crime report.
Besides a passive cooperation motivated by the fear of 
retaliation, a form of active cooperation between the 
legal entrepreneur and the OCG members was found 
in some case studies, as a result of an agreement that 
benefited both parties. Different types of entrepreneurs 
can thus be identified on the basis of Sciarrone’s (2009) 
typology: subordinate entrepreneurs, who have a 
passive relationship with the OCG based on intimidation 
and fear of retaliation; collusive entrepreneurs, who 
cooperate with organised criminals to obtain economic 
benefits; and criminal entrepreneurs who belong to the 
criminal organisation.
Subordinate entrepreneurs were found in some case 
studies where OCGs infiltrated legal businesses by 
means of threats, intimidation, and extortion (Box 18). 
Case studies with evidence of the use of violence and 
threat, as well as corruption, are scarce and generally 
involve Italian mafia groups. In most case studies in 
which legal entrepreneurs were involved, the evidence 
suggested that they were either collusive or unaware 
of the illicit activities conducted by the OCG members.
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Box 18. Infiltration through threats and extortion
This case study concerns criminal infiltration of 
the funeral sector in the province of Catania, Sicily. 
The infiltration process always followed the same 
steps. The legal entrepreneurs wanting to start 
a funeral company asked for authorisation from 
Mr. A, boss of the Sanpaola clan (Cosa Nostra). 
Once the business had been incorporated, the 
legal entrepreneurs were forced to rent the 
funeral cars from other businesses controlled by 
the criminal group. The legal entrepreneurs were 
also asked to pay a bribe (pizzo) to the Santapaola 
clan for preparation of the documents relative to 
transport of the corpses to the cemetery.
Intimidation, threat, extortion, and arson 
were used by Mr. A to take control of the legal 
businesses. Although the legal entrepreneurs 
were formally the owners of the companies, they 
were in fact straw men of the Santapaola clan, 
and the members of the criminal group were the 
beneficial owners of the companies.
Collusive entrepreneurs were generally approached 
by criminals who had identified their businesses as of 
interest to the criminal organisation. The OCG members 
offered the entrepreneurs an opportunity to (illegally) 
expand their businesses, increase the financial rewards 
and - in some Italian cases - reduce competition by 
other companies through illegal means (e.g. threats, 
corruption). In some case studies, the business owners 
considered cooperation with the OCG to be convenient 
and facilitated the process of infiltration of their own 
companies (Box 19).
Box 19. A legal entrepreneur as facilitator of 
infiltration
This case study concerns infiltration by the 
‘Ndrangheta of one of the largest construction 
company in Lombardy. Mr. A’s companies were 
of interest to the criminal group because their 
infiltration would enable its members to control 
the construction sector in the area, assign sub-
contracts to other companies controlled by the 
criminal organisation, and participate in bids for 
public contracts.
The infiltration process involved both ‘Ndrangheta 
associates and the legal entrepreneur Mr. A, who 
cooperated with the criminal group to obtain 
advantages for his companies. Mr. A facilitated 
the infiltration process because he wanted to 
solve the financial problems of the company and 
take advantage of unfair competition by means 
of mafia methods (e.g. threats to competitors 
and corruption of politicians to obtain tenders).
The collusive relationship between Mr. A and the 
‘Ndrangheta affiliates was indeed convenient 
for both parties. On the one hand, the company 
was able to win contracts because of the unfair 
competition with other legal businesses in the 
same sector; one the other hand, the OCG was 
able to infiltrate the sector in an area of non-
traditional mafia presence.
In some Italian case studies, the legal entrepreneurs 
were those who started the infiltration process by 
contacting the members of the OCG. The business 
owners requested the participation of the criminals in 
their business activities either because they needed 
money that they could not obtain from financial 
institutions (Box 20) or because they needed protection 
from another criminal group (Box 21).
Box 20. Infiltration of a business in economic 
difficulties
In this case study, the infiltration process started 
because the legal entrepreneur had economic 
difficulties and needed money that he could 
not obtain from a bank. Mr. A and Mr. B were 
business partners in a wine-producing company. 
Mr. B decided to start another business in the 
same sector. Mr. A guaranteed that he would 
furnish grapes; but he did not, and Mr. B found 
himself with a debt of €150,000. To obtain the 
money that he needed urgently, he thus asked 
for help from an Apulian criminal group, whose 
members became his financiers and used him 
to launder money. Together they then organised 
a fraud to the detriment of the state and the 
European Union.
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Box 21. A request for protection by legal entrepreneurs 
as the starting point of the infiltration process
In 2010 a criminal investigation uncovered a 
case of infiltration by a ‘Ndrangheta group of a 
company involved in telemarketing, teleselling, 
and call centre activities in the North of Italy. The 
infiltration began with a request for protection 
made by the owners of the business, Mr. A and 
Mr. B, to the boss of the Bellocco clan after the 
two legal entrepreneurs had been threatened by 
another ‘Ndrangheta clan.
The boss of the Bellocco clan assessed the 
value of the company and considered it suited 
to the criminal group’s interests, given that 
it had substantial cash assets. He therefore 
decided to provide the protection services in 
exchange for donation of some of the company’s 
shares to straw men acting on behalf of the 
criminal organisation. When Mr. A and Mr. B 
transferred 40% of the shares to the straw men 
of the Bellocco clan, the infiltration process was 
completed.
The infiltration process also involved OCG members’ 
relatives, professionals, public officials and politicians 
who helped the organised criminals to acquire and 
manage the legal businesses. Relatives were often 
involved in the infiltration process (Box 22), as well as 
shareholders of the infiltrated businesses (see Chapter 
10).
Box 22. Involvement of relatives in a fraud through a 
metal trading company based in London
A gang of criminals used a metal trading firm 
(ALPHA) based in London to defraud banks and 
creditors all over the world between 1996 and 
2002. The owner of the company with the help 
of accomplices and three of his brothers living 
in the USA, the UAE and Singapore coordinated 
over 300 bogus customers and companies 
based in the USA, Singapore, India, Dubai, Hong 
Kong, Italy and France to create false trades 
that could give credibility to ALPHA and allow 
it to ask for advance money from banks and 
creditors which believed they were giving money 
to an important metal trading firm. The company 
was so lucrative that its owner ended up in the 
Sunday Times Rich List. It also managed to dupe 
a number of politicians to act as advisers and 
give the company further credibility. 
The fake customers and companies were 
accomplices with addresses in different 
countries; they used false documents to present 
themselves as independent traders and win the 
confidence of auditors and banks. The fraud 
consisted in persuading lending institutions to 
advance large sums of money for metal trading 
transactions to ALPHA and its sister company 
in the USA (BETA), which was controlled by the 
owner of ALPHA with the involvement of his 
brother. The lending institutions were deceived 
into believing that the transactions involved 
genuine purchases and sales of metal with 
customers independent of ALPHA and BETA. 
Whilst there was some honest trading, most of 
it was fraudulent and related to the purported 
purchases or sales of metal which never took 
place, or the falsification of documents so as to 
make it appear that the amount of the purchase 
price was far greater than the true amount, 
typically by the documentary substitution of a 
more valuable metal for a less valuable one. The 
money advanced by the banks was of benefit to 
the group either by way of the sale of receivables 
or by way of funding the purchase of metal.
Professionals (e.g., lawyers, notaries, accountants) 
participate in the infiltration process to provide 
assistance to OCG members on specific matters, 
especially in Italy and in the Netherlands, where frauds 
were the main driver of infiltration (Figure 38). Box 23 
highlights the role of the web as a facilitator of the 
infiltration process.
Figure 38. Involvement of professionals in the 
infiltration process by country
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Box 23. The web as a facilitator of infiltration
This case involved ten suspects and six companies. 
All the companies were originally set up as legal 
businesses and then became involved in illegal 
activities. Hence, none of the six companies was 
set up with the intention to commit fraud/crime. 
The suspects slowly became involved in criminal 
activities while doing business.
One of the main suspects, Mr. A, was a pharmacist 
who originally had a pharmacy in a city. Mr. A, 
together with a business partner Mr. B, decided 
to take his business onto the Internet and started 
a web shop. The internet pharmacy was in fact an 
empty office, mainly run by Mr. C, who attended to 
the orders. The already-existing pharmacy was still 
needed because it is prohibited in the Netherlands 
to sell pharmaceutical products to consumers 
without a licensed pharmacy. The online pharmacy 
had contacts with several doctors. Patients or 
customers ordered products on the pharmacy’s 
website. These patients or customers lived in the 
Netherlands, in other EU countries, or in the USA. 
Together with the order, the patients/customers 
had to fill out a questionnaire on their physical 
condition. By law, this form must be checked by a 
doctor. Initially, only officially registered medicines 
were provided, but later also non-registered ones 
were sold. The patients/customers were led to 
believe that a doctor had checked their order and 
assessed the risks of the prescriptions. In practice, 
no one checked the orders. Seven doctors were 
involved. Payments by customers were made with 
the PayPal system. 
The first criminal investigation was conducted by 
Dutch Customs because illegal drugs in shipments 
had been returned by the US Customs. About half 
a year after this investigation, a second criminal 
investigation started on the same suspects in 
regard to the trade in illegal drugs (e.g. Viagra). 
In order to run the criminal business, customers 
were recruited at attractive internet sites. The 
costs of running the office were low. Moreover, 
prescriptions were often sold at prices higher 
than the lawfully prescribed rates. At least one 
of the collaborating doctors expressed concerns 
about the sale of illegal medications and drugs. 
His concerns were effectively dealt with by Mr. A, 
who stated that the internet pharmacy was in the 
process of opening an office in Curacao as cover 
up to legalise all transactions. 
10. Control strategies of 
infiltrated businesses59
The expression ’control strategies’ refers to the 
ownership structure of infiltrated businesses, i.e. how 
infiltrated businesses are owned and controlled. Given 
the lack of previous research, the analysis of the 
ownership structure has included:
• The legal form of infiltrated businesses;
• The nature of shareholders and directors;
• The use of other forms of control (e.g. complex 
corporate ownership schemes).
10.1 Legal form
Depending on the specific goals that they intend to 
pursue, OCGs may prefer some legal forms rather than 
others. Table 20 summarises the hypotheses on the 
legal forms of infiltrated businesses.
On the one hand, OCGs may need to conceal their 
criminal activities and identity. In these cases, 
they will prefer legal forms, such as private limited 
companies, which allow for greater fragmentation 
of the share capital, thus making it more difficult for 
law enforcement agencies to identify the beneficial 
owners of the infiltrated businesses and reducing the 
potential impact of seizure and confiscation. Indeed, in 
the case of seizure or confiscation, only the shares of 
the person indicted are usually restricted (FATF, 2006; 
Gup & Beekarry, 2009; Steinko, 2012; Transcrime, 
2013b). For the same reasons, OCGs may also choose 
legal forms with low transparency requirements, such 
as trusts or foundations, especially those registered in 
countries with low transparency regimes (FATF, 2006; 
Transcrime, 2013b; van der Does de Willebois, Halter, 
Harrison, Park, & Sharman, 2011).
On the other hand, individual companies (e.g., sole 
traders/proprietorships) or unlimited companies (e.g., 
partnerships) may be favoured by criminal groups 
which, by tradition or for cultural reasons, want to exert 
direct control over their assets. The same consideration 
also applies to OCG members who want to achieve 
visibility and social prestige by being publicly recognised 
as ‘successful entrepreneurs’ (Gup & Beekarry, 2009; 
Transcrime, 2013b).
59. With the collaboration of Federica Sarno (Università Cattolica del Sacro 
Cuore-Transcrime, Italy).
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Table 20. Hypotheses on the legal forms of infiltrated businesses
OC drivers and/or 
needs
Assumptions  OC strategy
Concealment of 
illicit activities and 
beneficial ownership
Fragmentation of company’s issued 
share capital to conceal the bene-
ficial owner and reduce the risk of 
seizure of the whole company
Limited companies
Use of non-transparent legal entities
Use of individual companies as holding compa-
nies
Use of trusts, fiduciary companies, associations, 
foundations
Use of shell companies
Direct control and 
exposure
Direct control over the company 
without the need to involve 
professionals or external managers 
Unlimited companies 
Individual companies 
Legal forms easy to establish 
and manage, and not requiring 
accounting of financial transactions 
Individual companies 
Unlimited companies
Limited companies
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Figure 39 presents the distribution of the legal forms of 
infiltrated businesses in the five countries covered by 
the project. Private limited liability companies are the 
preferred legal form in all the countries. In particular, 
they account for more than 90% of infiltrated businesses 
in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands. In Italy, 
Sweden and Slovenia, they have a lower prevalence 
(64.6%, 41.9% and 45.7% respectively). 
Figure 39. Legal forms of infiltrated businesses by 
country60
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Other types of legal forms are more country-specific. 
For example, sole traders are frequent among 
infiltrated businesses in Slovenia, while public limited 
companies are common among Swedish companies 
controlled by criminal groups. This may partly be due 
to the characteristics of the case studies collected in 
the different countries. For instance, many Slovenian 
case studies involve bars and night clubs with no or a 
few employees. This may explain the prevalence of sole 
traders among infiltrated businesses in Slovenia.
The decision of OCGs to infiltrate legitimate businesses 
with a certain legal form may depend on two different 
factors. On the one hand, the choice of a certain legal 
form may reflect the characteristics of the local economy 
in a given country. In this case, it is likely that the legal 
form of the infiltrated business coincides with the legal 
form most commonly used in the same country and 
business sector. On the other hand, OCGs may infiltrate 
businesses with the most attractive characteristics and 
not necessarily those with the most common legal form. 
In this latter case, it is likely that the legal form of the 
infiltrated business differs from the most common one.
60. The category ‘other legal forms’ includes: branches, non-profit organisa-
tions, and foreign companies.
92
The legal form of infiltrated businesses is thus compared 
with the most common legal form in the same country 
and business sector. Figure 40 shows the number of 
infiltrated businesses which do not have the same legal 
form as the most common one in the same country 
and business sector.61 62 In cases of discrepancy, 
private limited companies are the type of business 
most frequently used by OCGs. This further supports 
the hypothesis that private limited liability companies 
are the preferred legal form for infiltrated businesses, 
regardless of whether they are the most common legal 
form in the same country and business sector.
Figure 40. Infiltrated businesses with a legal form 
different from the one most common in the same 
country and economic sector
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
Overall, the above results suggest that OCGs decide 
to infiltrate legitimate businesses with attractive 
characteristics. In particular, they seem to prefer forms 
of businesses which favour the concealment of criminal 
identity and reduce the impact of law enforcement 
intervention. At the same time, the results of this study 
should be interpreted with caution. In fact, by comparing 
the DCS sample of infiltrated businesses with the 
number of active companies registered in Bureau van 
Dijk’s Orbis, some discrepancies have emerged.63 
In the case of Italy, it was possible to further detail 
the analysis by type of OCG.64 Previous studies on 
Italian mafia infiltration in legitimate businesses have 
pointed out that different mafias may prefer different 
legal forms (Transcrime, 2013b). Figure 42 describes 
the legal forms of infiltrated businesses in Italy, 
distinguishing by type of OCG. Private limited liability 
companies (i.e. società a responsabilità limitata) are 
the form of business favoured by all criminal groups. 
As suggested by Transcrime (2013b), they represent 
the best compromise between the need of OCGs to 
conceal criminal activities and identity and the ease of 
establishment and management. 
Private limited companies account for nearly 80% 
of the businesses infiltrated by Cosa Nostra and the 
‘Ndrangheta. In the case of the Camorra, private limited 
companies still represent the majority of infiltrated 
businesses, but with a lower percentage (59.5%). 
Conversely, sole traders and partnerships assume 
a greater relevance, in line with previous findings 
(Transcrime, 2013b). Partnerships are also favoured by 
other Italian groups.65 Contrary to previous findings, no 
sole traders were instead found among the companies 
infiltrated by the ‘Ndrangheta. This discrepancy is 
probably due to the different types of data used in this 
study, if compared with the previous ones.
With regard to foreign groups operating in Italy, all the 
evidence recorded by this study relates to Chinese OCGs. 
Similarly to Italian organisations, Chinese criminal 
groups seem to favour private limited companies (Figure 
41). Nonetheless, these results should be considered 
as preliminary findings and warrant further exploration. 
Indeed, in 43.8% of the episodes regarding Chinese 
OCGs it was not possible to identify the legal form of 
infiltrated businesses.
figure 1
figure 2
figure 3
figure 10
figure 15
figure 18
figure 19
figure 20
Figure 24
figure 27
figure 31
figure 32
figure 34
figure 35
figure 36
figure 37
figure 39
figure 40
figure 41
figure 42
figure 43
figure 45
figure 46
figure 47
figure 48
figure 49
figure 50
figure 51
9.2%
49.8%
1.3%
17.1%
22.5%
54.8%
25.4%
3.1%
5.9%
10.8%
27%
25%
1%
15%
32%
43%
33%
20%
3% 1%
20%
1%
3%
5%
70%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2002
4
1
3
2
3
1
1
4
15
1
62
2
47
1
139 89 40
2
5 3 39
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
21%
15%
1%
4%
59%
21
11
8
20
10
164
34
35
43
23
20
25
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
21%
16%
22%
21%
19%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
Italy 
(N=21)
Slovenia
(N=8)
Sweden
(N=20)
UK
(N=10)
The
Netherlands
(N=11)
Italy Slovenia Sweden UKThe
Netherlands
70% 14
5
6
2
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0.20%
0.30%
0.10%
0.50%
0.60%
0.70%
0.80%
0.40%
0.00%
2002
0.72%
0.51%
0.26%
0.47%
0.56%
0.33%
0.44% 0.47%
0.39%
0.36%
0.58%
0.52%
0.24%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
38
6
10
5
7
70%
80%
90%
100%
94
25
19
35
2
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
Public 
limited companies
Private 
limited companies
Partnerships
Sole traders
Other legal forms
NA
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
figure 44
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60% 90
11
22 26
17
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
10
12
6
8
4
2
14
16
0
Money 
laundering
Fraud OtherFormally legal 
activities
Concealment 
of illegal 
activities
4 4
3
5
15
Italy 
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
40%
50%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=137)
Slovenia
(N=32)
Sweden
(N=34)
UK
(N=18)
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
Italy 
(N=21)
Slovenia
(N=8)
Sweden
(N=20)
UK
(N=10)
The
Netherlands
(N=11)
Italy
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
Italy
(N=164)
Slovenia
(N=35)
Sweden
(N=43)
UK
(N=23)
The
Netherlands
(N=34)
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
20%
30%
10%
0%
30%
24.9%0.8%
Academic study Judicial evidence
LEA report Media Other
N = 2,380 
N = 2,380 
N = 2,380 
N = 1,305
N = 604
Institutional report
15%
29%
0.4%
Local OCGs Motorcycles gangsItalian mafias
Other OCGs NA
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
Academic study
Judicial evidence LEA report Media
Institutional report
Academic study
LEA report Media
No. criminal charges with references to OCGs % OCGs in relation to all criminal charges
%
 O
CG
s 
in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 a
ll 
cr
im
in
al
 c
ha
rg
es
Other
Institutional report
N
o.
 c
rim
in
al
 c
ha
rg
es
 w
ith
 re
fe
re
nc
es
 to
 O
CG
s 
Academic study
Judicial evidence LEA report Media
Institutional report
N = 74
23%
24%
20%
32%
1% N = 140
N = 257
N = 70
N = 299
Academic study
LEA report Media Other
Institutional report
No. filed criminal complaints for money laudering offences with references to OCGs 
No. filed criminal complaints for money laudering offences without references to OCGs 
Academic study
Judicial evidence LEA report Media
Institutional report
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
Money laundering FraudFormally legal activities
Concealment of illegal activities Other
Money laundering FraudFormally legal activities
New business NAAlready existing business
Concealment of illegal activities Other
90
53
19
24
9
14
4
30
1
5
29
21
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
Public limited
companies
Private limited
companies
Partnerships
Sole traders
Other legal forms
NA
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
UKSweden
Public limited
companies
Private limited
companies
Partnerships
Sole traders
Other
legal forms
NA
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
Cosa Nostra (N=14) Camorra (N=74)‘Ndrangheta (N=47)
Other Italian (N=13)Chinese (N=16)
Money laundering Fiscal fraudFormally legal activities
Corporate fraud OtherConcealment of illegal activities
Relatives Legal entrepreneursProfessionals
Women among shareholders Women as majority shareholders
Legal companies
53
7
6
14
9
8
3
1
8
4
1
Small LargeMedium Very large NA
Italy SloveniaThe Netherlands
Sweden UK
0 4-101-3 11-20 >20 NA
61. In order to identify which was the most common legal form in a given 
country and business sector (NACE 0-digit), use was made of the data on 
active companies registered in Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis. In the case in which 
more than one legal form was largely prevalent over the others, both the 
first and the second most common legal form were used for comparison, 
provided that the difference between the values of these two categories 
(calculated as % of the total) was less than or equal to 5%.
  
62. The low percentage of infiltrated businesses with an uncommon legal 
form recorded in the UK may depend on the type of data used for compar-
ison. Data on the legal form of active businesses in the five EU MS were 
retrieved from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis. The number of active sole traders 
registered in Orbis is lower in the United Kingdom if compared with the oth-
er four countries. Despite these limitations, the Orbis database represents 
the best available source at the present time. For instance, the statistics of 
the British national business register (i.e. Companies House) do not include 
information on sole traders, partnerships and charities (Companies House, 
2014)
63. In particular, private and public limited companies tend to be overrepre-
sented in the DCS sample in all the countries. For example, private limited 
companies account for 91.2% of infiltrated businesses in the Netherlands, 
while they represent only 31.9% of the Dutch active companies registered 
in Orbis. The same consideration also applies to infiltrated partnerships, 
with the exception of Sweden, where this form of business is poorly repre-
sented if compared with the percentage of active partnerships registered 
in Orbis. Similarly, sole traders are underrepresented in the DCS sample in 
Italy and Sweden, while they are overrepresented in Slovenia. No episodes 
of infiltrated partnerships and sole traders have been found in the United 
Kingdom.
64. It was not possible to conduct the same analysis for the other ARIEL 
countries because the OCGs involved in the infiltration process were in all 
cases local groups. In the case of Sweden, prison gangs and outlaw mo-
torcycle gangs were also present, but they accounted for a low number of 
episodes if compared with the Swedish OCGs. In particular, prison gangs 
recorded 2 episodes out of 43, corresponding to 1 foreign company and 1 
private limited company; motorcycle gangs accounted for 4 episodes, cor-
responding to 3 public limited companies and 1 private limited company.
65. The category “other Italian” includes the Società Foggiana and other 
non-specified Italian OCGs.
93
Figure 41. Legal forms of infiltrated businesses in 
Italy by type of OCG
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
There are several reasons why OCGs decide to infiltrate 
legitimate businesses. Nonetheless, regardless of 
the type of driver considered, private limited liability 
companies represent the legal form most frequently 
infiltrated by OCGs in the five countries covered by the 
project (Figure 42). Interestingly, no sole traders were 
found among the businesses used to commit frauds. 
Probably, individual companies are a form of business 
too small to permit the perpetration of complex 
fraudulent schemes as fiscal and corporate frauds 
usually are. Moreover, they do not provide the owners 
of the infiltrated companies with any form of protection 
from personal liability. Indeed, fraud schemes often 
exploit the possibility to incorporate businesses and 
make them disappear with limited impact on personal 
assets (i.e. missing trader frauds). For this reason, OCGs 
may prefer other and more secure types of businesses, 
which allow for fragmentation of the share capital and, 
therefore, reduced liability (H. Silverstone & Sheetz, 
2007).
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Figure 42. Legal forms of infiltrated businesses by 
type of driver
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
10.2 Shareholders and directors
The need to conceal criminal activities and identity and 
to exert direct control over infiltrated businesses may 
also influence the control strategies adopted by OCGs 
in terms of shareholders and directors of infiltrated 
companies. 
Table 21 summarises the hypotheses drawn from the 
literature on the subject. The use of figureheads as 
company shareholders is a strategy commonly used by 
OCGs to conceal their criminal activities and hide the 
identity of the ultimate beneficial owners (which, in fact, 
are the members of the organisation itself) (Brå, 2011b; 
FATF, 2006; Schneider, 2004; Transcrime, 2008b, 
2013b; van der Does de Willebois et al., 2011). Persons 
frequently used as figureheads include relatives of OCG 
members, legal entrepreneurs, and professionals. 
The use of figureheads is particularly frequent if 
the members of the OCG have criminal records 
which prevent them from directly participating in the 
ownership and management structure of the infiltrated 
business (Transcrime, 2013b). Legal companies as 
corporate shareholders may also be used to conceal 
the beneficial ownership of infiltrated businesses. Legal 
companies as corporate shareholders may also be 
used to conceal the beneficial ownership of infiltrated 
businesses.
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Table 21. Hypotheses from the literature on shareholders and directors of infiltrated businesses
OC drivers and/or needs Assumptions  OC strategy
Concealment of illicit 
activities and beneficial 
ownership
Natural persons as figureheads
Relatives among the shareholders
Professionals among the shareholders
Legal entrepreneurs among the shareholders
Young people among the shareholders/directors
Old/retired people among the shareholders/
directors
Women among the shareholders/directors
Presence of people with low levels of education 
among the shareholders/directors
Legal persons as shareholders Use of corporate shareholders
Direct control and exposure
Direct control on mafia 
companies; use of ‘family 
companies’
OC affiliates included as shareholders 
OC affiliates included as employees
Family members among the shareholders and/
or directors
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Nonetheless, the inclusion of relatives among the 
company shareholders can be used not only as a 
means to conceal the criminal activities and identity 
of OCGs, but also as a strategy to maintain control 
as direct as possible on the infiltrated business when 
OCG members cannot do this personally (Transcrime, 
2013b). Alternatively, OCGs will include some of their 
affiliates among the shareholders and the employees of 
the infiltrated businesses, in order to exert direct control 
or to achieve visibility and social prestige (Calderoni & 
Caneppele, 2009; Transcrime, 2008b, 2013b)
OCG members are directly involved as shareholders in 
55.5% of all infiltrated businesses analysed in the study, 
suggesting a certain propensity of OCGs to maintain 
direct control over infiltrated companies.66 Figure 43 
shows the number of infiltrated businesses with OCG 
members as shareholders in the five countries covered 
by the project. In almost all the countries, more than 
half of infiltrated businesses include at least one OCG 
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member among its shareholders. This is particularly 
the case in the UK, where the percentage of infiltrated 
businesses with OC members as shareholders reaches 
a peak of 73.9%. The only exception is represented by 
the Netherlands, where it seems that OCGs prefer more 
complex control schemes.
Figure 43. Infiltrated businesses with OCG members 
involved as shareholders by country
66. OCG members are persons who were directly involved in the illicit 
activities carried out by the criminal group.
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
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Box 24. High number of shareholders to hide the 
beneficial owners of a real estate business
67. Shareholder categories other than OC members include: relatives, 
professionals, legal entrepreneurs and legal companies. The sum of 
percentages (including those of the OC members reported in Figure 43) is 
different from 100% because more than one category of shareholders may 
be simultaneously involved in the same business.
A ‘Ndrangheta group was involved in the 
infiltration of several real estate businesses in 
the North of Italy. In particular, ALPHA was at the 
core of a network of companies controlled by the 
members of the criminal group since it held the 
shares of sixteen other companies operating in 
the construction and real estate sectors.
The company had a large number of shareholders 
who were straw men acting on behalf of three 
members of the ‘Ndrangheta group. The 
investigations revealed that the shareholders 
of ALPHA were employees, professionals and 
relatives used by the OCG members to hide their 
participation in the business.
Shareholders:
Mr. A, € 216,750 (43.35%) 
Mr. F, € 20,000 (4%)  
Mr. K, € 20,000 (4%)
Mr. B, € 101,750 (20.35%) 
Mr. G, € 20,000 (4%)  
Mr. L, € 20,000 (4%)
Mr. C, € 20,000 (4%)  
Mr. H, € 5,000 (1%)  
Mr. M, € 1,500 (0.3%)
Mr. D, € 20,000 (4%)  
Mr. I, € 5,000 (1%)  
Mr. N, € 5,000 (1%)
Mr. E, € 20,000 (4%)  
Mr. J, € 5,000 (1%)  
Mr. O, € 20,000 (4%)
Besides being directly involved as shareholders, 
OCGs may control the infiltrated businesses using 
figureheads as means to conceal their criminal identity 
and beneficial ownership (Box 25 and Box 26).
Box 25. Hiring a straw man for a tax credits fraud 
through a construction company
In this case study several construction companies 
with no actual business activities submitted false 
invoices and claimed tax refunds from the Dutch 
Tax Authority. The members of the criminal group 
behind the fraud did not control the infiltrated 
businesses directly. In March 2007 Mr. A was 
approached by Mr. B - who was involved in the 
OCG’s illicit activities - to become shareholder 
and director of BETA. He would have earned a 
salary of €2,000 a month for this job. He stated 
that he was hired to give advice on welding; 
however, in practice he was rarely asked to do 
anything for the company.
Box 26. Hiring a straw man for a missing trader in a 
VAT fraud
Company ALPHA was suspected of being a 
missing trader in a ‘carousel’ fraud. Mr. A was 
one of the suspects in the trial and he was 
shareholder and director of ALPHA for some 
months in 2010. He acted as a straw man on 
behalf of a Dutch criminal organisation. Mr. 
A was approached by one of the members of 
the criminal group to become director of the 
company. He was promised a salary of €1,500 a 
month. When the paperwork was completed, Mr. 
A did not hear from the organised criminals again 
and the salary was not paid.
Figure 44 describes the distribution of the other 
categories of shareholders (besides OCG members) 
in each country.67 The use of relatives and legal 
entrepreneurs is particularly frequent in Italy, where 
the two categories account for 39.6% and 30.5% 
of the infiltrated businesses. The large presence of 
relatives among the shareholders may be due to the 
characteristics typical of Italian criminal organisations, 
which are traditionally based on strong kinship and 
family ties (Paoli, 2003). 
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In particular, in 12.2% of infiltrated businesses in 
Italy, relatives replace OC members in the ownership 
structure of the company. This may indicate a tendency 
of Italian OCGs to maintain a degree of control as direct 
as possible on infiltrated businesses, even when they 
use figureheads as means to conceal their criminal 
identity, in line with the findings of previous studies 
(Transcrime, 2013b). 
Figure 44. Other categories of shareholders. 
Percentages by country
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
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Box 27. Use of straw men to hide the beneficial owner 
of a restaurant in a large city in Sweden
The infiltrated business in this case study, 
ALPHA, was established by an organised crime 
group as a new business. The business idea was 
to establish and run a restaurant in an attractive 
location in the very centre of a large city in 
Sweden.
There were two formal representatives during the 
early time period, and then two further persons, 
some of them family members of the suspected 
organiser. The first formal representative owned 
100% of the shares i  ALPHA, but claimed that 
he had bought them on behalf of the organiser. 
Their role was unclear, but they were suspected 
of being frontmen or straw en. According t  
the prosecutor, the organiser was the actual 
representative during the entire time period of 
the crimes investigated, although he held no 
formal position in ALPHA. 
As a subsidiary of ALPHA, BETA was initially 100% 
owned by ALPHA. Officially, the role of ALPHA was 
to own the premises, whereas the role of BETA 
was to run the restaurant. The cancellation of the 
liquor licence of BETA in late 2009/early 2010 
made it necessary to establish a new business, 
GAMMA, with a new board of paper members 
(straw men) not connected to ALPHA. All three 
companies were in fact owned by the same family.
The licence to serve liquor is of course very 
important for restaurants. Authorities, especially 
in big cities, therefore supervise restaurants, 
screen the owner and the manager in crime 
registers, and check how the business is 
financed. Therefore, there is an interest in 
‘changing on paper’ the company running the 
restaurant.
ALPHA
(owns the premesis)
BETA
(runs the restaurant)
- Liquor licence in 2009
- Tax liabilities after 
summer 2009
- Liquor licence for 2010 
at risk
- Licence to rent 
premises at ALPHA
- Plan to apply for a liquor 
licence for 2010
GAMMA
(runs the restaurant)
TenentSubsidiary
Box 28. Relatives as directors of a construction 
company in the Netherlands
A Dutch construction company was used to 
conduct tax credits fraud and to launder the 
profits of drug trafficking between 2003 and 
2008. Several relatives of one of the members 
of the criminal group (Mr. A) held formal 
management positions within the business. They 
acted as straw men on behalf of the criminal 
organisation. Mr. A’s brother had been director 
of the company since 2005. His sister and her 
ex-husband had also been directors.
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Box 29. A legal entrepreneur involved a shareholder 
in a fraudulent business
ALPHA, a business whose activities involved the 
trade of cars and trucks, was suspected of not 
having paid sales taxes for over two years and 
having thus been involved in VAT fraud. Besides 
the members of a Dutch criminal group, Mr. A, 
the legal entrepreneur who owned the company, 
was involved in the illicit activities. Mr. A was 
approached by a member of the OCG who asked 
to use the company’s VAT number. Mr. A agreed, 
and his signature was falsified to conclude sale 
agreements to buy cars and trucks. The legal 
entrepreneur in turn received money from the 
OCG member.
Box 30. Suspected cooperation between legal 
entrepreneurs and criminals in a VAT fraud
This case study involves several companies 
active in the wholesale of information and 
communication equipment, in particular mobile 
phones. The legal businesses were part of a 
‘carousel’ fraud in which Belgian and Swiss 
companies acted as missing traders and the 
Dutch infiltrated businesses never paid turnover 
taxes to the Tax Authority. ALPHA was founded 
in 2000 by Mr. A, a legal entrepreneur, who was 
also shareholder and director of the company.
Mr. A declared that an OCG member came to 
him with the idea of setting up a trade in mobile 
phones. The OCG member also told him that he 
had contacts with mobile phone dealers and 
clients, and that he needed an investor. The 
entrepreneur agreed to become involved in the 
business because of the economic profit that he 
could earn. The OCG member became informally 
involved in the company, and the company was 
used for a carousel fraud.
Mr. A claimed that he was unaware that his 
company was being used for a fraud. However, 
various activities were notified to him by the 
members of the criminal group. The Dutch law 
enforcement agencies thus suspected that he 
actively participated and was willing to contribute 
to the illicit activities.
Legal (shell) companies as shareholders are widely 
used in the Netherlands, where they account for 70.6% 
of the country episodes (Figure 44). This result is in line 
with the main driver behind the infiltration of legitimate 
businesses in that country. Indeed, the creation of large 
networks of companies interconnected with each other 
may be instrumental to the commission of complex 
fraudulent schemes, such as VAT and tax frauds, which 
indeed represent a significant portion of the results 
of OCG infiltration in the Netherlands. In regard to 
professionals, their involvement as shareholders is 
rare and records a limited number of episodes only in 
Italy – where the involvement of politicians was also 
found – and Sweden, in line with previous findings (see 
Transcrime, 2013b). Due to the lack of information, 
it was not possible to investigate the presence of 
politically exposed persons (PEP) as shareholders, 
whose involvement has been documented in cases of 
money laundering (Brun, Gray, Scott, & Stephenson, 
2011; van der Does de Willebois et al., 2011).
Box 31. Involvement of politicians
A ‘Ndrangheta group was involved in the 
infiltration of ALPHA, a company that controlled 
several supermarkets in the region of Reggio 
Calabria. The mafia group already controlled 
other businesses active in the production of 
food products. Through infiltration of ALPHA, the 
members of the criminal organisation were able 
to impose their companies as suppliers of food 
products to the supermarkets owned by ALPHA.
The infiltration was facilitated by Mr. A, who was 
a member of the city council of Reggio Calabria 
and the beneficial owner of ALPHA. He entered 
into contracts with a number of mafia companies 
for the supply of goods to the supermarkets 
owned by ALPHA. In return, he received support 
for his candidacy in the local elections.
A certain literature (Caneppele, Calderoni, & Martocchia, 
2009; Transcrime, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c) has 
suggested that a possible signal of the use of figureheads 
is the presence of very young (age ≤ 25 years old) or very 
old people (age ≥ 65 years old) among the shareholders 
and/or directors of infiltrated businesses (see Table 21). 
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For three out of the five countries analysed by this 
project it was not possible to test this hypothesis due 
to the paucity of information on the ages of the owners 
and directors of infiltrated businesses.68 Italy and the 
United Kingdom were the only two countries for which a 
significant amount of information was available. 
In Italy, 101 out of 164 infiltrated businesses 
had information on the age of at least one of the 
shareholders. Of these 101 businesses, 16 (or 16%) 
had young people among their shareholders; but in only 
1 case did the young shareholder also have the majority 
of shares. In 7 businesses out of 101 (or 7%), old people 
were included among the shareholders; but in none of 
these cases was the old shareholder also the majority 
one. In regard to the age of directors, information was 
available for 53 out of 164 businesses.Of these 53 
businesses, 3 (or 6%) had young people among their 
directors; while only 1 business had very old directors.
In the United Kingdom, 18 out of 23 infiltrated 
businesses had information on the age of at least one 
of the shareholders. Of these 18 businesses, 5 (or 28%) 
had young people among their shareholders; and in all 
cases the young shareholders were also the majority 
ones. Instead, only 1 business with an old person among 
its shareholders was found; but the old shareholder 
did not have the majority of shares. In regard to the 
age of directors, information was available for all the 
23 infiltrated businesses. In 8 of these 23 businesses 
(or 34.8%), young people were included among the 
directors; while no businesses with old directors were 
found. In this case, the presence of young shareholders 
may also be due to the larger involvement of young 
people in the British economy than in other European 
countries.
The age of the owners and directors of a certain 
company should be evaluated in conjunction with 
other risk factors, and it cannot be considered a single 
marker of OC infiltration into legitimate businesses. 
A similar consideration also applies to the gender 
of shareholders and directors. In some countries or 
regions, where female unemployment is high and 
women rarely occupy top management positions within 
companies, the presence of female shareholders 
or directors may represent a red flag of infiltration. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be considered a single marker 
of infiltration by OCGs into legitimate businesses 
(Caneppele et al., 2009). 
Figure 45 shows the number of infiltrated businesses 
with women among shareholders and with women as 
majority shareholders.69 In the case of the Netherlands 
it was possible to determine the gender of company 
shareholders for 11 out of the 34 infiltrated businesses; 
but in none of these 11 cases was there a woman among 
the shareholders. For this reason, it was excluded from the 
analysis. In Sweden, 8 out of 34 businesses had women 
included in the ownership structure.70 Nonetheless, 
the information on the amount of shares hold by each 
member was scarce (Figure 45). For the remaining three 
countries (i.e. Italy, Slovenia and United Kingdom) some 
more information was available and is discussed below. 
Figure 45. Infiltrated businesses with women 
among shareholders and with women as majority 
shareholders by country
68. In particular, in the case of Sweden and Slovenia, there was no 
information available on the age of shareholders and directors. In regard 
to the Netherlands, information on the dates of birth of shareholders was 
available for 1 business out of 34, while 3 episodes had information on the 
dates of birth of directors.
69. Episodes with no information on the gender of the shareholders were 
excluded from the total and, therefore, from the calculation of the percentages.
70. 34 is the total number of Swedish businesses for which it was possible 
to establish the gender of the shareholders. 
71. As in the case of shareholders, the percentage of infiltrated businesses 
with women among the directors was calculated on the total number of 
episodes for which information on the gender of directors was available. In 
the case of Slovenia, this number corresponds to 22 out of 35 infiltrated 
businesses.
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Women are frequently included among the shareholders 
of infiltrated businesses in Italy (38.7%) and Slovenia 
(28.1%); but only in the latter country do they have the 
majority of shares within the companies. In the case of 
Slovenia, a large percentage of infiltrated businesses 
(i.e. 50%) also have women among their directors.71 
These results are in line with the characteristics 
typical of that country in terms of infiltrated sectors 
and associated criminal activities. Bars and night 
clubs are among the economic sectors most widely 
infiltrated in Slovenia, and they are frequently used as 
covers for illegal activities such as forced prostitution 
and human trafficking. It is possible that the same 
women who participate in the illegal activities are also 
included in the ownership and management structure 
of infiltrated businesses, so as to make it more difficult 
for law enforcement agencies to identify the boundaries 
between the two activities (legal and illegal). Some 
Slovenian case studies are in line with this hypothesis.
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Box 32. Organised crime group’s members as 
employees
Since 1998 freight transport had been developed 
in Italy by ALPHA. The company managed the 
pick-up of packages through limited companies 
and cooperatives. A criminal group infiltrated 
three cooperatives operating in the province of 
Milan. The infiltrated companies were owned 
by straw men acting on behalf of the criminal 
organisation. The members of the criminal 
group were instead employed as drivers by the 
freight transport companies. This enabled them 
to have a formal role in the businesses and to 
control everyday activities without arousing the 
suspicions of the authorities.
Box 33. Organised crime group’s members as low- 
and high-level employees
A ‘Ndrangheta group infiltrated a company 
involved in telemarketing, teleselling, and call 
centre activities in the North of Italy. Once the 
infiltration process had been completed, the 
criminal group drained money from the company 
using various strategies. One of them entailed 
the imposition of mafia members as employees. 
Such collaborators were placed in both low and 
high positions. For instance, Mr. A, who had no 
criminal record, was employed as managing 
director and managed the business according 
to the instructions of the mafia boss. Other 
members of the ‘Ndrangheta were instead hired 
as unskilled workers for low-level positions.
Table 22. Hypotheses from the literature on other forms of control of infiltrated businesses
OC drivers and/
or needs Assumptions  OC strategy
Concealment of 
illicit activities 
and beneficial 
ownership
Use of complex corporate ownership 
schemes 
Pyramidal structures
Frequent transformations (e.g. registered address, 
name, business sector), transfers of business lines 
or business branches, dissolution of a company 
and transfer of its business activities to a newly 
incorporated company
Foreign countries with low 
transparency requirements 
Tax havens
Use of multi-jurisdictional structures
Direct control and 
exposure
Direct control on mafia companies Small or medium-sized companies
Source: Transcrime elaboration
10.3.  Other forms of control
Besides the choice of certain types of legal forms 
and the use of particular categories of shareholders, 
OCGs may resort to other strategies of control over 
infiltrated businesses in order to make it more difficult 
for law enforcement agencies to identify their criminal 
identity and beneficial ownership. The main hypotheses 
elaborated by the literature are summarised in Table 
22 and are discussed below. One strategy commonly 
used by OCGs is the creation of complex corporate 
ownership schemes (FATF, 2006; Schneider, 2004; 
Suendorf, 2001; Transcrime, 2008a, 2008b, 2013b). 
In particular, the literature distinguishes between static 
and dynamic schemes. The former involve the creation 
of large networks of companies interconnected by cross-
shareholdings (so-called ‘Chinese boxes’). The latter 
are more dynamic strategies which include: frequent 
transformations of company details (e.g., registered 
address, name), transfers of business lines or business 
branches, dissolution of a company and transfer of 
its activities to a newly incorporated one (Transcrime, 
2013b).
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Figure 46 sets out, for each of the five EU MS, the 
number of case studies with evidence of cross-
shareholding. Large networks of companies are 
frequently used in the Netherlands, where 7 out of the 
11 selected case studies (or 64%) register episodes of 
cross-shareholding among multiple businesses. One 
of these case studies is presented in detail in Box 34. 
Groups of interconnected companies are also used in 
Italy (6 out of 21 case studies, or 28.6%) and the United 
Kingdom (4 out of 10 case studies, or 40.0%).
Figure 46. Case studies with evidence of cross-
shareholding among different businesses by country
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Box 34. Use of complex corporate ownership schemes 
and frequent change of shareholders
An intricate web of holdings and companies 
was used in the Netherlands to commit tax 
credits fraud. To hide the beneficial owner of the 
businesses, the criminal group used a complex 
network of shell companies with frequent 
changes of shareholders and directors, also for 
a short time. For instance, ALPHA was registered 
as shareholder of GAMMA for a month between 
2006 and 2007. Similarly, BETA was registered 
as director between 2006 and 2007.
ALPHA BETA
DELTA EPSILON ZETA ETA
IOTA EPSILON ZETA MU NU
THETA
GAMMA
Some case studies were characterised by businesses 
involved in frequent transformations of registered 
address, name and shareholders, as well as transfers of 
business lines or business branches. Box 35 describes 
a case of dissolution of a company and transfer of its 
activities to a newly incorporated one in order to avoid 
bankruptcy.
Box 35. Creation of new companies to avoid 
bankruptcy
A ‘Ndrangheta group infiltrated a company 
involved in telemarketing, teleselling, and call 
centre activities in the North of Italy (ALPHA) 
and extracted money from it by imposing mafia 
collaborators as workers and contracts for 
services with other businesses controlled by the 
criminal organisation. As a consequence, the 
company was short of cash and was no longer 
able to pay its suppliers and employees. In 
2011, ALPHA was split into two new companies 
to avoid bankruptcy. Despite the creation of the 
new companies, the ‘Ndrangheta group did not 
change its behaviour and replicated the same 
control and management strategies in the new 
businesses.
Another common control strategy consists in the creation 
of multi-jurisdictional structures with companies based 
in foreign countries, and particularly in countries with low 
transparency requirements and off-shore jurisdictions 
(FATF, 2006; Schneider, 2004; Transcrime, 2013b; van 
der Does de Willebois et al., 2011). An example of these 
structures is described in Box 36. Similarly to Chinese-
boxes, the use of multi-jurisdictional structures allows 
OCGs to disguise their criminal activities and makes it 
more difficult for law enforcement agencies to trace the 
identity of the ultimate beneficial owners. Moreover, the 
apparently legitimate flows between these companies 
can be used to launder criminal money or to perpetrate 
complex fraudulent schemes (FATF, 2006). These 
indications are confirmed by the results of the analysis 
of the case studies. Indeed, in the episodes for which 
evidence of the use of off-shore and/or anonymous 
bank accounts was found, legitimate businesses are 
mainly infiltrated for the purpose of committing frauds 
(80.3%), laundering criminal money (12.1%) and 
concealing illegal activities (12.1%). The other drivers 
of OC infiltration (i.e. formally legal activities and other 
reasons) were found in only one case.72 
72. The total number of episodes with evidence of the use of off-shore and/
or anonymous bank accounts is equal to 66. The sum of the percentages 
is different from 100% because more than one driver could be involved in 
the same episode.
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The prevalence of frauds over the other types of drivers 
is probably due to the fact that half of the episodes with 
evidence of the use of off-shore and/or anonymous 
bank accounts pertain to the Netherlands, where the 
perpetration of complex fraudulent schemes is the main 
driver behind the infiltration of OCGs into legitimate 
businesses.
Box 36. Use of companies based in multiple 
jurisdictions to hide the beneficial ownership
A criminal investigation conducted by the 
Italian police uncovered the activities of 
a criminal organisation involved in money 
laundering operations at international level. 
With the complicity of relatives, professionals 
and other accomplices, Mr. A established a 
series of companies used to carry out fictitious 
transactions for the purchase and sale of real 
estate properties. The real estate properties 
subject to the transactions were ultimately 
owned by Mr. A. The aim of the transactions was 
twofold: to conceal the true ownership of the 
properties, and to launder the profits of illicit 
activities.
Mr. A used various companies to conceal the 
beneficial ownership of real estate properties 
acquired with dirty money. Some of these 
companies were based in foreign countries (e.g., 
Spain, Brazil) to conceal the illegal origin and 
true ownership of those assets. The offshore 
registration of the infiltration companies was, in 
fact, one of the strategies used by Mr. A to make 
it more difficult for law enforcement authorities 
to determine that he was the real beneficial 
owner of all the companies and assets involved 
in the fictitious transactions.
A final control strategy used by OCGs involves 
characteristics of the company profile, such as size 
or age. The literature on OC infiltration into legitimate 
businesses has frequently suggested that companies of 
small or medium size (in terms, for example, of personnel 
or equipment) are at greater risk of being infiltrated by 
OCGs because they are easier to control and manage 
(Albanese, 1987; Blum et al., 1999; Suendorf, 2001; 
Transcrime, 2013b). Similarly, OCGs may sometimes 
decide to set up new companies instead of infiltrating 
already-existing ones in order to avoid law enforcement 
controls. This is, for example, the case of infiltration 
in public procurement, where new companies can 
be used to obtain public contracts because they are 
usually supposed to be “clean” (Caneppele et al., 2009, 
p. 164). Of course, these characteristics, if considered 
on their own, cannot be regarded as certain markers 
of criminal infiltration. Nonetheless, if combined with 
other risk factors, they can be useful in order to identify 
suspicious and vulnerable companies.
Figure 47. Size of infiltrated businesses. Percentages 
by country and size category
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
The analysis of the case studies selected for this 
project largely confirms the hypotheses formulated by 
the literature. As Figure 47 shows, the vast majority of 
infiltrated businesses in all the five countries are small 
and medium-sized companies. Instead, only a small 
number of large or very large businesses is recorded. 
Similarly, in almost all the countries, the majority 
of infiltrated businesses are of newly-incorporated 
companies or young companies (from 1 to 3 years). 
The sole exception is represented by the Netherlands, 
where the majority of infiltrated businesses are more 
than 3 years old, and in a substantial number of cases 
(20.6%) even more than 10 years old (Figure 48).
Figure 48. Age of infiltrated businesses. Percentages 
by country and age category
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11. Management 
strategies of infiltrated 
businesses73
This chapter analyses how businesses infiltrated 
by OCGs are managed, and it identifies differences 
between infiltrated and legal businesses in order to 
identify accounting and non-accounting ‘red flags’ that 
can be used in a risk assessment model of criminal 
infiltration.
For the purpose of Project ARIEL, ‘management 
strategies’ refer to the financial management of 
infiltrated businesses, i.e. how infiltrated businesses are 
financed and if they are able to produce profits. Given 
the lack of previous research on infiltrated businesses’ 
management strategies, the analysis focuses on:
• The financing sources;
• The use of assets;
• The profitability of infiltrated businesses.
For 54 businesses listed in the Database on Case 
Studies (DCS) financial and accounting documents 
were available for the year when the infiltration process 
started and for at least three years afterwards. For 
another 12 businesses, accounting information was 
available for the year of infiltration, at least three years 
after, and at least three years before the infiltration 
started. The financial and accounting analysis thus 
focused on 66 infiltrated businesses in the five countries 
covered by the project (Figure 49).
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Figure 49. Infiltrated businesses covered by the 
financial and accounting analysis by country
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
For each infiltrated business, a legal company (i.e. a 
non-infiltrated business) with similar characteristics 
was identified based on the combination of four 
criteria (Donato, Saporito, & Scognamiglio, 2013) (see 
Methodological Annex for details):
Spatial proximity: the legal business was registered 
in the same country region (NUTS 2) as the infiltrated 
business – in the case of high levels of market 
concentration – or country.
Business sector: the legal business operated in the 
same business sector (NACE 2-digit) as the infiltrated 
company.
Availability of information: the legal business had 
annual reports available for the period from three years 
before the beginning of the infiltration process to three 
years after its start, or for the year of infiltration and the 
three years after in the case of new businesses.
Total assets: the legal business with a value of total 
assets closest to that of the infiltrated business was 
selected.
The results presented in this chapter are based on the 
analysis of financial items and ratios retrieved from 
financial and accounting documents of a sample of 
132 businesses: 66 belonging to the group of infiltrated 
businesses and 66 belonging to the peer group of legal 
companies.
73. With the collaboration of Lorena Di Bono, Salvatore Cincimino, Michele 
Riccardi and Giulia Berlusconi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore-
Transcrime, Italy).
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It is important to note that the analysis may be biased 
by the fact that some financial accounts are not 
reliable, consistent and verifiable. Figure 50 reports 
the number of infiltrated businesses for which evidence 
of accounting manipulation was found in the judicial 
documents. In about one third of the case studies 
(32%) financial documents were manipulated. As 
a consequence, the information reported in such 
documents may not correspond to the actual financial 
situation of the infiltrated businesses, therefore making 
the comparison with legitimate businesses difficult and 
questionable.
Figure 50. Number of businesses with evidence of 
accounting manipulation by driver of OCG infiltration
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Despite evidence of accounting manipulation, the 
whole sample of 66 infiltrated businesses was 
analysed. Firstly, accounting manipulation may occur 
in infiltrated, as well as in non-infiltrated businesses. 
Secondly, the judicial documents did not specify the 
type and extent of such manipulations (e.g. the financial 
items and the years). Finally, accounting manipulations 
are more visible in the income statement rather than in 
the balance sheet. The analysis, however, focuses on 
the latter.
11.1. Financing sources
Among the drivers of OCG infiltration of legal businesses, 
money laundering and the concealment of illegal 
activities may influence the financial statement items 
(i.e. investments and liabilities) of infiltrated businesses. 
Criminal groups may have a large amount of illicit 
proceeds to be invested and laundered through legal 
businesses. As a consequence, infiltrated businesses 
may not need to resort to bank credit, and they may 
have low levels of financial indebtedness (Transcrime, 
2013b).
At the same time, criminal groups need to conceal 
the origin of the money used to finance the infiltrated 
businesses. Possible options include the creation of 
complex corporate schemes to account loans as debts 
towards companies of the same group, or towards 
subsidiaries, shareholders and parent companies. OCGs 
may also incorporate (fictitious) supplier companies and 
disguise the injection of money as debts to suppliers 
(i.e. trade payables) (Transcrime, 2013b).
Table 23 summarises the hypotheses on the financing 
sources of infiltrated businesses and the corresponding 
signals in the balance sheet. It also presents the main 
results, i.e. whether the level of the financial ratios of 
infiltrated businesses is higher or lower than the one 
of non-infiltrated businesses, and therefore whether 
the analysis confirmed the hypotheses (see the 
Methodological Annex for the list of financial ratios 
used in the analysis and details on the results).
Table 23. Financing sources of infiltrated businesses. Comparison with the peer group of non-infiltrated businesses74
OC drivers and/or 
needs
Assumptions
Accounting level      
signals
Comparison with peer 
group
Significance 
level
Large availability of 
illicit resources for 
laundering and for 
financing the firm
Low levels of financial 
debt
Low level of financial 
debts on total assets
Lower (HP confirmed) **
Low levels of debts Low level of debts Lower (HP confirmed) n.s.
Need to conceal 
illicit resources
Little use of 
shareholders’ funds
Low level of equity on 
total assets
Lower (HP confirmed) n.s.
Use of covert forms of 
funding
High level of other 
debts
Higher (HP confirmed) n.s.
High level of trade 
payables
Higher (HP confirmed) n.s.
Intimidation of 
suppliers
High exposure to 
suppliers
High level of trade 
payables
Higher (HP confirmed) n.s.
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data 74. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.
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The results seem to confirm the hypotheses, although 
only the level of financial net debt of infiltrated businesses 
– measured as the difference between current financial 
liabilities plus medium/long term financial liabilities 
minus cash and cash equivalents on net equity – is 
significantly lower than the average level of legal, non-
infiltrated companies belonging to the peer group.
Low levels of financial debt indicate that legal businesses 
infiltrated by OCGs do not need to resort to banks and 
other financial institutions for loans to finance their 
activities. At the same time, the level of shareholders’ 
equity is lower in comparison to non-infiltrated 
businesses. This could be explained by the fact that 
OCGs tend to avoid direct involvement as shareholders 
in companies in order to make it more difficult for law 
enforcement agencies to trace their origin.
High levels of debts to suppliers and other debts may 
indicate an attempt to conceal the injection of illicit 
proceeds into legitimate businesses controlled by OCGs. 
Criminal groups may, in fact, use fictitious suppliers 
to disguise the injection of money as trade payables. 
At the same time, the high levels of trade payables in 
infiltrated businesses may reflect actual debts of such 
companies towards their suppliers, due to the fact that 
criminal groups are often able to intimidate suppliers 
and delay the payments (Box 37).
Box 37. Intimidation of suppliers
This case study concerns Cosa Nostra infiltration 
of a company that managed a beach resort in 
Sicily. The company was founded by two straw 
men, Mr. A and Mr. B on behalf of the criminal 
organisation. The company was in financial 
difficulties. It had no money to pay the suppliers, 
and Mr. A usually drew post-dated and overdraft 
cheques. When someone tried to cash the 
cheques, the bank called Mr. A, who phoned the 
OCG member. The latter then often intimidated 
the creditors to withdraw the cheques.
Some financial ratios could not be calculated due 
to the lack of financial information available from 
national business registers and other private business 
information providers, although some case studies 
presented the characteristics described in Table 23. 
Box 38 describes a Dutch case study in which evidence 
of variability in terms of financing sources was found.
Box 38. Variability in financial sources of a company 
involved in the wholesale of mobile phones
Mr. A (OC member) acquired ALPHA, a company 
active in the wholesale of information and 
communication equipment, and changed its 
name and NACE code. During the first three 
months, the company had little wholesale trade 
and therefore low revenues. Afterwards, the 
revenues suddenly grew dramatically. In this 
period, the company sold goods to companies in 
other EU countries for over €5,000,000. None 
of this trades had been declared to the Tax 
Administration, thus committing tax fraud. The 
sales over the products that ALPHA had bought 
should have rendered around €1,000,000 in 
VAT for the Tax Administration.
The same analyses were replicated by distinguishing 
the infiltrated businesses on the basis of the driver 
of infiltration. Although the results are not significant 
in most cases, they highlight differences among 
businesses used for different purposes in terms of 
sources of financing (Table 24). For instance, high levels 
of financial debts were found in infiltrated companies 
involved in frauds, whereas the same businesses 
showed levels of other debts lower than those of their 
peer group.
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Table 24. Financing sources of infiltrated businesses by driver of OCG infiltration. Comparison with the peer group 
of non-infiltrated businesses75
Accounting level signals Money laundering
Formally legal 
activities
Fraud
Concealment of 
illegal activities
Low level of financial 
debts on total assets
Lower*** Lower Higher Lower***
Low level of debts Higher Lower Lower Lower
Low level of equity on 
total assets
Lower Higher Lower Higher
High other debts Higher Lower Lower Lower
High trade payables Higher Higher Higher Lower
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
11.2. Use of assets
An infiltrated business’s use of assets may be 
influenced by the type of company, i.e. whether the 
business is a productive or a shell business entity. 
Productive businesses aim to maximise their profits 
through (formally) legal activities. Therefore, like any 
other legal business, they are likely to invest the capital 
in buildings, machinery and other means of production. 
By contrast, legal businesses infiltrated with the aim 
of laundering money or committing frauds are likely to 
keep their assets in liquidity (e.g. cash, bank deposits) 
or other current assets (Catanzaro, 1988; Transcrime, 
2013b).
Businesses infiltrated by criminal groups to conceal 
criminal activities may also show levels of receivables 
and a number of debtors higher than the sector’s 
average if they use them to disguise outflows to OCG 
members or other companies controlled by the criminal 
group (Schneider, 2004; Transcrime, 2013b).
Table 25 summarises the hypotheses on the use of 
assets of infiltrated businesses and the main results of 
the comparison between infiltrated and non-infiltrated 
businesses.
Some of the hypotheses concerning the use of 
assets are confirmed by the analysis of the infiltrated 
businesses. For instance, businesses managed by 
organised criminals show levels of non-financial current 
credits (i.e. inventory) significantly higher than the peer 
group composed of legal, non-infiltrated businesses.
Organised criminals may prefer high levels of current 
assets and cash because they would facilitate 
them in liquidating the business in the case of a law 
enforcement investigation and avoiding the risk of 
asset confiscation. Should the criminals be aware of a 
financial investigation (e.g. thanks to tipping-off or other 
disclosure), they may try to sell the company assets 
before these are seized by the judicial authority, and 
move the resulting liquidity in safer places (e.g. offshore 
bank accounts).
Some financial ratios instead show a trend which is 
in contrast with the one expected from the review of 
the literature. This may be due to the fact that the 
hypotheses presented in Table 25 refer to shell and 
paper companies, i.e. companies with no production 
activities. However, many infiltrated businesses 
analysed in the study were productive businesses and 
were thus likely to be similar to legal companies in their 
use of assets.
75. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.
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Table 25. Use of assets of infiltrated businesses. Comparison with the peer group of non-infiltrated businesses76
OC drivers and/or 
needs
Assumptions Accounting level signals
Comparison with 
peer group
Significance 
level
Shell companies: 
no production and 
investments, use of 
the companies only for 
money laundering
Low levels of fixed assets
Low levels of fixed assets 
and non-current assets 
out of total assets
Higher (HP not 
confirmed)
n.s.
High levels of current 
assets
High level of current 
assets out of total assets
Lower (HP not 
confirmed)
n.s.
High level of cash and 
cash equivalents out of 
total assets
Higher (HP 
confirmed)
n.s.
High level of  trade 
receivables out of total 
assets
Higher (HP 
confirmed)
n.s.
High level of non-
financial current credits 
out of total assets
Higher (HP 
confirmed)
***
Shell companies: need 
to conceal outflow to 
OCG members and/or 
colluding companies
Use of receivables 
and debtors to screen 
outflows to members
High levels of trade 
receivables
Higher (HP 
confirmed)
n.s.
High levels of other 
debtors
Lower (HP not 
confirmed)
***
High levels of receivables 
and debtors
Lower (HP not 
confirmed)
***
False invoicing Use of false invoices 68% of case studies
Structuring and smurfing
Large financial 
transaction parcelled 
into a series of smaller 
transactions
16% of case studies
Deposits to foreign 
countries with 
low transparency 
requirements
Deposits to foreign bank 
accounts
24% of case studies
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
Table 26 presents the results for businesses infiltrated 
to commit frauds (N=37). Such businesses are often 
used to create complex ownership schemes rather than 
production activities, and their accounting documents 
present many of the characteristics expected from 
the literature. Low levels of fixed assets indicate that 
businesses infiltrated for frauds are unlikely to invest 
the capital in buildings, machinery and other means of 
production. High levels of trade receivables may instead 
conceal outflows to OCG members or other companies 
controlled by the criminal group (Box 39).
Box 39. Methods to drain money from an infiltrated 
business
A ‘Ndrangheta group was able to infiltrate a legal 
business involved in telemarketing, teleselling, 
and call centre activities in the North of Italy. 
The organised criminals used several methods 
to drain money from the company. First they 
imposed mafia collaborators as employees. Mr. 
A was employed as managing director, whereas 
other members of the criminal group were hired as 
unskilled workers. Second, they signed contracts 
to buy unspecified services with other companies 
controlled by the criminal group, in order to 
transfer the financial resources to the latter. 
76. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.
107
Table 26. Use of assets of businesses infiltrated for fraud. Comparison with the peer group of non-infiltrated 
businesses77
OC drivers and/or needs Assumptions Accounting level signals
Comparison 
with peer group
Significance 
level
Shell companies: 
no production and 
investments, use of the 
companies only for money 
laundering
Low levels of fixed 
assets
Low levels of fixed assets 
and non-current assets in 
total assets
Lower (HP 
confirmed)
n.s.
High levels of 
current assets
High level of current assets 
out of total assets
Higher (HP con-
firmed)
*
High level of cash and cash 
equivalents out of total 
assets
Lower (HP not 
confirmed)
n.s.
High level of trade 
receivables out of total 
assets
Higher (HP con-
firmed)
***
High level of non-financial 
current credits out of total 
assets
Higher (HP con-
firmed)
**
Shell or paper companies: 
need to conceal outflow 
to OCG members and/or 
colluding companies
Use of receivables 
and debtors to 
screen outflows to 
members
High levels of trade 
receivables
Higher (HP con-
firmed)
***
High levels of other debtors
Lower (HP not 
confirmed)
**
High levels of receivables 
and debtors
Higher (HP con-
firmed)
False invoicing Use of false invoices
92% of the sample of case stud-
ies
Structuring and 
smurfing
Large financial transaction 
parcelled into a series of 
smaller transactions
22% of the sample of case stud-
ies
Deposits to foreign 
countries with 
low transparency 
requirements
Deposits to foreign bank 
accounts
38% of the sample of case stud-
ies
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
Box 40. Rental services as a cover for transfer of 
illicit proceeds
Several Slovenian case studies involved bars 
and nightclubs used as covers for prostitution. 
The women mainly came from Ukraine and the 
Dominican Republic and could enter Slovenia 
legally. ALPHA was one of the businesses used 
to acquire the documents to employ foreign 
workers and procure foreign women for various 
night clubs across Slovenia. It was engaged in 
activities related to the provision of advisory 
and technical support and organisation of 
entertainment events.
The women were housed in various bars across 
Slovenia which had contracts for ‘business and 
technical cooperation’ with ALPHA, which billed 
the night bars monthly for the rent of dance 
floors located in those bars. In fact, the rent was 
a provision of income that managers of the bars 
were earning from prostitution by the women that 
ALPHA have provided them. The rent was based 
on the number of women provided to the bar and 
the volume of activity of these women. The police 
investigation discovered that from January 2007 
to early 2008 these clubs transferred €267,907 
to ALPHA.
77. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.
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The analysis of the case studies also shows that the use 
of false invoices is frequent in infiltrated businesses, with 
more than 90% of frauds with evidence of false invoicing. 
Box 41 describes a Dutch case study where false invoices 
were used to cover VAT frauds. Evidence of the use of 
offshore bank accounts was also found (Box 42).
Box 41. False invoices to cover VAT frauds in the 
Netherlands
In January 2009 nine people were brought to 
court because they were suspected of fiscal 
fraud. The criminal investigation revealed a 
case of MTIC VAT fraud that involved several 
companies active in the trade of cars and trucks. 
The buffer traders were the actual buyers of 
the vehicles from abroad. The criminal group 
was able to falsify the documents and give the 
impression that the vehicles were imported by 
BETA, who then sold them to GAMMA and DELTA 
and created the possibility to claim a 19% tax 
return. By means of a false invoice, BETA did not 
pay the due VAT and caused a loss to the state.
During the VAT fraud, in order to render a correct 
balance sheet, in many cases the payment for 
the purchased trucks abroad went partly ‘under 
the table’. The invoice from the foreign supplier 
directed to the defaulting trader included the 
‘white’ lower purchase price, while the bill of 
the missing trader addressed to the recipients 
indicated the total amount paid (white and 
black). This allowed the buyer to record the total 
purchase costs in the administration.
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ALPHA
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The Netherlands
Box 42. Use of offshore bank accounts to disguise 
the proceeds of a ‘carousel’ fraud
Two chains of bogus companies based in London 
were used to defraud HMRC of VAT on carbon 
credit trades through a series of ‘carousel’ 
frauds. Carbon credits were imported free of VAT 
into the UK by two missing traders, and resold 
to four buffer companies, which then sold them 
to a broker. The broker finally sold the carbon 
credits to legitimate companies to make the 
transactions look legal. All the companies were 
owned by the members of the same criminal 
group.
The fraud earned the group £38 million. The 
trades were make quickly via computers, while 
the proceeds of crime were moved offshore 
into banking platforms, particularly commercial 
banks in Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand. 
All the money went into one bank account, but 
there were internal ledgers used to allocate 
it between the sub-accounts of the traders. 
Therefore, the true nature of the transfers was 
effectively disguised and difficult to detect. 
Credits went through complex transaction chains 
on the books of various banks.
Box 43. Shared assets between two infiltrated 
companies
Between 2008 and 2010 two companies – a car 
recovery, storage and hire company (ALPHA) and 
a claims management and taxi hire company 
(BETA) – created an informal partnership to 
organise a ‘crash for cash’ scam that involved 
staging and voluntary causing car accidents and 
fabricating or manipulating circumstances.
According to police investigations, the two 
companies merged their activities and essentially 
worked as a single entity in order to place, layer 
and integrate cash obtained through fraud 
through personal and business bank accounts 
and obtain assets with the aim of legitimising 
cash gained from fraudulent insurance claims.
The two businesses crossed over and merged in 
many ways, not only with regard to their criminal 
activities. ALPHA paperwork was found on BETA 
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computers. ALPHA paid Christmas bonuses to 
the staff of BETA. The two owners signed off 
each other’s documents. The bank accounts 
were connected. The assets of the businesses 
were connected and mostly derived from fraud.
The land on which both businesses were located 
was jointly owned by the owners of the two com-
panies and was paid through a joint mortgage. 
The two companies shared the same premises 
until the claim management company moved its 
registered office and trading address to another 
city.
11.3. Profitability
The study of profitability may be made difficult due to 
the presence of accounting manipulations, as income 
statements are more easily and more often falsified 
than balance sheets to minimise the taxable income. 
Keeping this in mind, it is possible to formulate some 
hypotheses on the profitability of infiltrated businesses. 
Table 27 summarises the hypotheses on the profitabili-
ty of infiltrated businesses and the main results.
An infiltrated business’ profitability is influenced by the 
type of company, i.e. whether the business is a produc-
tive or a shell company. Productive companies are likely 
to be similar to legal businesses in terms of revenues 
and costs. However, businesses infiltrated by criminal 
groups can exploit competitive advantages guaran-
teed by the coexistence of formally legal activities and 
criminal methods (e.g. threats, corruption). Therefore, 
infiltrated businesses may be able to minimise their 
labour and production costs (Arlacchi, 2007; Fantò, 
1999; Transcrime, 2013b). The former can be reduced 
by not paying social security contributions, insurance, 
and overtime work; the latter can be minimised by using 
poor-quality materials.
Infiltrated companies may instead be used to conceal 
outgoing flows to the members of the criminal group 
who are hired as employees. In this case the salaries 
– and thus labour costs – are likely to be higher than 
the sector’s average (Schneider, 2004; Steinko, 2012; 
Transcrime, 2013b).
Finally, shell and paper companies are characterised by 
no or minimum productive activities (Catanzaro, 1988). 
At accounting level, this may result in low revenues or 
in revenues characterised by high variance across time 
(Transcrime, 2008c, 2013b).
Table 27. Profitability of infiltrated businesses. Comparison with the peer group of non-infiltrated businesses78
OC drivers and/or needs Assumptions
Accounting level      
signals
Comparison 
with peer group
Significance 
level
Productive companies: profit 
maximization and costs 
minimization through criminal 
methods
Costs minimization in 
the purchase of raw 
materials and services
Use of poor-quality 
materials
Higher (HP not 
confirmed)
n.s.
Minimization of        
production costs
Low production costs
Higher (HP not 
confirmed)
n.s.
Advantages from 
illegality and 
discouragement of 
competition
Profitability higher 
than the sector’s 
average
Higher (HP 
confirmed)
n.s.
Shell and paper companies: 
concealing and laundering of 
criminal resources
No productive activity
Low revenues and 
profitability
Lower (HP 
confirmed)
*
Concealment of 
cash outflows to OC 
members in the form of 
wages or as purchases 
of services
High levels of 
services costs or 
ones above the 
sector’s average
Higher (HP 
confirmed)
n.s.
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DCS data
78. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.
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Only one financial ratio used to assess the profitability 
of infiltrated companies provides statistically significant 
results. In general, companies controlled and managed 
by criminal groups are characterised by profits lower 
than those of their peer group of non-infiltrated 
businesses, regardless of the driver of infiltration. This 
may be partly due to the fact that infiltrated businesses 
often face economic difficulties, either because of the 
management by the members of the criminal group or 
because organised criminals target businesses with 
financial difficulties.
The accounting documents of infiltrated businesses 
do not allow analysis of personnel costs. Some case 
studies reported members of the criminal organisation, 
as well as relatives and friends, among the employees 
(Box 44). This may increase the weight of personnel 
costs in the profit and loss account of such companies. 
A few cases were also found of attempts to minimise 
production costs through the use of poor-quality 
materials (Box 45).
However, these results may be biased by the presence 
of accounting manipulations which, in the case of 
income statements, are easier and more frequent 
than in balance sheets. Further research should try to 
better address this issue, e.g. by analysing infiltrated 
businesses’ financial statements jointly with other 
financial and non-financial documents (e.g. judicial 
administrators’ reports) that can provide further details 
about the actual management of the company and its 
‘true’ financial figures.
Box 44. Salaries increase before bankruptcy to 
maximise salary guarantees
In 2011 a crime report was filed by the Social 
Insurance Agency in regard to several people 
connected to a company in the care assistance 
sector, ALPHA. 17 persons – both formal 
representatives and employees – were indicted 
for serious social benefit fraud, accounting 
fraud, and tax evasion.
ALPHA provided care assistance for people with 
physical and psychological disabilities, and was 
established in 2008 with the intent to commit 
fraud against the Social Insurance Agency. 
ALPHA was doing well financially and had a 
large number of employees. Whilst not a family 
business per se, many of the persons in leading 
positions were related.
It is believed that salaries were boosted prior 
to bankruptcy in order to maximise the salary 
guarantees paid when ALPHA became bankrupt. 
For instance, a 14-year-old care assistance 
earned 29,000 SEK per month. Four other 
under-aged assistants were employed by the 
company and 4.5 million SEK were paid in salary 
guarantees to employees.
Box 45. Minimisation of costs through the use of 
poor-quality materials
A Cosa Nostra clan was able to infiltrate the 
construction of a wind farm in the province of 
Messina. The clan exerted external influence 
over the decisions and the activities of ALPHA, 
the general contractor in charge of construction 
of the wind farm. In particular, the members of 
the criminal group could count on two collusive 
entrepreneurs as co-offenders. The construction 
companies involved in the works committed 
serious irregularities in the execution to save on 
the costs of the materials and increase their profit. 
For instance, the concrete used to construct 
the turbine foundations was of poor quality. 
Inadequate materials were also used to build 
the gabions and the reinforced earth structures 
that are normally used in civil engineering for the 
purpose of building fortification.
No significant differences were found on considering 
the drivers of OCG infiltration separately. Infiltrated 
businesses do not seem to have low personnel and 
production costs, although revenues are slightly higher 
than those of the peer group of legal, non-infiltrated 
companies. However, the profitability is lower than that 
of the peer group, indicating that infiltrated companies 
are often characterised by little or no production activity.
Box 46. Long-term management strategies and 
profitability of a company involved in assistance care
This case study regards assistance compensation 
fraud. The company ALPHA delivered care to 
disabled persons (clients). However, the hours 
spent on performing the care and the quality of 
the care were in some cases exaggerated. Unlike 
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many of the other Swedish cases, this company 
was used for a long time – three and a half 
years. Profitability was increased by the absence 
of minimum wages for care assistants and flat 
rates for each hour of approved assistance. 
Because this company was targeting immigrant 
families (both as clients and employees) with 
little knowledge of the benefit, salaries could 
be set low. In some cases the employees did 
not speak Swedish well, which reduced their 
chances of finding work elsewhere. 
The care was provided in the client’s home, 
which means that transparency was low. It 
was not unusual for family members to be 
both the legal guardians and care assistants of 
disabled relatives (often children), decreasing 
transparency further. Because employees at 
ALPHA also acted as translators for the clients 
in their dealings with the authorities, it was 
possible to control the information given both to 
the clients and the authorities. 
It is believed that salaries were boosted prior 
to bankruptcy in order to maximise the salary 
guarantees paid when ALPHA became bankrupt. 
One example is a 14-year old care assistant 
who on paper earned 29,000 SEK per month. 
4.5 million SEK were paid in salary guarantees 
to employees, but it should be noted that not all 
of the 300 employees participated in the fraud. 
The employees who only worked on paper also 
wrongfully qualified for unemployment benefits 
and received higher benefits when on parental 
leave or for sickness.
According to the investigation, some care 
assistants also worked as sellers, meaning 
that they recruited new clients. According to 
anonymous tip-offs to the Tax Authority, ALPHA 
offered 10,000 SEK as a ‘bonus’ or bribe to new 
clients, and 8,000 each month to the company 
hired to furnish the care assistance. 
There was also a second company, BETA, which 
was established with the purpose of lending 
money to the clients of ALPHA. Thus profit could 
be made from the lending activities; but it also 
tied the clients closer to ALPHA, created a feeling 
of gratitude and loyalty, and made it difficult 
to change to another company and report 
irregularities to the Social Insurance Agency.
Box 47. Evolution of a small taxi business
The performances of the businesses in the 
Slovenian case studies are diverse. Some did not 
even manage to become fully operational before 
they were deleted from registers, while others 
continued to function. In the case of company 
IOTA the latter holds true. 
IOTA started as a simple sole proprietorship 
taxi business that has also (at one time) been 
registered as amusement provider service. 
Around the time of the official opening of the 
business, the owner was prosecuted as an 
accomplice in an organised crime group engaged 
in smuggling people across the state border, and 
he had also provided some foreign women to a 
bar in Slovenia. These women were forced into 
prostitution and the owner of IOTA drove them to/
from clients. Because IOTA was a taxi business, it 
was also used as a cover (although the business 
was probably not directly set up with this intention) 
for transporting smuggled people across Slovenia. 
Despite the conviction and imprisonment of 
the owner, the business continued to prosper. 
With some occasional minor alternations to its 
name and expansion to providing airport shuttle 
services as well, the business grew from one 
employee to more than 10 officially employed79 
–  which by Slovenian standards is a sign of good 
management. The company developed to such 
an extent that it had all necessary requisites 
for use by public institutions as well: in fact, the 
profit earned from providing services to the public 
sector was substantial.  
Box 48. Profitability of two infiltrated businesses in 
the car recovery and claims management sector
This case study concerns the partnership 
between two British companies - a car recovery, 
storage and hire company (ALPHA) and a claims 
management and taxi hire company (BETA) – with 
the aim of conducting a ‘crash for cash’ scam.
79. It should be pointed out, however, that this number could not be verified 
on Zavod za pokojninsko in invalidsko zavarovanje [Office for Pension and 
Disability Insurance], which holds data on actual employment. However, on 
the other hand, student workers and sub-contractors (who frequently work 
in such businesses) would be excluded from the registers, even though they 
receive wages from a business entity.
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ALPHA recovered and stored the damaged cars 
and provided replacement cars, while BETA 
arranged insurance claims through two legal 
firms. The extent to which ALPHA also ran some 
sort of legitimate business is unclear, but the 
police maintain that it would not have been 
profitable without criminal activities. In fact, 
no turnover figures were supplied after the 
partnership between the two companies ended 
(when ALPHA was put under a restraint order in 
2010). This is an indication that the business 
could not be profitable without criminal activities 
and without the connection with BETA.
By contrast, BETA started as a legitimate company 
whose owner was self-educated in insurance 
claims and the hire and replacement of taxis. The 
turnover of the company in its first six months 
of activity are estimated at around £140,000. 
Fraudulent claims started on a smaller scale and 
increased after the recruitment of employees 
with specific skills and expertise in insurance 
claims. The criminal association with ALPHA was 
an opportunity to accelerate business further by 
making fraudulent claims related to accidents 
involving private cars. 
While the main aim of ALPHA was to exploit a 
particular business sector and use a sham 
company to profit from fraud, BETA did not 
necessarily need to resort to criminal activities 
for its economic survival. In fact, BETA was 
crucial for the survival of ALPHA, but not vice 
versa. Once the connection between the two 
companies was severed and the joint criminal 
activities limited, ALPHA collapsed while BETA 
continued to trade (allegedly) legally. 
The analysis of financial accounts has provided some 
useful information on the accounting red-flags that 
could allow to identify infiltrated businesses from non-
infiltrated ones. However, further research is needed in 
this field. Improvements could be possible by widening 
the sample and enriching the set of information to be 
analysed; in particular it is suggested to integrate the 
analysis of financial statements with other documents 
(e.g. reports by judicial administrators) which can 
provide more details about the actual financial 
management of the company.
Moreover, attention should be devoted to the fact 
that infiltrated companies may change management 
strategy over time, and this behaviour could be 
reflected also in accounting terms. In particular, as 
mentioned, it is possible that criminals could disinvest 
from the company as soon as they have the suspect 
of being under investigation: as a result, for example, 
they could start liquidating the company’s assets 
(with impact both in terms of income statement and 
balance sheet) or closing down business operations 
(resulting in a decrease of revenues and investments). 
Future research should necessarily add a time-series 
component to the analysis
12. Key inputs for a 
common risk assessment 
model80
Previous chapters have mapped OCG infiltration in Italy, 
the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, and they have analysed selected case studies 
to identify the infiltration process, and the control and 
management strategies of infiltrated businesses. The 
last step of Project ARIEL is to identify, on the basis of 
these results, risk factors (i.e. ‘red flags’ or ‘markers’) 
of organised crime infiltration that can be used in a risk 
assessment model of criminal infiltration.
The purpose of developing a common risk assessment 
model is twofold:
• To protect EU MS legitimate economies from OCG 
infiltration and from the misuse of legal businesses 
for illicit purposes;
•  To improve prevention and enforcement by identifying 
the factors facilitating and/or promoting OCG 
infiltration and help LEAs in enhancing the prevention 
of and the fight against organised crime.
Chapter 12 reviews past studies on the economy’s and 
market’s vulnerabilities to organised crime, identifies 
risk factors of OCG infiltration of legal businesses, and 
provides key inputs for the development of a common 
risk assessment model.
80. With the collaboration of Lorella Garofalo, Maurizio Lisciandra and Gi-
ulia Berlusconi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore-Transcrime, Italy).
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12.1 Risk assessment in organised crime 
research
Criminal organisations operate in different sectors of 
the legal economy that allow them to invest in, and 
launder profits from, illegal activities together with the 
provision of additional opportunities for extra gain. 
The infiltration process is often difficult to detect. The 
constant monitoring of changes in the legal economy, 
and its vulnerabilities that may be exploited by criminal 
organisations, could help anticipate the negative 
consequences and develop appropriate actions to 
recognise and prevent them.
Risk-assessment models are useful for assessing the 
extent to which a certain business sector, territory, 
or business is exposed to criminal infiltration. The 
existing risk-assessment models on organised crime 
can be grouped into three different categories: those 
evaluating the presence of organised crime groups in 
a given area; those concerned with the infiltration of 
such groups into the legitimate economy; and models 
focusing on a specific sector, i.e. OCG infiltration of 
public procurement.
Analysis of organised crime groups presence
A first group of risk assessment models comprises those 
that analyse the presence of organised crime groups in a 
given area or country. The ‘Composite Organised Crime 
Index’ developed by van Dijk (2007, 2008) combines 
data on the perceived prevalence of organised crime 
in a country, instrumental violence, grand corruption, 
money laundering and black economy. These variables 
are statistical ‘markers’ (2007, p. 40) of the organised 
crime presence in a country.
The perceived prevalence of organised crime is 
measured by the ‘Organised Crime Perception Index’, 
built with data on OCG activities, such as extortion, 
drugs, people and arms trafficking, as perceived by 
potential victims and independent experts. These 
data are gathered from the World Economic Forum 
victimisation surveys among the CEOs of larger 
companies and from the Merchant International Group 
assessment of organised crime risk.
Organised crime groups usually resort to violence as 
a means to resolve conflicts. Instrumental violence is 
measured through the rates of unsolved homicides by 
calculating the number of police-recorded homicides 
divided by the number of convictions for homicides. 
These data are drawn from the UN ‘Crime and Criminal 
Justice survey’.
‘Grand corruption’ refers to the corruption of high-
ranking public officers, judges and politicians. Bribes 
and benefits are given to a public official who can 
enable organised crime activities to be carried out or 
reduce the risk for criminals of being caught. A solid 
indicator of this marker is developed from data of the 
World Bank Institute. Data on money laundering and 
black economy are drawn from the World Economic 
Forum surveys among business executives. The 
assumption is that organised crime usually reinvests 
excess profits in the legitimate economy by means of 
financial operations in order to conceal the illicit source 
of the money. Moreover, organised crime groups also 
invest in shadow economies.
Data included in the Composite Organised Crime Index 
have been recalculated by dividing them by the highest 
score in the data series and multiplying by 100. All data 
are thus presented on a 100% scale.
The Composite Organised Crime Index is calculated at 
country level. The ‘Mafia Index’ (MI) instead assesses 
the presence of mafias across the Italian provinces 
(Calderoni, 2011). The methodology used for the 
creation of the index is based on three steps. The 
first defines the concept of ‘mafia’ and provides the 
operational definition comprising multiple dimensions. 
The second step is the selection of the indicators 
and variables most appropriate for each dimension 
according to specific criteria. The third step is creation 
of the Mafia Index by combining the variables selected.
The concept of ‘mafia’ has been divided into four main 
dimensions: presence of criminal groups providing 
illicit goods and services; use of violence, threat 
or intimidation; infiltration of the political system; 
infiltration of the economic system. On the basis of a 
systematic review of the literature on existing attempts 
to measure the presence of mafia in Italy, the author 
selected a number of possible indicators and related 
variables with which to measure the above dimensions. 
The selected and available variables were analysed 
according to three criteria: availability of data for a 
sufficiently long period of time;81 content validity; 82 and 
criterion validity.83
81. Because a mafia is an established and long-lasting system, measuring 
its presence in a given territory requires account to be taken of its persistent 
and continuous nature. Therefore, long time series are preferred for the 
analysis. 
82. ‘Content validity’ refers to how ‘the measure covers the full range 
of the concept’s meaning’ (Bachman & Schutt, 2010, p. 95). Therefore, 
each variable was checked for its content validity, in order to assess how it 
reflected one or more dimensions of the operational definition. 
83. ‘Criterion validity’ refers to how ‘the scores obtained on one measure 
can be compared to those obtained with more direct or already validated 
measure of the phenomenon (the criterion)’ (Bachman & Schutt, 2010, p. 
95). Therefore, each variable was analysed in order to verify its statistical 
correlation with the other variables.
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Only four variables fulfilled the three selection criteria 
and were included in the MI: mafia-type associations; 
mafia murders; city councils dissolved for mafia 
infiltration; assets confiscated from organised crime. 
Each of them covered a different dimension of the 
operational concept of ‘mafia’. In order to create the 
MI, the average of the annual rates (per 100,000 
inhabitants for mafia-type associations, murders and 
confiscated assets; per 100 city councils in the province 
for city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration) for each 
variable and for each province were calculated. The 
rates were then normalised, attributing the score of 
100 to the province with the highest average rate. The 
average of the scores for each indicator provided the 
final score for each province.
Analysis of infiltration of organised crime into the 
legitimate economy
The theory that the economic activities, both legal and 
illegal, move along a continuum (Smith, 1980) and that, 
therefore, their vulnerabilities to crime are determined 
by the specific characteristics of the economic sector 
was first developed by Albanese (1987). Albanese 
created a model to predict the level of risk of a company 
being infiltrated by organised crime. He identified six 
predictors which defined the vulnerability based on 
the previous literature, experience, and investigations 
carried out on businesses exposed to organised crime 
(Table 28). Albanese considered two different ways in 
which criminal infiltration of the legal economy can be 
assessed: the use of legal businesses as covers for 
illegal activities, and corruption.
Table 28. Preliminary predictive model on organised crime infiltration into legitimate business
Predictors Low risk High risk
Supply Few available small, financially weak 
businesses
Readily available small, financially weak 
businesses
Customers Elastic demand for product Inelastic demand for product
Regulators Difficult to enter the market Easy to enter the market
Competitors Monopoly/oligopoly controlled market Open market with many small firms
Patronage Entrepreneurs are professional managers Entrepreneurs are non-professionals ill-equipped 
to deal with business problems
Prior record No prior record of organised crime 
involvement in the market
Prior history of organised crime infiltration in the 
industry
Source: Albanese (1987)
This model has not been applied or further developed 
by other authors, and it has limitations. In particular, it 
does not consider the illegal use of legal instruments 
by organised crime groups, and it uses the same set of 
predictors for all the economic sectors, as if there were 
no significant differences among them. Therefore, the 
indicators identified by Albanese should be considered 
more as starting points for the creation of a model, 
rather than constituting a model in itself.
Rozekranz and Emde (1996) developed a conceptual 
model of analysis based on the preventive screening 
of economic sectors. The model focused on business 
processes rather than on businesses themselves. 
Their study proposed a division of crime activities 
among primary (basic illegal criminal activities), 
secondary (activities to generate profits, such as money 
laundering) and tertiary (investments). On the basis 
of this subdivision, the model is termed ‘PST’ (from 
primary, secondary and tertiary). These different forms 
of crime are linked to the specific characteristics and 
vulnerabilities of each business process.
The use of indicators (different according to the diverse 
forms of crime that may affect the sector) helps measure 
these elements. The indicators are chosen on the 
basis of the literature, interviews with representatives 
of government and the economy, empirical studies, 
case study analysis, laws and regulations. The model 
identifies indicators either facilitating or discouraging 
criminal activities. Each indicator should be weighted 
carefully when the model is applied to a specific 
economic sector.
The PST model is built starting from identification of the 
key phases of the business process, and the indicators 
assess the vulnerabilities to crime of each phase in the 
process (PST risk profile). However, Rozekranz and Emde 
did not provide specific guidelines for identification of 
indicators, and their model has not found any practical 
application.
The MAVUS model (Method for Assessment of the 
Vulnerability of Sectors), developed in 2005 by the 
Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy 
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(IRCP) of the University of Ghent and Transcrime – Joint 
research Centre on Transnational Crime is a method 
of analysis which aims at assessing the degree of 
vulnerability of the legitimate economic sectors to 
organised crime. It is based on a multidisciplinary 
approach comprising economic, sociological and 
criminological methodologies. In Europe, the model has 
been applied to diverse economic sectors such as the 
diamond industry, transport, music, pharmaceuticals, 
fashion, and waste management (Vander Beken, 2005, 
2007).
The MAVUS model is based on three different levels of 
analysis: macro, meso and micro. At the macro level it 
analyses the environment surrounding the economic 
sector; the meso level analyses the sector itself; while 
the micro level analyses the individual economic entity 
and its business processes. The application of MAVUS 
moves through two main steps, each of them divided 
into further steps:
• Descriptive phase
◦ Analysis of the sector (sector analysis);
◦ Analysis of the environment and the cluster around 
the sector (environmental scan and cluster analysis);
◦ Analysis of the economic entity and its business 
processes (reference model analysis).
•  Analytical phase
◦ Width scan;
◦ Depth scan.
In the descriptive phase, the first two steps involve 
the collection of information on the cluster around 
the sector (macro-level), the sector itself (meso-level), 
and the activities within the sector (micro-level). The 
data collected lead to the development of indicators 
and the construction of a reference model for the 
economic sector under investigation that describes 
how the business is organised. The third step 
(reference model analysis) deals with definition of the 
business’s structure: it analyses its business processes 
by collecting data on the operating rules that guide 
the choices and information derived directly from the 
sector.
The information gathered in the descriptive phase is 
used in the analytical phase to develop the vulnerability 
profile of the sector. In particular, the indicators 
identified from the information gathered at the macro 
and meso level are analysed to define a width profile of 
vulnerability of the entire sector (width scan). Analysis 
of the indicators identified at the micro level leads to 
the creation of an in-depth vulnerability profile of the 
business (depth scan).
The MAVUS model allows consideration to be made of the 
peculiarities of each sector with very detailed analysis. 
However, the high numbers of variables and phases/
steps involved make the model complex to apply.
The model developed by Albanese (2008) also 
considered illicit markets as the units of analysis. The 
purpose of this model was to assess the presence of 
organised crime groups in ‘areas that may or may not 
have a history of organised crime involvement’ (2008, 
p. 263).
Albanese aimed at assessing comparative risk levels 
of criminal activities and illicit markets. He considered 
that, if illegal activities are properly assessed and 
ranked, targeting these activities will make it possible 
to tackle the high-risk organised crime groups involved. 
Through this approach, Albanese wanted to identify 
higher-risk products and markets in order to identify 
where criminals could be caught.
Albanese identified three main categories of organised 
crime activities: provision of illicit services; provision of 
illicit goods; and infiltration of legitimate businesses. 
Each of these activities was further divided into more 
specific offences. The provision of illicit services 
encompasses:
• Commercialised sex (prostitution or pornography);
• Illegal gambling;
• Human trafficking;
•  Subcontracting to others (to provide services such as 
illicit dumping of waste, trafficking in human organs 
or protected animal species, or murder for hire).
The provision of illicit goods involves:
• Drug trafficking;
• Property theft (vehicles, art);
• Counterfeiting (identity documents, software, DVDs, 
weapons).
The infiltration of business includes:
• Extortion of business owners;
• Racketeering;
• Money laundering;
• Fraud.
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According to prior studies on illicit markets and 
organised crime (Albanese, 2001; Edwards & Gill, 
2002; Vander Beken, 2004; Wilkins & Casswell, 2003), 
supply, demand, regulators and competition are the 
fundamental dimensions for assessment of which 
markets are at higher risk. Each of these dimensions is 
further divided into specific indicators. Albanese’s model 
is made up of 10 risk factors (indicators) with which to 
assess organised crime risk. The model includes:
• Supply indicators: objective availability of the product 
or service; easily transported/sold;
• Regulation indicators: ease of entry into the market 
due to market regulations, skills needed, law 
enforcement capability and competence, and level of 
local government corruption; 
• Competition indicators: history of organised crime in 
the market; profitability; harm; 
• Demand indicators: current customer demand for the 
product; nature of the demand.
By analysing these indicators and using this model, it is 
possible to create a risk index of infiltration by organised 
crime of the economic sector under investigation. In the 
concrete application of the model, such indicators can 
be combined into a specific index for each sector. The 
information necessary for construction of the index can 
be found through analysis of case studies or through 
information obtained from the population, businesses, 
law enforcement agencies, and the analysis of national 
and local legislation. This last is carried out in order to 
verify the extent to which the regulation involuntarily 
facilitates the expansion of illegal markets for some 
products or services.
In 2011 Transcrime carried out the Me.Tri.C. project 
(Monitoring the Trentino Economy against the Risk 
of Crime), a first exploratory project with the purpose 
of analysing the vulnerabilities of the economic 
sector in the Italian province of Trento which might 
facilitate infiltration of the legal economy by criminal 
organisations. Two different risk models were created 
starting from identification of the risk factors: the first 
focused on the territory; whereas the second model 
focused on the economic sector. The risk factors were 
identified through the literature review on the topic, 
the analysis of case studies, and consultations with 
stakeholders. The risk factors were operationalised 
into indicators and proxy variables so that they could be 
directly measured.
Table 29 summarises the indicators and variables 
included in each model. 
Table 29. Me.Tri.C. model. Indicators and variables included in the Territory and Economic sector models
Indicator Variable
Territory
Small business
No. of small businesses (0-1 employee) over the total number of active 
businesses in the territory
Bankruptcy
No. of bankruptcies over the total number of active businesses in the 
territory
Business turnover
No. of new businesses over the total number of registered businesses 
in the territory
Economic crime index
No. of tax evaders over the resident population in the territory 
No. of taxation crimes (Law 74/2000) over the resident population in 
the territory
No. of money laundering crimes over the resident population in the 
territory
Organised crime index
No. of extortions over the resident population in the territory
No. of criminal associations over the resident population in the territory
No. of drug crimes over the resident population in the territory
Wealth index
Cost of houses per square metre over the resident population in the 
territory 
Amount of taxable income over the total number of taxpayers in the 
territory
Business structure
No. of business employees over the number of family employees in the 
territory
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Indicator Variable
Economic sector
Business structure 
static index
No. of small businesses (0-1 employee) over the total number of active 
businesses in a given economic sector 
No. of business employees over the number of family employees in a 
given economic sector
Business structure 
dynamic index
No. of bankruptcies over the total number of active businesses in a 
given economic sector
No. of new businesses over the total number of registered businesses 
in a given sector
Economic crime index 
of the sector
No. of tax evasions over the number of active businesses in a given 
economic sector 
No. of taxation crimes (Law 74/2000) over the number of active 
businesses in a given economic sector
Source: Transcrime (2013a)
The variables described above were combined in order 
to create the relative indicators. The score of each 
variable was normalized by assigning 100 to the highest 
value, considered as the reference score, whereas the 
other values were expressed as a function of it. The 
average value of all the variables’ scores referred to a 
given indicator provided the value of the indicator itself. 
The two final risk of infiltration indexes (Territory and 
Economic sector) were given by the average values of 
the indicators referred to each model.
Starting from the experience of the Me.Tri.C. project, 
Transcrime has developed a second model to assess 
the vulnerabilities of the legal economy to infiltration by 
organised crime (Transcrime, 2013b). Its name is Mo.Vu.S., 
and it aims at identifying the risk of infiltration by organised 
crime for twelve economic sectors at provincial level. 
The model consists of the combination of two different 
risk factors: the Territory (Rt), which is related to the 
characteristics of the territory that can facilitate infiltration 
by criminal organisations, and the Economic sector 
(Rs), determined by the characteristics of each sector at 
provincial level. Each risk factor was operationalised into 
different indicators and variables, which were chosen on 
the basis of the literature review, analysis of case studies, 
consultations with institutions and stakeholders.
Table 30. Mo.Vu.S. model. Indicators and variables included in the Territory and Economic sector risk factors
Indicator Variable
Territory
OC presence
No. of confiscated assets over the resident population in the province
No. of mafia murders over the resident population in the province
No. of charges for art. 416bis over the resident population in the province
No. of city councils and institutions dissolved for mafia infiltration in the 
province
Wealth
Amount of GDP per capita in the province
No. of cars with more than 2000 cc over the total number of cars in the 
province
Amount of taxable income over the total number of taxpayers in the 
province
Shadow economy
Amount of tax evasion over the amount of IRAP84 added value in the province
Ratio of the amount of tax collected over the amount of tax supposed to be 
collected (Tax Gap) in the province
No. of notifications of unusual transactions over the resident population in 
the province
Market structure
Expenditure on R&D in the province
Structural equipment index in the province
Amount of import + export over the amount of added value in the province
84.   IRAP is the acronym for the regional tax on productive activities. It is a tax on the net value of production generated by businesses. In particular, it is the 
income generated before costs for staff and for expenses and financial proceeds.
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Indicator Variable
Economic sector
Business size
No. of local units with up to 5 employees over the total number of local 
units in a given economic sector and province
Crisis
No. of bankruptcies over the total number of active businesses in a given 
economic sector and province
Competitiveness
No. of active businesses in a given economic sector and province over the 
resident population in the province  
Amount of added value in a given economic sector and province over the 
number of active businesses in the economic sector and province
Previous infiltration
No. of confiscated businesses in a given economic sector and province 
over the number of active businesses in the economic sector and province
Source: Transcrime (2013b)
The variables were normalised by assigning the score 
100 to the province with the highest value among all 
provinces analysed and scores proportionally smaller 
to the other provinces, up to 0 for the province with 
the lowest value. Each indicator was obtained by 
calculating the arithmetic mean of the normalised 
variables. Subsequently, this score was normalised 
following the same procedure as the one applied 
to transform the variables. The final Territory and 
Economic sector risk of infiltration indexes (Rt and 
Rs) were given by the aggregation of their respective 
normalised indicators, which were combined using the 
method of the generalised mean. Subsequently, the 
values thus obtained for each sector and for each of 
the 107 provinces were normalised, attributing 100 to 
the highest value and scores proportionally lower for 
the provinces with the lowest value.
Analysis of the infiltration of organised crime in the 
public procurement
Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003) tested the link between 
organised crime and corruption growth in the public 
sector in a large number of countries. The authors 
created an index combining objective factors linked to 
complex crimes in order to measure the prevalence of 
organised crime. The presence of organised crime in a 
country was assessed by means of indicators deriving 
from elements contained in investigations conducted 
by law enforcement agencies, as well as in the UN 
Organised Crime Convention and its protocols. Since 
the data from official police records do not provide 
reliable information on the extent of organised crime 
activities in a given country, the authors used the World 
Economic Forum business survey to measure the costs 
imposed by organised crime on firms in order to assess 
the extent of business victimisation. They ranked the 
countries according to this indicator and then correlated 
it with indices for corruption and violence (homicide). 
Thereafter, they added further national data available 
on the main activities of organised criminal groups, 
such as credit card fraud and trafficking in drugs, 
persons, firearms, stolen cars and cigarettes. Therefore, 
the authors developed a composite index including 
indicators of five main activities (human trafficking, 
firearms, stolen cars and cigarettes, and fraud) and 
four secondary factors (costs of business, extent of the 
informal economy as a proportion of gross domestic 
product, violence and money laundering). 
Transcrime (2008c) has developed a model to analyse 
infiltration by organised crime of public procurement 
called Ris.I.C.O. (Risk of Infiltration by Organised Crime). 
This is an analytic and early warning tool with the 
purpose of preventing infiltration by organised crime of 
public procurement. The model assesses, on the basis 
of scientific evaluations and assumptions, whether a 
given public procurement is likely to be infiltrated. In 
order to create the model, several markers for the risk 
of infiltration by organised crime in public procurement 
were identified, according to interviews with national 
authorities, prefectures, review of the existing 
legislation and the analysis of several case studies. 
The markers were operationalised in indicators, which 
were grouped into five risk profiles: territory; contract; 
business, business staff; and other risk indicators.
The Ris.I.C.O. model consists of two levels of risk 
evaluation:
• Quantitative, which is subdivided in rapid evaluation 
and detailed evaluation;
• Qualitative. 
The quantitative evaluation is carried out by combining 
the indicators relative to the territory, contract, business 
and business staff. They are grouped into two main risk 
factors: the territory, and the business (which includes 
indicators on contract, business and business staff). 
The scores for the territorial risk and business risk are 
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both expressed in percentage values. The final risk of 
infiltration index is defined as follows:
risk of infiltration index = α · territory risk + (1 - α) · 
business risk
The qualitative evaluation further analyses the risk 
of infiltration by organised crime scored by the first 
quantitative evaluation. It is performed by counting 
how many of the ‘other risk indicators’ are present 
in the analysis. The score is a number expressed as 
a fraction (e.g. 2/10), which indicates the number of 
indicators found to be relevant to the risk of infiltration 
by organised crime.
12.2 Infiltration risk factors
Infiltration risk factors are those features of the 
territory, business sector and legal business that favour 
infiltration or highlight an already-infiltrated business.
The case studies selected for the analysis are not 
representative of the totality of infiltrated businesses, 
but are only examples of the infiltration dynamics. 
Furthermore, they are based on the analysis of criminal 
infiltration in five EU MS. Therefore, the risk factors 
listed below highlight factors that may influence the risk 
of infiltration, but they do not represent a full list of risk 
factors.
Four types of risk factors can be identified: those 
referring to the territory where infiltration takes place; 
those related to the business sector; and risk factors 
linked to the main characteristics of a legal business, 
i.e. its ownership structure and its economic and 
financial management.
Territory
Risk factors can be linked with characteristics of 
the territory. Territories with past evidence of OCG 
infiltration, or characterised by the presence of criminal 
groups, high levels of shadow economy and corruption, 
and low levels of regulation are more vulnerable to OCG 
infiltration of legal businesses.
Past evidence of OCG infiltration
Territories with high levels of evidence of past infiltration 
may be more vulnerable to OCG infiltration in the future. 
Criminal groups may favour territories with which they 
are familiar because of past cases of criminal infiltration 
into legal businesses. In the five countries covered by 
the project, these territories include Southern Italian 
regions, Lombardy and Lazio (Italy); North and South 
Holland, and Limburg (the Netherlands); Western 
Slovenia, and particularly Osrednjeslovenska; the 
regions of Stockholm; Sydsverige; Västsverige in 
Sweden; Scotland and the London area in the UK.
High presence of OCGs
Territories with a historical, well-rooted presence of 
organised crime groups are likely to present evidence 
of the involvement of such groups in legal markets. 
Territories with a stable presence of criminal groups are 
thus vulnerable to the criminal infiltration of legitimate 
businesses. This includes both territories historically 
connected with organised crime (e.g., Southern Italy, 
South-Western Scotland) and regions where police 
operations have concentrated in the past years (e.g. 
Lombardy).
Regions with large urban areas
Evidence of OCG infiltration concentrates in regions 
with large cities, where the largest cities of the country 
and the main transport facilities (e.g., harbours and 
airports) are located, and where the vast majority of 
economic activities are conducted. Regions with large 
urban areas thus seem to be more vulnerable to OCG 
infiltration of legal businesses. In the five countries 
covered by the project, these regions include: Lombardy 
and Lazio (Italy); North and South Holland (the 
Netherlands), Western Slovenia; the Stockholm and 
Malmö regions in Sweden; the London area in the UK.
High level of infrastructural equipment
High levels of infrastructural development (i.e. the 
presence of motorways) seem to be associated with the 
presence of OCG infiltration into legal businesses. Like 
legal entrepreneurs, organised criminals exploit the 
industrial, commercial, financial, and banking systems 
to conduct their business activities, and thus benefit 
from the presence of developed infrastructures.
High level of shadow economy and corruption
The evidence of OCG infiltration seems greater in 
those regions characterised by high levels of shadow 
economy and corruption. The presence of widespread 
corruption and market illegalities can be exploited by 
criminal groups because it facilitates illicit activities and 
reduces the risks of being reported to law enforcement 
agencies.
Business sector
Risk factors can be linked with characteristics of the 
business sector. Sectors with past evidence of OCG 
infiltration, or characterised by low levels of competition 
and openness to foreign investments and low levels of 
technology, may favour the criminal infiltration of legal 
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businesses. Other risk factors include a small average 
company size, low barriers to entry, and a weak or 
developing regulation.
Past evidence of OCG infiltration
Business sectors with high levels of evidence of past 
infiltration may be more vulnerable to OCG infiltration 
in the future. Ten business sectors show evidence of 
criminal infiltration in legitimate businesses in the five 
EU MS. These include the construction industry, which 
is strongly deregulated and often has an inefficient 
control system. Furthermore, the subcontracting 
procedures and agreements on the purchase of goods 
and services make it vulnerable to infiltration.
The wholesale and retail trade sector is important for 
the concealment of criminal activities and for money 
laundering. The vulnerability of this sector is mainly due 
to the fact that it includes multiple sub-sectors that can 
be exploited for different types of illegal activities, such 
as counterfeiting (as in the case of the wholesale and 
retail trade of clothing and textiles) or drug trafficking 
(as in the case of import/export companies).
Other business sectors with evidence of criminal 
infiltration in the five EU MS are: transportation; hotels, 
bars and restaurants, real estate activities; financial 
and insurance activities, and clubs and gambling 
activities.
Low level of competition and openness to foreign 
investments
Sectors characterised by inelasticity of demand and 
where the number of competitors is limited (i.e. sectors 
with low openness to international investments and low 
competition) are more vulnerable to OCG infiltration. 
Criminal groups, in fact, favour business sectors where 
the competition with other legal businesses is low.
Low level of technology
Sectors characterised by low technology seem to be 
vulnerable to OCG infiltration, which is associated 
with business sectors such as bars and restaurants, 
construction, transportation, retail trade. Traditional 
activities, or activities with low technological levels, 
may be vulnerable to infiltration by criminal groups 
because they ensure high profits without entailing high 
research and development costs, or requiring specific 
knowledge.
Company size
OCGs seem to favour business sectors with a small 
average company size. This is also reflected in the 
decision to infiltrate a specific business. Indeed, OCGs 
frequently infiltrate small, unlisted companies to reduce 
the visibility and minimise the risk of controls.
Low barriers to entry
Business sectors with low barriers to entry are favoured 
by criminal groups. These include: few requirements to 
set up a company (e.g., registration with the national 
business registry and absence of disqualifications from 
being a company director); no need for a licence (e.g. in 
the wholesale and retail trade, no need for an import 
licence except for particular goods); low initial costs 
(e.g. low costs of equipment).
Weak or developing regulation
OCGs may also exploit sectors with weak or changing 
regulations that allow easy concealment of criminal 
activities. Sectors characterised by weak or developing 
regulation (e.g. gambling activities; renewable energy; 
transportation) are thus vulnerable to criminal 
infiltration. For instance, the European Union’s VAT 
system is vulnerable to organised fraud schemes, as 
several case studies showed. In some countries, tax 
reductions for specific works may also create incentives 
to OCG infiltration (e.g. tax reduction for the renovation 
of properties in Sweden).
Ownership structure of legal business
A third category of risk factors includes characteristics 
of a business’s ownership structure. Limited 
companies show higher levels of OCG infiltration 
compared with other legal forms. The characteristics 
of the shareholders and the directors may instead 
help highlight an ongoing infiltration. OCGs often use 
straw men chosen from among their relatives and may 
include very young or old people. The use of corporate 
shareholders and complex ownership schemes may 
also indicate a case of infiltration, although in some 
business sectors it may be a common strategy.
Limited companies
Limited companies seem to be the legal form preferred 
by organised criminals in all the countries covered by 
the project. First, the requirement of share capital for 
limited liability companies is often minimal. Second, 
this legal form favours the concealment of criminal 
activities and reduces the impact of law enforcement 
intervention. Indeed, it allows for great fragmentation 
of the share capital, thus reducing the potential impact 
of seizure and confiscation and making it more difficult 
for law enforcement agencies to identify the members 
of the organisation.
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Characteristics of shareholders
The use of straw men as company shareholders is a 
strategy commonly used by OCGs to conceal their 
criminal activities and hide the identity of the ultimate 
beneficial owners (which, in fact, are the members 
of the organisation itself). The use of figureheads is 
particularly frequent if the members of the OCGs have 
criminal records which prevent them from participating 
directly in the ownership and management structure of 
the infiltrated business.
Persons frequently used as nominee shareholders 
include the relatives of OCG members, and in 
particular very young or very old people. The age of 
the owners and directors of a certain company cannot 
be considered as a single risk of OCG infiltration into 
legitimate businesses. Instead, it should be evaluated 
in conjunction with other risk factors. 
A similar consideration applies to the gender of 
shareholders and directors. In some countries or 
regions, where female unemployment is high and 
women rarely occupy top management positions within 
companies, the presence of female shareholders 
or directors may represent a red flag of infiltration. 
Women, in fact, were frequently included among the 
shareholders of infiltrated businesses in two of the 
countries analysed.
Corporate shareholders, complex corporate ownership 
schemes and cross-shareholding
The presence of corporate shareholders may be a risk 
factor of OCG infiltration into legal businesses. The 
creation of large networks of interconnected companies 
may be instrumental to the commission of complex 
fraudulent schemes, as well as other illicit activities.
Risk factors also include the creation of complex 
corporate ownership schemes and the frequent change 
of company details. The former involve the creation of 
large networks of interconnected companies among 
each other with cross-shareholding; the latter includes: 
frequent transformations of company details (e.g. 
registered address, name), transfers of business lines 
or business branches, dissolution of a company and 
transfer of its activities to a newly-incorporated one. 
Frequent changes of registered address, name and 
shareholders, and transfers of business branches was 
found in several case studies analysed during the project.
Size and age
A final risk factor related to the ownership structure of 
businesses includes characteristics of the company 
profile such as size or age. Small- and medium-sized 
businesses are more frequently infiltrated by organized 
criminals because they are easier to control and 
manage. Similarly, OCGs may sometimes decide to set 
up new companies instead of infiltrating already existing 
ones in order to avoid law enforcement controls. These 
characteristics, if considered on their own, cannot be 
regarded as certain risk factors of criminal infiltration. 
Nonetheless, if combined with other risk factors, they 
can be useful in identifying suspicious and vulnerable 
companies.
Financial management of legal business
Finally, risk factors linked with the financial management 
of legal business can be identified, although it is 
difficult to find management strategies that are 
reflected unambiguously in the financial statements. 
To further complicate matters, it should be pointed 
out that, in about one third of the case studies (32%), 
evidence of accounting manipulation was found in the 
judicial documents. As a consequence, the information 
reported in such documents may not correspond to the 
actual financial situation of the infiltrated businesses.
Low level of financial debt
Low levels of financial indebtedness of infiltrated 
businesses – measured as current financial liabilities, 
medium/long term financial liabilities, and cash and 
cash equivalents on net equity – may indicate that the 
legal businesses do not need to resort to loans from 
banks and other financial institutions to finance their 
activities and may be infiltrated by OCGs.
High level of current assets
The analysis of infiltrated businesses confirmed that 
businesses managed by organised criminals show 
levels of non-financial current credits (i.e. inventory) 
significantly higher than those of the peer group 
composed of legal, non-infiltrated businesses. Legal 
businesses infiltrated with the aim of laundering money 
or committing frauds do not undertake production 
activities and keep their surplus mainly in current assets 
(e.g., cash, bank deposits). High levels of current assets 
may thus help identify legal companies controlled and 
managed by criminal groups.
Low revenues and profitability
Only one financial ratio used to assess the profitability 
of infiltrated companies provides statistically significant 
results. In general, companies controlled and managed 
by criminal groups are characterised by profits lower than 
those of their peer group of non-infiltrated businesses, 
regardless of the driver of infiltration. Therefore, low 
revenues and profitability can be included in the risk 
factors with which to identify OCG infiltration of legal 
businesses.
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12.3. Towards a common risk-assessment 
model
The mapping of OCG infiltration in Italy, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and United Kingdom, and the 
analysis of selected case studies, helped identify 
criminal infiltration risk factors, i.e. those features of 
the territory, business sector, and legal business that 
favour infiltration or highlight an already-infiltrated 
business, and that can be used in a risk assessment 
model of criminal infiltration.
Risk factors need to be operationalised and transformed 
into risk indicators to be measurable and to be included 
in a risk assessment model. Data on crime trends, the 
legal economy and legal businesses, and other socio-
economic data at European and national level, have 
been reviewed to identify a measurement for each risk 
factor.
Table 31 presents the list of risk factors, a proposal 
for their operationalisation, and information on the 
availability of data at European and national level. 
As regards risk factors, they can be grouped into 
four categories: territory, business sector, ownership 
structure, financial management. Data collected by 
the Eurostat or other international institutions provide 
useful information with which to create risk indicators. 
On the contrary, national data may be more detailed but 
they often present problems of comparability across 
countries.
Table 31. Operationalisation of risk factors
Dimension Risk factor Proxies Source
Territory
Past evidence of OCG infiltration No. references of OCG infiltration DCI
Presence of OCGs
No. active OCGs Data not available 
for all the five EU 
MS and/or not 
comparable among 
each other85
OCG-related crimes
Large urban areas
Level of urbanisation
EUROSTAT
No. inhabitants per square km
High level of infrastructural 
equipment
Motorways and rails EUROSTAT
High level of shadow economy
Shadow economy on the GDP 
(%)
Herwartz et al. (2013)
High level of corruption Extent of corruption
European Quality of 
Iife Index (2013)
Business sector
Past evidence of OCG infiltration No. references of OCG infiltration DCI
Low level of competition
Herfindahl-Hirschman index ORBIS
Gross added value/No. 
enterprises
EUROSTAT
Low level of openness to foreign 
investments
Foreign control of enterprises/
No. enterprises
EUROSTAT
Low level of technology
Employment in technology and 
knowledge-intensive sectors (%)
EUROSTAT
Business enterprise R&D 
expenditure (euro per inhabitant)
Small average company size
No. employees/No. enterprises EUROSTAT
No. enterprises with max. 1 
employee/No. enterprises
ORBIS
Low barriers to entry - -
Weak or developing regulation - -
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Dimension Risk factor Proxies Source
Ownership 
structure of legal 
business
Limited company Legal form
National Business 
Register86 and/or 
ORBIS
Characteristics of shareholders 
(young/old, female shareholders)
Family ties of the shareholders -
Age of the shareholders National Business 
Register and/or 
ORBISGender of the shareholders
Corporate shareholders Legal person as shareholder
National Business 
Register and/or 
ORBIS
Complex corporate ownership 
schemes and cross-shareholding
Large networks of interconnected 
companies
ORBIS
Frequent change of company 
details
Frequent change of registered 
address or name 
Transfer of business lines or 
branches
Dissolution of a company
Transfer of company’s activities 
to a newly-incorporated company
Small company size Business size
National Business 
Register and/or 
ORBIS
Financial 
management of 
legal business
Low level of financial debt
Current financial liabilities 
National Business 
Register and/or 
ORBIS
Medium/long term financial 
liabilities
Cash and cash equivalents on 
net equity
High level of current assets Non-financial current credits
National Business 
Register and/or 
ORBIS
Low revenues and profitability
Revenues National Business 
Register and/or 
ORBISProfitability
Source: Transcrime elaboration
86. Italy: Infocamere/registro delle imprese. The Netherlands: Kamer van 
Koophandel. Slovenia: Ajpes. Sweden: Bolagsverket. United Kingdom: Com-
panies House.
85. Italy (NUTS 2, 3): mafia presence index; OC and mafia type crimes rate; 
confiscated assets. The Netherlands (NUTS 2): real estate properties seized 
from OCGs. Slovenia (NUTS 2 and 3): criminal charges for organised crime. 
Sweden: no available data. United Kingdom (NUTS 2): no available data.
Finally, the risk of infiltration can be identified as a 
function of the features of the territory (Rter), business 
sector (Rsec), the business’s ownership structure 
(Rown), and financial management of legal businesses 
(Rman), as shown in Figure 51.
Figure 51. Risk model of OCG infiltration of legiti-
mate businesses
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Rsec Rown
Rter RmanRtot
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13. Conclusions
Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organised Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a 
Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries analysed the methods 
used by different OCGs to infiltrate, control, and manage 
legitimate businesses in five selected EU member 
states (Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, 
United Kingdom), and to identify the risk factors of 
OCG infiltration for the development of a common risk 
assessment model to detect the infiltration of legitimate 
businesses by criminal groups.
Despite limitations due to availability of information 
on the infiltration process and infiltrated companies, 
and to the focus on five EU MS, the project provided 
an unprecedented cross-national comparative analysis 
of criminal infiltration of legitimate businesses in five 
countries. It provided insights into the infiltration of 
legitimate businesses by organised crime groups. 
In particular, it identified the vulnerabilities of legal 
businesses to OCG infiltration by analysing the modi 
operandi, and the control and management strategies 
of organised criminals. The final result is a list of risk 
factors to be included in a common risk assessment 
model to detect OCG infiltration of legal businesses.
However, both data and the analyses could be improved. 
First, the scope of the analysis could be widened, and 
data and case studies from other European countries 
could be included. This would yield a wider variety 
of case studies to be analysed. A larger number of 
case studies could also enable analyses on a smaller 
sample of all case studies and infiltrated businesses, 
e.g. businesses infiltrated to fulfil a specific driver. This 
would allow better identification of the differences 
among infiltrated businesses in terms of drivers of 
infiltration, as well as other variables.
Finally, the risk factors could be verified and translated 
into risk indicators to be used to develop the common 
risk assessment model. The model should then be 
tested on a sample of infiltrated and legal, non-infiltrated 
businesses, and applied. Indeed, Project ARIEL is only 
the first step towards the development of a common 
risk assessment model of OCG infiltration. The model 
would make it possible to move from contrast to risk 
assessment, and to prevent organised crime infiltration 
of legal businesses.
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